WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XLI, Number 1 October 1988

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD
Henry S. Bienen, *Chairman*
Cyril E. Black, John Lewis Gaddis, Chalmers Johnson,
Timothy J. McKeown, Sadako Ogata, Condoleezza Rice,
John Gerard Ruggie, Theda Skocpol, Tang Tsou, Stephen Van Evera,
John A. Vasquez, Raimo Väyrynen, Kenneth N. Waltz, M. Crawford Young

Editors: Nancy Bermeo, Henry S. Bienen, Richard D. Challener,
Robert G. Gilpin, G. John Ikenberry, Kenneth A. Oye
Atul Kohli (*Review Articles*)
Associate Editors: David M. Bachman, Kent E. Calder, George W. Downs,
Michael W. Doyle, Aaron L. Friedberg, Mark Gersovitz, Charles A. Kupchan,
A. James Mcadams, Barry J. Nalebuff, Paul E. Sigmund, Robert L. Tignor,
Stephen M. Walt, John Waterbury
Executive Editors: Elsbeth G. Lewin, Yoma Ullman

The editors invite submission of articles (up to 10,000 words, including footnotes) bearing upon problems in international relations and comparative politics. Manuscripts and footnotes should be doublespaced throughout and submitted in triplicate, together with an abstract of approximately 125 words. Footnotes should only cite sources; they should be numbered consecutively and placed at the end of the manuscript. Address: WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08544.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within three months from date of submission. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of readers' and editors' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for transmitting readers' evaluations to authors of rejected manuscripts. Exceptions may be made if, in the opinion of the editors, such comments contain substantive suggestions for improvement. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere, or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material should be sought from Permissions Department, WORLD POLITICS, P.U.P., 41 William St., Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, P.U.P., 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648.
U.S. and Canada—Individuals: $18.00 per year; $29.00 for two years; $43.00 for three years. Institutions: $27.50 per year. Single copies: $8.25.
Foreign—Individuals: $22.50 per year; $36.50 for two years; $53.50 for three years. Institutions: $34.00 per year. Please add $5.00 per year for foreign postage and handling. Single copies: $10.50 plus $1.00 for postage and handling.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648.

Advertising: Advertising Dept., Princeton University Press, 41 William St., Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS), Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886-1974 (RSJ), PAIS Bulletin, Social Science Index*, and *Monthly Periodical Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents, International Bibliography of Periodical Literature (IBZ)*, and *International Bibliography of Book Reviews (IBR)*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts*, and *Political Science Abstracts*.

Copyright © 1988 by The Trustees of Princeton University

WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648. Vol. XLI, No.1, October 1988. Second class postage paid at Trenton, N.J., and additional mailing offices. Send address changes to Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. XLI • October 1988 • No. 1

CONTENTS

Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict — *Bruce Bueno de Mesquita* and *David Lalman* — 1

The Distribution of Wars over Time — *Edward D. Mansfield* — 21

Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of Indonesia — *Richard Robison* — 52

Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics — *James D. Morrow* — 75

Review Articles

"The Spirit of the Sierra Maestra": Five Observations on Writing about Cuban Foreign Policy — *Tony Smith* — 98

Dilemmas of Change in Mexican Politics — *Kevin Middlebrook* — 120

The Contributors — ii

Abstracts — iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The author of *The War Trap* (1981) and (together with David Newman and Alvin Rabushka) *Forecasting Political Events: Hong Kong's Future* (1985), he is currently working with David Lalman on a book-length study tentatively entitled *War and Reason*, which focuses on war and its causes.

David Lalman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland. His joint paper with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Arms Races and the Opportunity for Peace" (*Synthese*, 1988) is a precursor to *War and Reason*, their book in progress.

Richard D. Mansfield is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently writing a dissertation on the timing and determinants of war.

Richard Robison is Associate Professor in Politics and Dean of the School of Humanities at Murdoch University, Western Australia. He is the author of *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (1986) and co-editor of *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change* (1985) and *Southeast Asia in the 1980s: The Politics of Economic Crisis* (1987). His current research focuses on industrial policy in Indonesia and Australia.

James D. Morrow is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate of the Center for Political Studies at The University of Michigan. He is currently working on a project examining the effects of American domestic politics on arms control bargaining.

Tony Smith is Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. His most recent book is *Thinking Like a Communist: State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba* (1987). At present, he is working on a book entitled *America and the Struggle for Democracy Worldwide since 1945*.

Kevin J. Middlebrook is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is co-editor of *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis* (1986), and is currently completing a book on the political economy of Mexican organized labor.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by The Trustees of Princeton University for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of .05 per page is paid directly to CCC, 21 Congress St., Salem, MA 01970. 0043-8871/88 $0.00 + .05

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict

By B. BUENO DE MESQUITA and D. LALMAN

Systemic theorists emphasize the interplay of the distribution of power, the number of poles, and their tightness in predicting the occurrence of major-power war. The authors link individual-level incentives to these systemic constraints as factors that might affect the likelihood of war. They believe that their model specification is more comprehensive than any prior effort to evaluate the impact of structural attributes on the risk of major-power war. Empirical results from the individual-level prespective are encouraging when one examines European crises from 1816 to 1965, but there is no evidence that decision makers were significantly constrained by variations in the structural attributes. Neither the distribution of power nor the number or tightness of poles appears to influence the risk of war.

The Distribution of Wars over Time

By E. D. MANSFIELD

Much of the empirical research on war has been conducted using only one of a number of data sets that have been compiled by leading scholars of international politics. In view of the low correlation among the data sets, however, one must be cautious in choosing between them for whatever task is at hand. The preliminary findings indicate that, regardless of which data set is used, many of the central tests of important hypotheses concerning Kondratieff waves, international trade, and hegemony and war yield much the same results.

Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: the case of Indonesia

By R. ROBISON

In the past three decades, the Suharto regime has presided over the rapid industrialization of Indonesia and the development of its capital-owning classes. A complex relationship between state and capital has emerged, based upon structural factors (the need to maintain investment, economic growth, and a revenue base) as well as instrumental factors (the involvement of officials in business as state managers of capital and private investors). Recently, however, significant tensions have emerged between the interests of the regime and its officials on the one hand, and the interests of various elements of the capital-owning classes on the other, in response to broader structural pressures for economic change.

These tensions and pressures are a challenge to the pact of domination between state officials and their corporate allies, the system monopolies and protection from which corporate capital emerged, and the nature of political domination exerted by officials over the state apparatus. Although the growing social and economic power of the capital-owning classes is not being converted into formal instrumental control over the state apparatus, economic strategies and political and economic alliances are being restructured, resulting in important shifts in the nature of Indonesian authoritarianism.

Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics

By J. D. MORROW

This paper analyzes the implications of social choice theory for the study of world politics. A view of the world system as a social choice mechanism leads to the observation that the outcomes of world politics are determined neither by structure nor by preferences alone, but rather by their interaction. Structural change occurs only when the actors cannot achieve their preferences through the current system. Three particular social choice mechanisms are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analyzed to determine which conditions of Arrow's theorem they violate. The argument is illustrated by examining two salient theoretical works, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* and Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics*. The critique of Waltz illustrates that structure alone cannot determine outcome; the critique of Gilpin examines how structural change occurs in world politics and underlines the importance of preferences in such changes.

"The Spirit of the Sierra Maestra": Five Observations on Writing about Cuban Foreign Policy

By T. SMITH

For a variety of reasons, explanations of Cuban foreign policy lack in persuasiveness. Some authors adopt a kitchen-sink approach in which any number of factors are adduced to explain Cuban behavior, but they do not pay adequate attention to how these various pieces fit together into a coherent whole. Other writers concentrate on a single factor to explain Cuba's globalism, but in the process load more explanatory power than it can bear onto a sole variable. Still others have a penchant for prescribing proper foreign policy for the United States, with the result that the study of Cuban policy in its own terms is often shortchanged. Only by studying the character, world view, and charismatic influence of Fidel Castro can a center of gravity be found for the study of Cuban foreign policy.

Dilemmas of Change in Mexican Politics

By K. MIDDLEBROOK

Despite the past resilience of Mexico's authoritarian regime, the severity of the country's post-1982 economic crisis raises major questions concerning the future direction of Mexican politics. This review examines recent developments affecting two key members of the governing revolutionary coalition, the political elite and organized labor. The political elite's unity is potentially threatened by shifts in education and recruitment patterns, and widespread uncertainty regarding Mexico's economic future has produced the most serious intra-elite division since the early 1950s. Prolonged economic crisis has also placed severe strains on state-labor relations, and the government's implementation of a new development strategy may lead to a substantial redefinition of organized labor's overall position in the Mexican regime. These changes pose significant challenges to the political elite's ability to preserve a broad-based governing coalition and political openness while managing the economic crisis and conflicting development priorities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In-depth explorations of Eastern cultures and their histories

THE SAUDIS
Inside the Desert Kingdom
By Sandra Mackey. Journalist Mackey spent four years in Saudi Arabia pretending to be no more than a doctor's wife. She could go where reporters were not allowed—a royal wedding, visiting women in harems, and to PLO headquarters, among other places. The result is a unique inside view of a country that is struggling to reconcile twentieth-century technology with an almost medieval ruling mentality.
Ⓜ **MERIDIAN** 0-452-00948-0
$8.95/$11.95*

CHINA
A Concise Cultural History
By Arthur Cotterell. Chronologically tracing the rise and fall of states and dynasties, from prehistoric times to the present, Cotterell probes the lives of key individuals and the events that have shaped China, and shows how the modern post-Mao People's Republic is part of a larger pattern of China's historical, political, religious, artistic, and scientific development. Illustrated with 32 photos.
Ⓜ **MERIDIAN** 0-452-00950-2
$10.95/NCR

A SHORT HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA
Third Revised Edition
By Manning Clark. Detailing its 200-year rise from British penal colony to prosperous Commonwealth, Clark traces the many stages of Australia's social, political, and cultural growth and future directions.
Ⓜ **MENTOR** 0-451-62561-7
$4.95/$6.95*

THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN
By Michael Grant. In this superb volume Grant interweaves the history of the diverse Mediterranean peoples, from prehistoric times (circa 15,000 B.C.) to the time of Constantine (306–37 A.D.) to create an all-encompassing study of the cultures that formed the foundation of Western society. A selection of the History Book Club. 32-page photo insert.
Ⓜ **MERIDIAN** 0-452-00949-9
$9.95/NCR

AFRICANS AND THEIR HISTORY
Revised Edition
By Joseph E. Harris, Ph.D. A major re-evaluation of the Western view of African history, this book documents the ways in which Western writers have distorted historical fact.
Ⓜ **MENTOR** 0-451-62556-0
$4.95/$6.95*

UNDERSTANDING ISLAM
An Introduction to the Moslem World
By Thomas W. Lippman. Lippman places such events as the Iranian revolution, the Lebanese civil war, and the insurgency in Afghanistan within the context of Islamic history, making Islam's formidable influence understandable to the Western reader.
Ⓜ **MENTOR ORIGINAL**
0-451-62501-3 $3.50/$4.50*

*Price in Canada.
Prices subject to change.

Write to the NAL Education Department at the address below for a free History & Political Science catalog.

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
NAL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1988	Stephen M. Walt *The Origins of Alliances* Cornell University Press
1987	Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. *The Army and Vietnam* The John Hopkins University Press, 1986
1986	Bruce G. Blair *Strategic Command and Control* Brookings Institution
1985	Barry R. Posen *The Sources of Military Doctrine* Cornell University Press
1984	John J. Mearsheimer *Conventional Deterrence* Cornell University Press
1983	Harry G. Summers *On Strategy* Presido Press

Announcing the 1989 Edgar S. Furniss Jr. National Security Book Award

A $1,000 cash prize will be awarded to the author of a book published in 1988 that makes an exceptional contribution to the study of national security or the role of the military in society. The award, which commemorates the first director of the Mershon Center, is restricted to the author's first published book. Nominations by authors, publishers, or third parties must be made by February 28, 1989.

For more information, contact:
Carole Dale
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
199 West 10th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-2399
614-292-1681

T · H · E
OHIO
STATE
UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MRS. THATCHER'S REVOLUTION
The Ending of the Socialist Era
Peter Jenkins
"[Jenkins] has given us the best analysis to date of Thatcherism in power and the Opposition in disarray. His narrative is gripping, his character sketches are superb, his judgments are thoughtful."
— *London Sunday Telegraph*
$25.00 cloth

SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
David S. Yost
"A well researched and ably developed account of complex issues relating to the East-West military relationship, well organized, clearly written, and impressively deliberate." — Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Rand Corporation
$30.00 cloth

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT, SOCIALIST DISCIPLINE, AND SOVIET POWER
Mark R. Beissinger
Drawing on a number of unusual sources, including previously unavailable Soviet documents, Mark Beissinger examines how excessive bureaucratization of central planning has affected politics in communist countries.
Russian Research Center Studies, 84
$30.00 cloth

SOPHISTICATED REBELS
The Political Culture of European Dissent, 1968-1987
H. Stuart Hughes
"Hughes [is] the premier chronicler of European political and intellectual history in the twentieth century...[and] is perhaps the most gracious stylist among living historians." — Paul Robinson, Stanford University
Studies in Cultural History
$20.00 cloth

SURPRISE ATTACK
The Victim's Perspective
Ephraim Kam
Foreword by
Thomas C. Schelling
"Kam's work [is] absolutely first rate. It represents one of the most definitive expositions on [surprise attack] that I am aware of and...shows an unusual degree of insight into the problems of warning which we face every day."
— David Y. McManis, National Intelligence Officer for Warning
$25.00 cloth

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, MA 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politics around the Globe—

New

Liddell Hart and the Weight of History

By JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER. Mearsheimer shatters the myths surrounding the career of British military strategist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart while offering a striking illustration of how an individual can create his own self-serving version of the past. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $24.95

Soviet Industry from Stalin to Gorbachev

Essays in Management and Innovation

By JOSEPH S. BERLINER. The eleven essays in this book provide an astute appraisal of the reasons behind the urgent drive to reorganize the Soviet economy. Written by Joseph Berliner over a period of thirty-five years, they present the richest available account of the structural problems that have hampered Soviet economic development since the Stalin revolution. *Studies in Soviet History and Society.* $34.50

The State and American Foreign Economic Policy

Edited by G. JOHN IKENBERRY, DAVID A. LAKE, and MICHAEL MASTANDUNO. Seven notable young political scientists here provide a theoretical reevaluation of the forces at work in national policy making and present evidence that the effectiveness of the national government in shaping U.S. foreign economic policy has been greatly underestimated. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $9.95 paper; $29.95 cloth

At your bookstore or call toll-free 1-800-666-2211 for credit card orders.

Cornell University Press

124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, NY 14850

New in Paper

Nuclear Crisis Management

A Dangerous Illusion

By RICHARD NED LEBOW. "The conjunction of Lebow's knowledge of crisis behavior and his focus here on the nature of nuclear crises makes this a particularly useful and important work. . . . This book is a most well argued and analytical survey, which alone should make it required reading for anyone interested in the complex reality of crisis management in the nuclear age."—Steve Smith, *International Affairs. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $9.95 paper

Japan Prepares for Total War

The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941

By MICHAEL A. BARNHART. "A first-rate, original account of Japan's road to war, fortified with documentation largely unavailable in English."—Akira Iriye, University of Chicago. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $9.95 paper

The Formation of Modern Lebanon

By MEIR ZAMIR. "In its large outline, the story is familiar. But no one before Meir Zamir has put it all together. A splendid book."—Fouad Ajami, The Johns Hopkins University. "A superb account of factors leading up to the French decision and . . . [of] its consequences to 1926. . . . More studies like this and we may begin to understand the Middle East."—Daniel Pipes, *Orbis.* $9.95 paper

The Army and Politics in Indonesia

By HAROLD CROUCH. With a new Preface and Epilogue. This book analyzes the role of the Indonesian army in that country's politics, putting special emphasis on the Sukarno years, the gradual take-over of power by the military, and the nature of Suharto's New Order government. "A valuable contribution to our knowledge of modern Indonesia."—*Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia.* $10.95 paper

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR SYSTEMIC AND DYADIC EXPLANATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

By BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA and DAVID LALMAN*

At least since the Treaty of Westphalia, observers of international affairs have speculated that the structure of the international system influences the prospects for peace. Efforts to identify structural characteristics related to peace and war have concentrated on how power is distributed throughout the international system and on the configuration of agreements among nations that allow for the international aggregation of power.

More recently, some theorists, taking their lead from those who study decision-making processes within governments, have analyzed how the opportunities and the constraints faced by the decision makers of individual states affect national behavior. Those who approach the study of international relations from this perspective acknowledge that the sources of these opportunities and constraints reside in both domestic and international politics. By acknowledging both sources, these theorists do not assume *a priori* that there is any inherent inconsistency in the various levels of analysis. Indeed, different levels of analysis should engender no inconsistencies when there are shared subjects of study—peace, war, alliances, etc. While state-level analysts do not anticipate findings to be inconsistent with those at the system level, they, like many system theorists, prefer that system-level explanations be built up from individual-level theories. Siverson and Sullivan observe that "in future research it might be advantageous to combine theoretical propositions and findings from both the systemic and dyadic levels." And, "in terms of general theory-building it may be profitable to combine them rather than view both levels as totally distinct from one another."[1]

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 1987. David Lalman thanks the Institute for Governmental Affairs at the University of California, Davis, for its support of this research. Both authors thank the Hoover Institution of Stanford University for assistance in completing this project. We also wish to thank Randolph Siverson and Jack Levy for helpful comments on an earlier version.

[1] Randolph Siverson and Michael Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983), 473-94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is not our intention in this study to provide the theoretical linkage between the national dyad and the international system. Rather, we intend to combine the two levels empirically in an effort to evaluate the relative merits of the two approaches in terms of their ability to predict a shared theoretical concern: international conflict.

Some advocates of the balance-of-power theory believe that, when power is more or less equally distributed, the prospects for peace—or at least for the avoidance of a major, cataclysmic war—are enhanced. The concept of peace in some balance-of-power theories refers only to the absence of wars between major powers, while other balance-of-power theories view peace (or stability) as the condition in which any level of warfare is absent. Our empirical analyses take both meanings of peace into account.

The balance-of-power view is not, however, shared by all theorists concerned with structural explanations of war. Some maintain that international stability is not enhanced by a balance of power, but by the presence of a hegemonic power acting as the guarantor of peace. For these analysts, peace refers generally to the absence of war *among the great powers*. Their concern is with wars that have the potential of creating fundamental shifts in the leadership of the international community of nations. Supporters of the balance-of-power perspective often cite the experiences of post-Napoleonic 19th-century Europe as evidence for their views, while advocates of the hegemonic power perspective note the long periods of peace during the *Pax Romana* or the more recent *Pax Americana*.

The debate over the relationship between the distribution of power and the likelihood of peace is but one example of disagreement over the role of systemic structure in international affairs. An additional debate focuses on the clustering of nations into more or less cohesive blocs. Some scholars, particularly students of Soviet-American relations, draw attention to the relatively peaceful and bipolar nature of the international community in the post-World War II era. Others, noting the bipolar character of Europe just before World War I, suggest that multipolar, not bipolar, international systems have the greater potential for peace.

Closely associated with the controversy over the consequences of the number of poles in the international system is the question of the degree of cohesion, or "tightness," of the poles. It is often suggested that the degree of polarization affects the reliability of the bipolarity and the multipolarity arguments. This concern over the tightness of the poles arises, in part, from the growth in the number of states during the postcolonial era and the coincident rise in the number of newly emergent nonaligned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or neutral states. International theorists quite reasonably speculate that these nonaligned states affect the operation of any *n*-polar system. The experience of NATO in the 1960s also aroused concern over the cohesion of international alignments. France's withdrawal from the unified military command and Germany's policy of *Ostpolitik* seemed to signal a new era of independence within the alliance. Some analysts speculate that a decrease in NATO's cohesion might decrease the alliance's reliability, thereby increasing the risk of an East-West crisis.

Still other theorists are skeptical of the argument that the identified structural features of the international system are, by themselves, determinants of the behavior of nations. Individual national decision makers may well be aware of systemic features, but this knowledge serves as an imperfect guide in the conduct of international affairs. Furthermore, these theorists, as well as many system theorists, believe that greater confidence would be generated in systemic explanations if the properties of the international system were the product of carefully delineated state-level explanations that specify how structural features constrain national choices.

Until the late 1960s, structural theories were subjected to few systematic empirical tests. Studies that investigated the empirical relationship of systemic characteristics to international conflict generally focused on only one aspect of the system's structure. Adherents of systemic approaches might reasonably object that such unidimensional analyses distorted their theoretical statements. To focus on a single structural characteristic is to ignore many of the nuances that system theorists postulate. For example, Morton Kaplan identified a number of system types that are distinguished by the interdependence of such systemic characteristics as power balance, polarity, and alliance cohesion.[2]

Our objective is to examine the empirical support for the independent and joint effects of such key systemic variables. In doing so, we allow free reign to all three properties that have been postulated as being significantly related to international conflict—the distribution of power among nations, the number of poles in the system, and the tightness of these poles. After describing the properties, we shall combine the variables to capture the extant hypotheses and to develop new ones.

The major hypothesis drawn from the theory of the balance of power is that, as the distribution of power in the international system (or among the essential states) approaches equality, the potential for international

[2] Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conflict is reduced.[3] When placed in the context of major cataclysmic war, this assertion is in direct contradiction to the hegemonic theory which argues that peace is the result of the influence of a powerful, dominant state. To hegemonic theorists, a peaceful system is a system containing a preponderant power, and is therefore unbalanced.[4]

Some theorists view the level of uncertainty regarding aggression by potential adversaries as the underlying element driving the balance-of-power or the preponderance-of-power arguments.[5] The focus on uncertainty is also the central concern of those who believe that either bipolarity or multipolarity is the structure most conducive to peace. Polarity theorists seem to agree that multipolar systems inherently engender more uncertainty than do bipolar systems, but they disagree about how national leaders react to that uncertainty. Some believe that uncertainty stimulates particularly cautious behavior.[6] They hypothesize that such cautious behavior among decision makers reduces the likelihood that any nation will engage in activities that carry sufficient risk of precipitating a conflict.

Still others, believing that national leaders faced with uncertainty are more likely to miscalculate or misjudge their opportunities, argue that the uncertainty of multipolar systems leads nations to engage in highly dangerous activities.[7] This view can be interpreted as a belief that the miscalculations of national leaders lead to acts that are consistent with risk-acceptant behavior. Thus, decision makers in a multipolar world act *as if* they are risk-acceptant, thereby initiating or precipitating higher levels of conflict than would occur in a bipolar environment. Another interpretation of the handling of uncertainty by polarity theorists is that they assume that miscalculations are not symmetrically distributed

[3] Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978).

[4] A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968); George Modelski, *Principles of World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[5] J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 19-48.

[6] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics* 16 (April 1964), 390-406.

[7] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93 (No. 3, 1964), 881-909. We should note that Waltz uses bipolarity to refer to a situation in which most power is held by only two states that form the core of competing coalitions; others refer to bipolarity in terms of the number of discrete international coalitions. For Waltz, only the post-1945 world satisfies the definition of bipolarity—at least since the Napoleonic Wars. Our investigation of the effects of polarity on war is more in line with Kaplan's (fn. 2) and Deutsch and Singer's (fn. 6) usage of the concept of polarity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

around the "correct calculation." In other words, errors in multipolar systems tend to be generated in such a way as to bias decisions toward dangerous outcomes.

Related to the clustering of nations into poles is a concern with the *cohesiveness* of those poles. Generally stated, the view held by many theorists is that the more closely knit (or tighter) the bonds joining nations together within a pole, the lower the level of uncertainty about the reliability of one's allies and the opposition of one's foes. This increased tightness might make war more likely by providing information about the level of threat attributed to potential rivals and by making clear the magnitude of preparation necessary for a successful campaign. Conversely, others argue that the clarity provided by a high level of tightness reveals the risks associated with engaging in conflictual behavior, and thereby lowers the possibility of national leaders' miscalculating or misjudging their options—and waging war.[8]

To summarize, the following are the main hypotheses found in the literature linking system-level features to the probability of international conflict:

H1: A balance-of-power system tends to be peaceful and an imbalanced system tends to be conflictual.
H2: An imbalanced system tends to be peaceful and a balanced system tends to be conflictual.
H3: Bipolar systems tend to be peaceful and multipolar systems tend to be conflictual.
H4: Multipolar systems tend to be peaceful and bipolar systems tend to be conflictual.
H5: Systems with tight poles tend to be peaceful and systems with loose poles tend to be conflictual.
H6: Systems with loose poles tend to be peaceful and systems with tight poles tend to be conflictual.

Although we have greatly simplified the reasoning behind these six hypotheses, they represent the principal unidimensional perspectives in the literature connecting system structure to conflict. We will investigate the independent and the combined properties implied by these hypotheses.

In recent years, aspects of these perspectives have been tested; several excellent summaries of the evidence suggest that the hypotheses do not hold up well against variations in the specification of the relevant varia-

[8] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Praeger, 1968); Kaplan (fn. 2); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (June 1978), 241-66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bles.[9] Positive results appear to be highly data-dependent, and the general tendency of the analyses is to disconfirm all six hypotheses. Still these arguments should not be abandoned prematurely; perhaps the theories have not been more strongly supported because previous tests have seriously misspecified them.

Many of the system theorists are concerned with the interplay of several structural characteristics of the international system. They rarely isolate a single structural variable as the sole, or even the predominant, explanation of war or instability. The impact of polarity on peace, for instance, may be influenced by the tightness of the poles, and/or the distribution of power among the key states. Since many theorists recognize that it is unlikely that any one of the structural variables is, by itself, a satisfactory predictor of international conflict, it is inappropriate to evaluate the theories empirically without controlling for the effects of the other variables. We have therefore designed tests that account simultaneously for the three dimensions of polarity, tightness, and distribution of power.[10]

Specification of the Models

The central variable in theories of hegemonic stability (or power transition) and balance of power is the assessment of the distribution of power. For theories of polarity, the central variable is whether there are two or more than two poles. Finally, scholars concerned with the reliability of members of one or another pole focus on the tightness or looseness of the bonds within the poles.

The three dimensions specified in the systemic theories imply the eight possible types of systems depicted in Figure 1. Each dimension of the cube depicts one of the core systemic properties we address. Each face of the cube represents the combination of any two of these properties, holding the third constant. The front lower left-hand corner of the cube, for instance, depicts a situation of a tight, balanced, bipolar system. The rear upper right-hand corner depicts a loose, preponderant, multipolar system. All possible types of systems that can be generated using the three systemic attributes are accounted for in Figure 1. The eight generic international systems are:

[9] Siverson and Sullivan (fn. 1); Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, 2d ed. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1985); Dina Zinnes, "Why War? Evidence on the Outbreak of International Conflict," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *The Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1980); William Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 353-81.

[10] Kaplan (fn. 2); Aron (fn. 8); Waltz (fn. 7, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 1
TYPE OF SYSTEM ACCORDING TO THREE STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS

1. Tight, balanced, bipolar
2. Tight, balanced, multipolar
3. Tight, preponderant, bipolar
4. Tight, preponderant, multipolar
5. Loose, balanced, bipolar
6. Loose, balanced, multipolar
7. Loose, preponderant, bipolar
8. Loose, preponderant, multipolar.

In contrast to previous empirical studies, we examine the possible simultaneous contributions of all three theoretically identified features of the system. The analytic focus here is on the relationship between these system structures and the likelihood of various types of conflict.

Some theorists focus exclusively on wars among great powers,[11] while others are concerned with a broader set of wars.[12] We attempt to take both perspectives into account. However, we should be aware that, until after the fact, it is difficult to say which wars will threaten the structural fabric of the international system; it is therefore inappropriate to use *ex post* knowledge in a predictive model. The outbreak of war, however minor, holds the potential of escalating to global proportions. In this regard, we should remember that many did not expect Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia in 1914 to lead to a war involving all the great powers of the world.[13] Similarly, no one could be sure that the involvement

[11] Modelski (fn. 4); Waltz (fn. 7, 1964 and 1979); Organski and Kugler (fn. 4); Gilpin (fn. 4).
[12] Morgenthau (fn. 3); Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (fn. 5); and Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 8).
[13] John Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War* (New York: St. Martins, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the United States in Vietnam might not grow into a major confrontation between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Therefore, our empirical investigation encompasses two sets of analyses. The first, which occupies most of our attention, focuses on all wars involving at least one major power in Europe since the Congress of Vienna. The second, in keeping with the concern of preponderance theorists, stresses wars involving at least one great power on each side.

For each year between 1816 and 1965, we examine whether or not war began in Europe as a function of the number of poles, the tightness of the poles, and the distribution of power apparent in the system. Our inquiry is analogous to assigning the international system in each year to a position within the cube depicted in Figure 1 and evaluating the relationship between that location and the occurrence of international conflict. Following the intent of the system-level theorists, we confine our analysis to conflicts among major powers. In order to evaluate the effects of system structures comprising more than a single attribute, we specify the following statistical models:

$$(1)\ \text{Conflict} = a + b_1\ \text{Tightness} + b_2\ \text{Polarity} + b_3\ \text{Balance}$$

$$(2)\ \text{Conflict} = a + b_1\ (\text{Tightness})(\text{Polarity})(\text{Balance})$$

$$(3)\ \text{Conflict} = a + b_1\ \text{Tightness} + b_2\ \text{Polarity} + b_3\ \text{Balance} + b_4\ (\text{Tightness})(\text{Polarity})(\text{Balance}) + b_5\ (\text{Tightness})(\text{Polarity}) + b_6\ (\text{Tightness})(\text{Balance}) + b_7\ (\text{Polarity})(\text{Balance})$$

Equation (1) assesses the independent effects of each of the dimensions of the cube of Figure 1. This equation controls for the independent effects of each of the major ways of describing the international system. The linear, additive model of equation (1) represents our most elementary response to our own criticism that earlier empirical studies addressed only one structural argument at a time. In equation (2), we provide a simple model that combines interactively the three attributes of polarity, power balance, and tightness. In equation (3), we account for the independent as well as the interactive effects of the three dimensions. This last equation contains the most complete specification; it identifies the relationship between the location of an international system in the cube of Figure 1 and the observation of war.

Measurement

Two data sets are used for our analyses. In one, the unit of analysis is the year; in the other, the unit of analysis is the conflictual event itself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the first data set, the dependent variable WAR indicates whether or not a European war involving at least one major power began in the year of the observation. If such a conflict began in that year, the variable is coded one; if not, it is coded zero. The determination of the presence of such a conflict is based on Singer and Small's definitions of war and of major-power status. The second data set consists of 125 observations for which we have complete data; 97 of these designate international disputes that did not become wars, while the remaining 28 satisfied the criteria for an interstate war as specified by Singer and Small. This data set is derived from earlier research by Gochman. The variable WAR is coded one in the events data set if the conflict under examination satisfies the definition of a war. Otherwise, WAR is coded zero. We make a further distinction between wars involving great powers on each side (MPWAR = 1) and those in which only one of the initial belligerents was a major power (MPWAR = 0). Major powers are defined in accordance with Singer and Small.[14]

The independent variables are all operationalized in accordance with procedures used by ourselves or others in previous studies. The balance or imbalance of power, for instance, is measured as the concentration of power, using the composite capabilities index developed by the Correlates of War project. The concentration of power is estimated using procedures developed by others in earlier research.[15] We depart from the measure of concentration used in prior studies only in that we base our calculations on annual, rather than quinquennial, composite capabilities data. The measure is calculated across the major powers, which we specify slightly differently from Singer and Small: because our tests are focused on conflict in Europe, we include only European major powers in our calculations. The United States is included as a European major power after 1939, when it chose to play an active diplomatic, strategic, and military role in European affairs. The higher the concentration score, the more preponderant (and consequently less balanced) is the distribution of power in the European major-power system for that year.

Whether the European major-power system was bipolar or not is determined using the procedure developed by Bueno de Mesquita. Since that procedure is discussed in detail elsewhere and has been used in sev-

[14] J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972); Charles Gochman, "Status, Conflict, and War: The Major Powers, 1820-1970," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1975).

[15] Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (fn. 5). See also James Ray and J. David Singer, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System," *Sociological Methods and Research* 1 (May 1973), 403-36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eral subsequently published studies, we do not review the technique extensively here.[16] The purpose of this technique is to cluster European nations according to the similarity of their portfolios of alliances. We slightly modify the original technique by noting that any nation whose highest dyadic alliance similarity score is less than zero is in fact always nonaligned, and is therefore treated as a pole unto itself. For the purpose of evaluating the number of poles, only the major powers are counted, although their alliance behavior takes their linkages to any and all other states in Europe into account.

The measurement of the tightness or looseness of poles is based on the degree of similarity of alliance portfolios across nations, as has been described in detail elsewhere.[17] This measurement technique has been used in several studies to assess the cohesion of international blocs or the cohesiveness of individual dyads.[18] For each year, the degree of tightness found in the international system is assessed according to the similarity of formal alliance commitments across every pair of nations in the European system. The calculation of systemic tightness is accomplished by using the Tau_b statistical measure to indicate the dyadic similarity of national foreign policies. Typal analysis is applied to the Tau_b scores to identify the clustering of nations into blocs or poles. Finally, the mean of all intra-bloc Tau_b values yields the measure of systemic tightness.

Results of Systemic Level Tests

Since both data sets account for international conflict as either present or absent, the war variable for the statistical models specified in equations (1), (2), and (3) is dichotomous. Due to the discreteness of the dependent variable, these equations fail to meet the usual requirements for estima-

[16] Bueno de Mesquita, "Measuring Systemic Polarity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19 (June 1975), 77-96; Bueno de Mesquita, (fn. 8); Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Charles Ostrom, Jr., and John Aldrich, "The Relationship between Size and Stability in the Major Power International System," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (November 1978), 743-71; Frank Wayman, "Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among Major Powers, 1816-1965," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (No. 1, 1984), 61-78.

[17] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 16).

[18] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 8 and fn. 16); Michael Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, "Choosing Sides in Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (March 1979), 87-112; Organski and Kugler (fn. 4); Jacek Kugler, "Terror without Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (September 1984), 470-506; Jacek Kugler, "The Politics of Foreign Debt in Latin America: A Study of the Debtors' Cartel," *International Interactions* 13 (No. 2, 1987), 115-44; Walter Petersen, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (September 1986), 269-94; Bruce Berkowitz, "Realignment in International Treaty Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (March 1983), 77-96; Michael Altfeld and Won Paik, "Realignment in ITOs: A Closer Look," *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (March 1986), 107-14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion by the method of ordinary least squares. To evaluate the effect of the independent variables on the probability of observing a violent conflict, we arrive at our estimation of the parameters in equations (1), (2), and (3) through probit analysis.

One of our major goals is to investigate the empirical support for systemic explanations of international conflict; it is desirable that we be able to distinguish the effects of the separate systemic variables. This effort would be frustrated in a multivariate framework if the independent variables themselves were highly correlated. The correlations between tightness, polarity, and the distribution of power are presented in Table 1. It is evident from the low correlations between these variables that problems with multicolinearity do not prohibit an evaluation of the separate effects these features of the international system have on the occurrence of war. It is also evident that the degree of colinearity is not highly variable across these two data sets.

TABLE 1
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS AMONG THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	By Event (N = 125)			*By Year (N = 140)*		
	Tightness	*Balance*	*Polarity*	*Tightness*	*Balance*	*Polarity*
Tightness	1.000	0.413	0.041	1.000	0.412	−0.039
Balance		1.000	−0.064		1.000	0.098
Polarity			1.000			1.000

The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for models (1), (2), and (3) based on the events data are given in Table 2, together with their confidence levels.

The tightness variable appears to be positively and significantly related to war when specified according to model (1), using WAR as the dependent variable. When tightness is put in the form of an interactive variable together with the variables Balance and Polarity, there is little confidence in the predictive quality of the relationship. Also, when systemic tightness is specified as part of model (3), tightness is no longer a significant predictor.

Aside from the performance of tightness in model (1), there are no statistically significant variables indicated in Table 2. As predictive equations, the models fare poorly. Models (1) and (2) are unable to improve upon the explanatory power obtained by always predicting that an event will be in the modal category of non-war, as indicated by the proportionate reduction in error (P.R.E.) of 0.0.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2[a]
SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BY EVENT

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*	
	Coefficient	*P>t*	*Coefficient*	*P>t*	*Coefficient*	*P>t*
α	−2.676	.000	−.809	.000	−3.446	.401
Tightness (T)	2.338	.000			.120	.983
Polarity (P)	.060	.843			36.724	.167
Balance (B)	.749	.764			4.238	.769
TxPxB			.925	.433	192.602	.205
TxP					−40.377	.228
TxB					6.414	.748
PxB					−173.305	.163
Model X^2	21.34		.61		31.19	
p of X^2	.0001		.436		.0001	
P.R.E.	0.0		0.0		.107	
N = 125						

[a] We conducted a number of additional tests that are not reported in detail here in order to conserve space. We investigated variations of models (1), (2), and (3) in which the independent variables were lagged; were constructed as first differences over various time intervals; and in which various nonlinear forms were used. These all yielded results comparable to those reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4. We also tested an alternative conceptualization of polarity by designating the post-1945 years as bipolar and all other years as multipolar (Waltz, fn. 7, 1964, 1979). These additional tests did not produce significant relationships or improve the ability to predict events.

Model (3), which we believe to be the most accurate statistical evaluation to date of the controversies regarding systemic structure, yields a proportionate reduction in error of only 10.7 percent. The predictions even from this model are quite similar to predicting the modal category. Of the 97 events that did not escalate to war, 94 are accurately predicted—but at the cost of erroneously predicting that 22 of the 28 war events would not reach that level.

Table 3, which presents the analysis of models (1), (2), and (3) using the data organized by year, yields results that reinforce the conclusions from Table 2.[19] Examining the effects of system structure on the likelihood of war year by year, we find that not even one variable achieves statistical significance. This holds true whether the dependent variable evaluates war in general or focuses only on wars between major powers. The "goodness of fit" is so weak that not one of the models, whether based on WAR or MPWAR as the dependent variable, yields any reduction in error over the naive predictions based on the modal category.

[19] Model 3 can not be calculated with MPWAR as the dependent variable. With only 6 years in which major power wars began (out of the 140 years for which we have complete data), the independent variables outnumber the observations. Models 1 and 2 have been estimated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BY YEAR

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*	
	Coefficient	*P>t*	*Coefficient*	*P>t*	*Coefficient*	*P>t*
α	−1.748	.006	−1.130	.000	−4.433	.165
Tightness (T)	.871	.136			.143	.972
Polarity (P)	−.035	.900			4.613	.146
Balance (B)	−.108	.960			10.434	.352
TxPxB			−.459	.689	8.181	.659
TxP					−.490	.908
TxB					.908	.949
PxB					−21.722	.139
Model X^2	2.76		0.16		15.63	
p of X^2	.431		.686		.029	
P.R.E.	0		0		0	
N = 140						

Figure 1 and the findings from its associated empirical analyses reported in Tables 2 and 3 are of greatest interest to theorists who concentrate their efforts on explanations of conflict at the system level. We recognize, of course, that the relationships may be more complex than the statistical models we have constructed. Without more specific theoretical guidance, consistent empirical results will probably continue to be elusive in the field of international relations. We maintain, however, that system theorists have been clear on the importance of the three dimensions used to construct Figure 1. Our tests that include the interactive as well as the separate effects of polarity, tightness, and balance reinforce the evidence from earlier investigations that focused on only one structural dimension at a time. These structural dimensions, contrary to arguments in the literature and to conventional wisdom, show no sign of significantly altering the likelihood of international warfare.

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS AND THE DYAD

Some analysts have pursued theory building at the individual state level in order to develop the reasoning that underlies the behavior of the international dyad. Because of the great complexity of relationships in any fairly large system, it is all too possible that individual behaviors can cancel one another out, and thus mask an understanding of actual relationships. Beyond this academic concern, there is a policy-relevant aspect to microlevel theories. Decision makers are responsible for formulating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy in the interest of their nation. They are not expected to design policies that redound to the benefit of the greater community of nations if such policies would harm the interests of their own state. A policy maker who is faced with a choice between a policy that leads to an international system that is thought to be conducive to peace and a policy that provides security for the individual state, would, at the very least, confront an ethical dilemma. It is also quite plausible that decision makers in this position would wish to be highly confident of the effects of any decision before overriding the responsibilities with which they have been charged. As academicians, we are not faced with such problems. Still, it is our responsibility to provide the most reliable explanations within our ability. We share the view expressed by Siverson and Sullivan that the reliability of explanations of international phenomena will be improved by wedding systemic and dyadic (individual) level approaches.[20] Indeed, we believe that the international system is itself the aggregate manifestation of individual actions based on individual incentives. If this view is correct, reliable explanations of systemic phenomena should result from the logic of individual behaviors.

In order to address the question of what might motivate warlike behavior among individual decision makers, we must explicitly set out our assumptions from which we derive hypotheses that can be compared to the current system-level explanations.

Assume that decision makers act in what they believe to be the best interest of their state, and thus behave as expected utility maximizers. Assume, then, that decision makers subjectively assess the expected gains and losses from either challenging or not challenging some potential adversary. We construct a predictive model based on these assumptions, with the additional qualification that the probability that a national leader will choose to use force against an adversary increases in a strictly monotonic fashion with our estimates of expected utilities from challenging versus not challenging the opponent. From these basic assumptions, we derive the relative probability for various forms of international violence between two states that find themselves in a confrontational situation.

By a threatening or confrontational situation we mean an international crisis. Following Lalman, we define a crisis as a constraint on the strategies that are open to a decision maker. In the absence of a crisis, an individual actor or nation has a basic set of strategies available:

1. to do nothing, allowing the potential antagonist the option of initiating any action;

[20] Siverson and Sullivan (fn. 1).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. to make a demand upon the other actor, accompanied by some incentive to yield concessions;
3. to resort to force in order to extract the improvement in welfare that the initiator wishes to obtain.

A crisis situation is defined as a condition where the "do-nothing" strategy is not feasible. Since at least one of the parties will no longer accept the current configuration of policies, some new arrangement must be found. Without the discovery of some mutually acceptable negotiation point, the crisis condition will precipitate some form of violent event.[21]

The conjunction of choices to use force (strategy 3) or not to use force (strategy 2) by two contending states, i and j, yields four possible events that can arise from the dispute: war, a military intervention by i, a military intervention by j, and the peaceful resolution of the dispute. We calculate the *ex ante* probability that a conflict of interest between nation i and nation j will be resolved in one of these four identified forms as follows:

(a) $P(\text{War}) = P_{Fi}\,(P_{Fj})$
(b) $P(\text{Intervention by } i) = P_{Fi}\,(1 - P_{Fj})$
(c) $P(\text{Intervention by } j) = (1 - P_{Fi})\,P_{Fj}$
(d) $P(\text{Peaceful Resolution}) = (1 - P_{Fi})\,(1 - P_{Fj})$

where P_{Fi} is the probability that i chooses its fight strategy and P_{Fj} is the probability that j chooses its fight strategy. A fifth important condition is defined by combining all violent outcomes. The probability of some form of violence resulting from the crisis is the sum of the probabilities in (a) to (c):

$$\begin{aligned}(e)\ P(\text{Violence}) &= P(\text{War}) + P(\text{Intervention by } i) \\ &\quad + P(\text{Intervention by } j) \\ &= 1 - P(\text{Peaceful Resolution}).\end{aligned}$$

Although all these functional forms are of great importance to the study of international conflict, we restrict our attention in this paper to the probability of war. The interpretation of the equation predicting the condition of war is that the probability of war is the product of the probability that i escalates its threat against j to the point of force, and the probability that j also escalates to the use of force against i. As mentioned previously, the probabilities attached to the strategy choices are assumed to be strict monotonic functions of the utility that an actor expects to gain from challenging another state. Thus, condition (a) converts to probabilistic terms Geoffrey Blainey's categorical observation that "wars can

[21] David Lalman, "Conflict Resolution and Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (August 1988), forthcoming.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only occur when two nations decide that they can gain more by fighting than by negotiating."[22] Even though condition (a) is a dyadic, theoretical statement, it does not rule out the possibility of systemic influences on the occurrence of war. The policies held by states, the distribution of power in the international system, and the possibilities for power to be aggregated through alliances are all systemic attributes that affect a decision maker's assessment of what is to be gained through challenging another state and the probability that it actually would be gained. In this way, our approach substantially accomplishes the objective of combining systemic and dyadic factors in analyzing conflict.

Operational Procedures

We assume that the selection of a strategy either to negotiate with or to fight another nation is consistent with the net gains that are expected to result from challenging that nation. In order to evaluate empirically the proposition that war is the product of individual strategic choices, we assume that these decisions are based on the policy positions taken by states and the power they may exercise in the pursuit of their interests. We describe only the main features of the estimation procedure here and refer the reader to other studies for more detailed descriptions.[23]

Prior to the onset of a crisis, nation i is faced with the choice between challenging some nation j with the intention of persuading j to alter its foreign policies in keeping with the policies preferred by i, or not challenging j's policies; the latter would leave j free to formulate policy in the absence of explicit pressure from i. If i chooses to forgo challenging j, then i contemplates the prospects and the probabilities of three contingencies: that j's policies will not be changed over the period of concern to i, that j's policies will improve from i's perspective, or that j's policies will deteriorate. Nation i anticipates that, with some probability (Q), j will not alter its current policies over the time period of concern to i, and i will continue to derive the utility that it associates with the status quo between itself and j, denoted (U^isq). On the other hand, i may anticipate that, for better or for worse, j's foreign policies will undergo some change. If j does reformulate its policies, i expects with probability (T) that the change will be in a direction that is better for i, and with probability ($1 - T$) the change will be detrimental to the interests of i. We

[22] Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 159.

[23] Bueno de Mesquita, "The War Trap Revisited," *American Political Science Review* 79 (March 1985), 157-76.; Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 16); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, "Reason and War," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1113-31; Lalman (fn. 21).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

denote the expected utility of a change for the better from the standpoint of i's interests as $T(U^i_{bi})$, and the expected utility of change for the worse as $(1-T)(U^i_{wi})$.

The alternative strategy to not challenging j is that i chooses to pressure j for a modification of policies in line with i's interests. With probability $(1-S_j)$, j may yield to the demands without the use of force by i. Recognizing that j may also resist i's demands with probability (S_j), i must be prepared to compel j to alter its policies. Should i and j both press the issue to the point of an open military confrontation, then i estimates its chances for successfully winning control of j's policies (valued at U^i_{si}) as the probability (P^i_i). In this contest, i is also aware of the prospects for failure $(1-P^i_i)$ and the loss of control over its own foreign policy (U^i_{fi}).

The difference in net utility that i expects between challenging and not challenging is calculated as follows:

$$E^i(U_{ij}) = E^i(U_{ij})c - E^i(U_{ij})nc,$$

where the expected utility of challenging nation j is

$$E^i(U_{ij})c = S_j[P^i_i(U^i_{si}) + (1-P^i_i)(U^i_{fi})] + (1-S_j)(U^i_{si}),$$

and the expected utility of not challenging j equals

$$E^i(U_{ij})nc = Q(U^i_{sq}) + (1-Q)[T(U^i_{bi}) + (1-T)(U^i_{wi})].$$

A foreign policy position adopted by a nation is assessed according to the array of formal defense commitments it has undertaken. The utility terms associated with these positions are measured as a function of the similarities in international accords.[24] The utilities associated with success, failure, and the status quo are estimated according to the method described in "The War Trap Revisited."[25] The utilities for the possible changes in j's policies where there is no challenge from i are estimated by the procedure described in "Reason and War."[26] The welfare that is to be gained or lost by a nation is in the form of a change in the configuration of another state's foreign policies from the status quo. When two nations hold similar foreign policies, there is little to be gained by one's challenging the other. Conversely, greatly dissimilar policies provide an incentive, though not necessarily the requisite capability, to challenge those policies. The combination of both the incentive for a change and

[24] Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (No. 3, 1969), 257-82.

[25] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 23).

[26] Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 23).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the capability to achieve that change forms the basis for a decision maker's expectation of a gain in its welfare.

The assessment of national power (or capability) for each nation in the system is calculated as the annual composite capability index developed by the Correlates of War project. This index measures the military, industrial, and demographic capabilities of a nation relative to the capabilities in the system. The term for the probability of success (P^i_i) is estimated as the proportion of national capabilities available to i relative to all the capabilities that i expects to be involved in the dispute. We assume that both antagonists i and j are willing to contribute all of their capabilities in order to succeed in the dispute. Third parties, who may not be belligerents and therefore are not necessarily risking the control of their policies, are assumed to contribute their capabilities proportionate to their preference for a victory of i over j.[27] This procedure results in expected utility estimates that take on values from -3 to 3. In the statement of the theory, we postulated that the probability that an actor uses force is a monotonic function of our estimate of its expected utility for challenging the other state. Whatever function is selected, it must map the expected utility values into the [0,1] interval for probabilities. Here we employ linear functions that are identical for both i and j[28]:

$$P_{Fi} = [3 + E^i(U_{ij})]/6,$$
$$P_{Fj} = [3 + E^j(U_{ji})]/6.$$

Once these two values are estimated following the method we have outlined, we can substitute them directly into the equations for conditions (a) through (d) to derive our predictions. Here we do so only for condition (a), defining a variable we call P(War).[29]

Empirical Analysis

Our interest here is in juxtaposing the individual-level and the system-level approaches. The function estimating the probability of war is used

[27] Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 18). For a full description of the estimation of the probability of success, see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 23).

[28] Results from these linear transformations are reported in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 23). Lalman (fn. 21) reports results from various curvilinear functions and finds that these functions do not perform in significantly different ways from linear models. These studies yield strong empirical support for our contention that such functions reliably estimate the probability of war and other forms of violence.

[29] To check for possible problems with multicolinearity, we correlated P(War) with the other independent variables: Tightness, Balance, and Polarity. The respective correlations are .199, .114, and $-.344$.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to capture the calculations of national leaders confronting one another in a crisis. Beyond the concern of these leaders for the welfare of their states, it is entirely possible that decision makers also assess the overall conditions of the international system when deciding upon a course of action. Systemic attributes may represent either constraints on their decisions or opportunities for their activities. In order to capture the impact of such potential systemic constraints, we construct tests that are parallel to those presented in Table 2 by adding to those models the variable *P*(War).[30] The results of these statistical estimations are presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4[a]
SYSTEM STRUCTURE, INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*	
	Coefficient	*P>t*	*Coefficient*	*P>t*	*Coefficient*	*P>t*
α	−3.998	.000	−2.886	.000	−5.484	.215
P(War)	6.702	.001	8.001	.000	8.902	.001
Tightness (T)	1.909	.002			−.691	.911
Polarity (P)	.473	.157			38.892	.144
Balance (B)	.310	.910			5.234	.732
TxPxB			2.625	.051	198.832	.191
TxP					−40.216	.229
TxB					6.293	.765
PxB					−185.083	.137
Model X^2	33.53		21.70		46.61	
p of X^2	.0000		.0000		.0000	
P.R.E.	.214		.179		.321	
N = 125						

[a] In addition to the lags, first differences, and nonlinear tests mentioned in the footnote to Table 2, we also replicated models (1), (2), and (3) with *P*(War) treated interactively with the structural variables. Again, no marginal gain in predictive or explanatory power was achieved over the simple treatment of *P*(War) as a separate, additive variable.

These analyses largely reinforce the results from Table 2. The individual-level variable *P*(War) is statistically significant in all three models. In the test of model (3) — the most comprehensive test — it is the only significant variable. Indeed, *P*(War) is the only variable in all of the analyses that is consistently significant.

[30] Comparable analyses cannot be conducted using the data set organized by years because *P*(War) is a dyadic, not a systemic, attribute; it is therefore undefined for the system as a whole.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conclusion

We set out to tie individual-level incentives and structural constraints in order to obtain a better understanding of the factors that affect the likelihood of war. Earlier tests of structural explanations seemed disappointing. However, we believed that the lack of consistent evidence regarding system structure and war might be a consequence of misspecified statistical models rather than a problem in the theories themselves. We believe that our tests do a better job of representing the intentions of system theorists who emphasize the interplay of the distribution of power, the number of poles, and the tightness of the poles in predicting the occurrence of major-power wars. Nonetheless, our test results are consistent with earlier findings. We continue to find encouraging results in the individual-level perspective, but have discovered no evidence that decision makers act as if they were significantly constrained by variations in the structural attributes we examine. It may be that decision makers have already taken those structural attributes into account, or that we have failed to specify models that fully capture the intentions of one or another theorist. We hope that such theorists will help to inform future empirical investigations by specifying clearly and precisely what tests of their propositions are most appropriate. It is of equal importance that empirical analysts do justice to those specifications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WARS OVER TIME

By EDWARD D. MANSFIELD*

I. Introduction

POLITICAL scientists and other scholars have displayed a lively interest in the distribution of wars over time. A variety of research has been conducted on the subject, and the implications of these studies are important: only through empirical research can we hope to identify patterns, trends, and possible causes of warfare. Comprehensive and frequently cited data sets have been developed by Quincy Wright, Lewis Richardson, and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, as well as by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Jack Levy.[1] In this paper, I shall try to determine the extent to which various well-known empirical findings concerning the distribution of war over time are sensitive to the particular data set employed. I then will present preliminary tests of some additional hypotheses concerning the factors influencing the probability of war, and ascertain whether—and, if so, how—the results depend on the inclusion of all wars or only of wars involving major powers.

II. What Is a War?

At the outset, each author's definition of war should be described because this has a profound impact on the content of his data set. Wright's list is intended to include all hostilities involving members of the family of nations,

> whether international, civil, colonial, or imperial, which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense or which involved over 50,000 troops. Some other incidents are included in which hostilities of considerable but

* I am grateful to Youssef Cohen, Frederick Frey, Avery Goldstein, Joanne Gowa, Edwin Haefele, Arvid Lukauskas, Jack Nagel, and Bryan Sayer for their useful comments on various drafts of this paper.

[1] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1960); J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York: John Wiley, 1972); Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> lesser magnitude, not recognized at the time as legal states of war, led to important legal results such as the creation or extinction of states, territorial transfers, or changes of government.[2]

Wright's data are plotted in Figure 1 (the entire compilation of wars) and Figure 2 (interstate wars only).

Richardson's list "is classified . . . in seven broad classes by the number killed."[3]

> The war dead were taken to include all those, on both sides, whether armed personnel or civilians, who were killed fighting, or drowned by enemy action, or who died from wounds or from poisonous gas, or from starvation in a siege, or from other malicious acts of their enemies. Moreover, deaths from disease or exposure of armed personnel during a campaign were included.[4]

He is not concerned with whether the deadly quarrels "occurred in Europe, America, Asia, or Africa, whether between recognized states, between revolutionary groups within a state, between primitive tribes, or between governments and rebels, insurgents, or colonials."[5] Richardson's data are shown in Figure 3.

Small and Singer list all wars that had been identified between 1816 and 1980 by Wright, Richardson, and diplomatic and military historians; they screen out "those quarrels which failed of inclusion because of: (a) the inadequate political status of their participants; or (b) their failure to meet a minimum threshold of battle-connected casualties of troops in combat."[6] They also include civil wars between 1816 and 1980 in their data set. Civil wars are defined by "(a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides."[7] Internationalized civil wars are also recognized by Small and Singer if a second state commits 1,000 troops to the combat zone or, in the event that the deployed force is smaller than this figure or the number of troops is not known, at least 100 deaths are sustained.[8] Small and Singer's data are plotted in Figure 4 (the entire data set) and Figure 5 (interstate wars only). Singer and Small have also compiled a list of major-power wars which I will analyze in section VIII;[9] this is shown in Figure 6.

[2] Wright (fn. 1), 636.

[3] Richardson (fn. 1), 3.

[4] Lewis F. Richardson, "The Distribution of Wars in Time," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 107 (Parts III-IV, 1944), 247.

[5] Richardson (fn. 1), vii.

[6] Small and Singer (fn. 1), 38.

[7] *Ibid.*, 210

[8] *Ibid.*, 218-19.

[9] Singer and Small (fn. 1), 23, and Small and Singer (fn. 1) categorize Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), Prussia/Germany (1816-1870; 1871-1918; 1925-1945), Russia/Soviet Union (1816-1917; 1922-present), France (1816-1940; 1945-present), England (1816-present), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945), China (1949-present), and the United States (1898-present) as mem-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bueno de Mesquita began by utilizing Singer and Small's data. He mentions that "using the coding rules of Singer and Small and extending their data through 1974 gives me 79 interstate war initiations, for which I have sufficient data to test my theory on all but 3."[10] He does not include civil wars in his compilation. Of particular importance for the present purposes is the fact that he lists wars in terms of dyadic relationships between individual antagonists. Figures 7 and 8 show his data—the latter after adjustments described in Section IV.

Levy defines war as "a substantial armed conflict between the organized military forces of independent political units."[11] He argues that, because Great Powers occupy a unique position in the international system, have been involved "in a disproportionately high percentage of history's wars," and "many theories of international politics are essentially theories of Great Power behavior," wars between and involving these states deserve special attention.[12] For these reasons, Levy excludes hostilities that do not involve a Great Power, civil wars, and "imperial or colonial wars, unless they expand through the intervention of another state."[13] Because his data pertain solely to Great Powers, they will be utilized only in Section VIII, where I compare the results based on all wars with those restricted to major powers. Figures 9 and 10 show Levy's data involving major powers and between them, respectively.

III. How Different Are the Data Sets?

Because of the differences in the definitions of war in these studies, we would expect each data set to vary from the others. For example, as shown in Table 1, the mean number of wars breaking out annually tends to be higher in Small and Singer's study and lower in Wright's (interstate war) data than in the other compilations. Similarly, the standard deviation of the number of wars beginning per year varies substantially from data set to data set.

Nonetheless, it is surprising and interesting that *there is a relatively low*

bers of the major-power system. For their list of major-power wars, see Singer and Small (fn. 1), 70.

[10] Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 1), 101.

[11] Levy (fn. 1), 51.

[12] *Ibid.*, 3. Levy identifies France (1495-1975), England/Great Britain (1495-1975), the Hapsburg Dynasty (1495-1519; 1519-1556; 1556-1918), Spain (1495-1519; 1556-1808), the Ottoman Empire (1495-1699), the Netherlands (1609-1713), Sweden (1617-1721), Russia/Soviet Union (1721-1975), Prussia/Germany/West Germany (1740-1975), Italy (1861-1943), the United States (1898-1975), Japan (1905-1945), and China (1949-1975) as "Great Powers." See *ibid.*, 24-43.

[13] *Ibid.*, 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND RESULTS OF TESTS OF POISSON DISTRIBUTION, LINEAR TREND, AND EFFECTS OF KONDRATIEFF WAVES

		Wright[a]		*Bueno de Mesquita*		*Small and Singer*	
	Richardson	*All Wars*	*Interstate Wars*	*Unadjusted*	*Adjusted*	*All Wars*	*Interstate Wars*
Mean Number of Wars Beginning per Year	.81	.60	.34	.48	.35	1.35	.41
Standard Deviation of Wars Beginning per Year	.93	.81	.60	1.03	.64	1.29	.64
Number of Years	130	462	462	159	159	165	165
Time Period	1820-1949	1480-1941	1480-1941	1816-1974	1816-1974	1816-1980	1816-1980
Poisson Distribution: Chi-Square Statistic	—[b]	2.40	0.79	9.93	0.19	1.31	0.02
Linear Regression of Annual Number of Wars Begun on Time:[c] Regression Coefficient	−.00032	.00057	.00008	.0023	.0017	.0057	.00227
t-statistic	−.15	2.03	.38	1.31	1.55	2.72	2.19
r^2	−.008	.007	−.002	.005	.009	.038	.023
Durbin-Watson Statistic	2.11	1.99	2.06	2.06	2.07	2.09	1.90

Mean Number of Wars Beginning per Year: Kondratieff Upward Phase	.81	.62	.32	.70	.47	1.63	.50
Kondratieff Downward Phase	.81	.62	.37	.28	.24	1.07	.30

[a] Wright lists the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II as single wars and also breaks them down into a series of smaller wars. In the present analysis, these conflicts are each considered as a single war.

[b] No Chi-square statistic is provided by Richardson (fn. 4), 248; however, he notes that his data are in "agreement with the Poisson law" and he asserts that "there is considerable resemblance between the historical facts and the Poisson law" (fn. 1), 128. In order to observe the rule that the expected frequency be no less than 5, the Chi-square statistic for Bueno de Mesquita and Bueno de Mesquita (adjusted), respectively, was computed by categorizing the number of wars breaking out in a year as 0, 1, and 2 or more. The Chi-square statistic for Wright is from Richardson (fn. 4), 243. To observe the same rule, the number of wars beginning per year is classified as 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more. Small and Singer's Chi-square statistic is from H. W. Houweling and J. B. Kuné, "Do the Outbreaks of War Follow a Poisson Process?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (March 1984), 56; the wars per year were classified as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more.

[c] The coefficients of determination, r^2, are adjusted for degrees of freedom.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

correlation between the number of wars begun in any particular year according to one data set and the number of wars begun in the same year in another compilation. As shown in Table 2, the average value of the coefficient of determination (r^2) is only about 0.22. Moreover, the correlation remains low when Wright's and Small and Singer's data are adjusted to include only interstate wars.[14]

Because all of these data sets continue to be used widely, analysts (and readers) should be aware that results may vary depending on which list

TABLE 2
COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION (r^2) BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING IN A PARTICULAR YEAR IN ONE DATA SET AND THE NUMBER BEGINNING IN THE SAME YEAR IN ANOTHER DATA SET, 1820-1941[a]

			Wright[b]		*Bueno de Mesquita*	
Data Set	*Small and Singer (Interstate Wars)*	*Richardson*	*(All Wars)*	*(Interstate Wars)*	*(Unadjusted)*	*(Adjusted)*
Small and Singer (all wars)	.38	.07	.20	.12	.15	.31
Small and Singer (interstate wars)	—	.02	.13	.28	.40	.79
Richardson	—	—	.05	.04	.00	.02
Wright[b] (all wars)	—	—	—	.42	.11	.12
Wright[b] (interstate wars)	—	—	—	—	.14	.29
Bueno de Mesquita	—	—	—	—	—	.54

[a] All coefficients of determination are adjusted for degrees of freedom. The time frame employed here is restricted to 1820-1941, since it is the only period common to all seven data sets. The Richardson data include only wars of magnitude ranging from 7 ± ½ to 4 ± ½ because, as Richardson notes, his data for lesser magnitudes are quite vague, sketchy, and incomplete. (See fn. 1, p. 73.)

[b] The Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II are treated as single wars, rather than being broken down into a series of component wars.

[14] In my calculations, I made the following adjustments: extra-systemic and civil wars were excluded from Small and Singer's data; only their list of interstate wars was employed. Civil and imperial wars were deleted from Wright's compilation; only the wars he classified as defensive and balance-of-power conflicts were utilized in the subsequent analysis. Richardson's data were not broken down because it was difficult to determine which "deadly quarrels" were (and were not) between nation-states. I am indebted to Joanne Gowa and an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to analyze these compilations with only interstate wars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is employed. That is not to imply, however, that any of these data sets is "wrong" or misleading. Each is useful contingent on the objectives of the particular researcher.[15]

Three factors seem to account for most of the differences that are observed between these compilations. First, as mentioned earlier, there is considerable debate over what constitutes a war. Various definitions of war would be expected to produce different results. For example, Richardson cautions:

> Let no one suppose that the present list ought to agree with Wright's. Their principles are different; because his [Wright's] rule for selecting incidents does not mention the number of deaths, and may involve the importance of legal results.[16]

Similarly, the decision to include hostilities involving non-state actors has a marked impact on the compilation. Table 2 indicates that data sets that include such wars agree little with lists that are restricted to international wars. More is at work here, however: substantial divergencies exist even between data sets that follow similar rules for inclusion regarding non-state actors.

Second, the level at which war is analyzed explains some of the differences between data sets. This apparently accounts for much of the difference between Bueno de Mesquita's compilation and the other lists. Bueno de Mesquita is interested in modeling the calculus that decision makers employ when evaluating whether or not to go to war; thus, he focuses on dyadic relations between states. For example, he identifies eight separate dyads in 1866 involving Germany and a series of states, rather than classifying the incident as the Seven Weeks' War or the Austro-Prussian War, as other scholars have.

[15] Singer and Small (fn. 1), 78-128, provide an analysis of the agreement between Richardson's, Wright's, and their own data. However, they are concerned with different measures of agreement than the one used in this study. They compute the "commonality in percentage terms by . . . divid[ing] the number of wars which [a pair of data sets] included by the number which *either* of them included, for the period covered by both studies." *Ibid.*, 78; emphasis in original. Their results indicate only moderate agreement between the lists, and the "commonality declines even further [when they] compute . . . the number of wars found in *every* one of the . . . lists . . . and divide by the total found in *any* one of them" during the time periods when the studies overlap. *Ibid.*, 79; emphases in original.

However, when Singer and Small analyze "for each pair of studies, what percentage of the first's wars are also in the second's list, and what percentage of the second's wars are found in the first's list . . . the discrepancies are not nearly so great as they first appeared." *Ibid.*, 79. Although Singer and Small find evidence of some commonality among the compilations that they compare, Table 2 indicates that there is little correlation between the data sets used in this study. Even though a considerable percentage of wars may be common to a given pair of data sets, the non-common outbreak of wars in a particular year seems to reduce the correlation significantly. Thus, I believe that the present analysis is a useful supplement to Singer and Small's seminal work on this topic.

[16] Richardson (fn. 1), 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third, there are differences in the dating of wars. Wright, and Small and Singer, for example, date the onset of the Russian Revolution in 1917, while Levy places it in 1918. Richardson breaks the Revolution into two deadly quarrels, one beginning in 1917, the other in 1918.[17] Such discrepancies seem minor, but they help to reduce the correlation between the data sets.

Scholars of war have been particularly interested in testing (1) whether wars occur in accord with the Poisson distribution; (2) whether there is an upward or downward trend in the number of wars beginning per year; (3) whether there is autocorrelation in the number of wars per year; (4) whether the number of wars per year differs between the upswing and downswing of Kondratieff waves—and if so, how; (5) whether increasing openness or closure in the international trading system affects the incidence of war; and (6) whether the existence or absence of a hegemon inhibits or promotes the outbreak of conflict. In the following sections, I will present some preliminary findings that indicate the extent to which these findings vary, depending on the data set selected.

IV. How Robust Is the Poisson Distribution?

If wars occur at random, one would expect the number of wars beginning each year to conform to the Poisson distribution.[18] That is, if the probability equals $\lambda\Delta$ that a war begins in a short period of time of Δ years, the probability that x wars begin in a year equals $(\lambda\Delta)^x e^{-\lambda\Delta}/x!$ In view of the findings in the previous section, it is interesting to note that the Poisson distribution provides a good approximation to the data, regardless of whether the Wright, Richardson, or Small and Singer compilations are utilized.[19] Thus, the fit of the Poisson distribution to these

[17] Bueno de Mesquita's dating of the Russian Revolution is not considered because he does not include civil wars in his data. Small and Singer, on the other hand, list this conflict twice, once as an extra-systemic war and once as a civil war. (Fn. 1, pp. 311, 321.)

[18] The Poisson distribution occurs under the following circumstances: (a) the probability that an event (in this case, a war) occurs in a short period of time is proportional to the length of the period; (b) the probability that more than one event occurs in any very short period of time is zero; (c) the events are independent of one another; (d) the probability that an event occurs in a short period of time does not depend on when the period begins. Regardless of whether these assumptions hold, the Poisson distribution may be a good approximation to the distribution of wars. If that is true, it is important to know since it is empirically useful. Knowledge of the probability distribution is obviously of use for purposes of prediction. (For an example of the usefulness of the Poisson distribution for major-power wars, see Figure 11.)

[19] See Wright (fn. 1); Richardson (fns. 1 and 4); Singer and Small (fn. 1); Houweling and Kuné (Table 1, fn. b); and J. E. Moyal, "The Distribution of Wars in Time," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 112 (Part IV, 1949), 447.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

data is remarkably robust.[20] Table 1 shows the results of the Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for each of these studies.

To determine if Bueno de Mesquita's data also conform to the Poisson distribution, a Chi-square test was carried out. Table 1 indicates that his data do not fit the Poisson distribution at all well. Apparently, that is because he frames the outbreak of hostilities in terms of dyadic conflicts (which is more appropriate for his purposes), and does not employ a more customary definition in which all combatants are viewed as engaging in a single war. When his data are adjusted to aggregate wars (from dyads) in cases in which at least two of the other three data sets agreed that this could be done, the adjusted data (plotted in Figure 8) fit the Poisson distribution remarkably well.[21]

Because students of international politics have traditionally focused their attention on relations between nation-states it is important to consider this class of wars separately. When Small and Singer's and Wright's compilations are restricted to international wars, the Poisson distribution again approximates the data extremely well. (See Table 1.) Hence, the fit to the data appears to be quite robust.

V. Trend and Autocorrelation

In addition to testing whether the Poisson distribution provides a good fit, many major studies attempt to determine whether there is a trend in

[20] A Poisson process is not necessarily at work just because the data fit the Poisson distribution. Thus, a tight fit does not necessarily imply randomness. For example, Houweling and Kuné (Table 1, fn. b) find that Small and Singer's data do not follow a Poisson process although they are closely approximated by a Poisson distribution. Interestingly, they are not able to reject the hypothesis that a Poisson process is at work when they analyze Small and Singer's "international wars, excluding civil wars." *Ibid.*, 60. See *ibid.* for a more complete discussion of this issue.

[21] The following adjustments were made: (1) The three dyads in 1827 involving Great Britain, France, and Russia versus Turkey were aggregated into the Battle of Navarino Bay. (2) The eight dyads that Bueno de Mesquita identifies in 1866 between Germany and eight states are aggregated into either the Seven Weeks' War or the Austro-Prussian War. (3) In both 1906 and 1907, Bueno de Mesquita lists two dyads that Wright aggregates into the Central American War; Small and Singer list one war between the combatants each year. I shall adopt the latter position as a compromise between Bueno de Mesquita, Wright, and Small and Singer. (4) The two dyads that appear in 1913 between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and Greece and Bulgaria were lumped together into the Second Balkan War to conform with the other scholars. (5) The five dyads in 1948 are aggregated into one war in Palestine to conform with both Richardson and Small and Singer. (6) The two dyads in 1965 between North Vietnam and both South Vietnam and the United States were condensed into one war, consistent with Small and Singer (the only other study including wars as recent as this one). (7) The three dyads in 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, respectively, were aggregated into the Six-Day War. (8) The two dyads in 1973 between Israel and both Egypt and Syria were aggregated into the Yom Kippur War. Adjustments (7) and (8) are also in accord with Small and Singer's compilation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the data. Richardson, for example, concludes that no trend exists; Small and Singer note the "absence of any clear trend," although they do find a slight upward drift in the data.[22] To see whether this is true regardless of which data set is used, the least-squares regression of the annual number of wars begun in a particular year on the year itself was calculated.[23] The results (shown in Table 1) indicate that, except for Richardson's list, there does seem to be an upward drift in all cases. However, it is statistically significant only for Wright's and Small and Singer's data.[24] As Small and Singer note, this upward drift may be due to nothing more than an increase in the number of states in the international system over time.[25] The coefficients of determination (r^2) for each set are quite small, indicating that these trends explain very little of the variation in the outbreak of warfare.[26] It is also interesting to note that Wright's and Small and Singer's data produce upward trends when only international wars are analyzed, and that r^2 remains small.

Investigators such as Houweling and Kuné, and Moyal, have found that there is autocorrelation in the distribution of wars over time.[27] For example, Moyal concluded that there was "some small positive correlation for intervals greater than one year, though only the values for 5 and

[22] Richardson (fn. 1), 141, and Small and Singer (fn. 1), 132. In earlier research, Small and Singer argue that not only is there "no long range secular trend" in the data as a whole, but that there is also no clear trend in the separate compilations of international wars, military confrontations, and civil wars, respectively. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Conflict in the International System, 1816-1977: Historical Trends and Policy Futures," in J. David Singer, ed., *Understanding War* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), 73.

[23] It should be noted that ordinary least-squares regression is a somewhat rudimentary technique for analyzing trends in data. It is frequently used for this purpose, however, and is the natural starting point in a comparative study of this sort. See, for example, Small and Singer (fn. 1); Levy (fn. 1); and Richardson (fn. 1).

[24] The use of tests of statistical significance is appropriate when a researcher is analyzing a sample and wants to generalize from the sample to the population. Such tests are inappropriate when the population is being studied. The data sets that are being used in this analysis can be thought of as the population of all wars during the time frames that each compilation covers. However, these data can also be considered a sample of the hypothetical population of all wars over all times. Tests of significance are often used in this paper, but, depending upon the assumptions that are made about the data, these tests may or may not be meaningful.

[25] In fact, Small and Singer have found that, when their subset of data on international wars is normalized to account for the number of nations in the international system, a "discernible downward trend" appears (fn. 22, p. 64). It is important to note that the decision to normalize or not to normalize these compilations "rests on an implied null model: that system size, population growth, or number of possible pairs, etc., should have *no effect* on the incidence of violence and conflict." *Ibid.*, 72; emphasis in original.

[26] The regression coefficients are quite small for each data set. However, it is possible that over the course of hundreds of years, the average number of wars could go up by a significant amount. Consequently, the percentage change was calculated between the predicted number of wars at the beginning of the time period and that at the end. The change exceeded 20% only in the case of Wright's data for all wars; however, in the latter case the change was approximately 70%, which is quite substantial.

[27] Houweling and Kuné (Table 1, fn. b); Moyal (fn. 19).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

15 years are distinctly significant."[28] To determine whether the residuals from the regressions in this section are serially correlated, we calculated the Durbin-Watson statistic for each compilation[29] (shown in Table 1). In each case, there exists no evidence of serial correlation of this sort.[30] In this regard, the results are quite robust.

VI. Kondratieff Cycles and War

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in whether or not the occurrence of hostilities is correlated with so-called Kondratieff cycles of approximately fifty to sixty years in length.[31] Although many scholars are not convinced that such cycles exist, others have postulated that economic upswings provide the wealth to finance wars, technological advances that enhance war-fighting capacities, and increases in international tensions that can boil over into conflict. Conversely, it has been suggested that war gives rise to upswings in the economy. For example, Thompson and Zuk argue that major wars may be responsible for reinforcing upswings in price series, but that the conclusion of such hostilities usually signals a price downswing.[32]

A number of studies have investigated whether there is a difference in the incidence of the outbreak of war between the upswings and the

[28] *Ibid.*, 447.

[29] If the value of a time series at time t is correlated with its value k periods before, the time series exhibits serial correlation (also known as autocorrelation). The assumption in classical linear regression is that there will be no serial correlation of the residuals. For present purposes, I am interested in whether the residuals are serially correlated because if they are, this might help us predict and understand the incidence of war.

[30] This is true if we use the standard table of the Durbin-Watson statistic and let $n = 100$. Alternatively, we can use the von Neumann ratio, which is $n/(n-1)$ multiplied by the Durbin-Watson statistic. Since for large n it may be taken as approximately normally distributed (its mean being $2n/(n-1)$ and its variance being $4n^2(n-2)/(n+1)(n-1)^3$), we can use this statistic to test for serial correlation of the residuals. In no case is the result statistically significant. For a more detailed explanation of this method, see J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 250-51.

[31] Kondratieff identified a series of cycles in the international economy. Specifically, he argued that long waves existed in the wholesale price level, interest rates, wages, turnover in foreign trade, and the production and consumption of certain raw materials. Other researchers have found evidence of long cycles in investment, innovation, and profit levels. See Joshua S. Goldstein, "Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles," *International Studies Quarterly* 29 (December 1985), 411-44, for a discussion of this literature. Of particular interest for my purpose is Kondratieff's assertion that "it is during the period of the rise of long waves . . . that, as a rule, the most disastrous and extensive wars and revolutions occur." See Nikolai D. Kondratieff, "Long Waves in Economic Life," *Review* II (Spring 1979), 536 (originally published as "Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* LVI, No. 3, 1926.) Kondratieff speculated that the explanation for this finding may be that "wars originate in the acceleration of the pace and the increased tension of economic life, in the heightened economic struggle for markets and raw materials, and . . . social shocks happen most easily under the pressure of new economic forces." *Ibid.*, 539.

[32] William A. Thompson and L. Gary Zuk, "War, Inflation, and the Kondratieff Long Wave," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26 (December 1982), 621-44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

downswings of the Kondratieff cycle. Joshua Goldstein has utilized Levy's data on Great Power wars and concluded that a "roughly equal number of wars took place on downswings as on upswings."[33] In other words, with respect to these economic cycles, wars involving major powers seem to occur at random. Raimo Väyrynen has argued, however, that major wars were more likely to occur in the upswing stages.[34] Thompson and Zuk corroborate these results, finding that 80 percent of the wars beginning between 1816 and 1914 occurred during upswings.[35]

To see whether the average number of wars begun per year differed between the upward and downward phases of the cycles, I calculated the mean number of wars begun per year for each phase (using Goldstein's dating of the phases). When all wars were considered, the mean number of wars during the upward phase equaled or exceeded that of the downward phase, regardless of which data set was used (Table 1). The differences in the mean number of wars between upswings and downswings are statistically significant only in the cases of Bueno de Mesquita (both adjusted and unadjusted) and Small and Singer. Nonetheless, the results suggest that the outbreak of wars may be correlated with long-term movements in the global economy.

While Kondratieff expressed interest in the relationship between long waves of economic activity and international wars as well as revolutions, it would be useful to analyze the former classification separately for a better illustration of the role that such cycles play in the international arena. When the lists of Small and Singer and Wright are adjusted to include wars between nations only, the results are not quite so robust. Whereas Small and Singer's data still produce a higher mean number of wars in the upward phases of the Kondratieff cycles, the opposite is true for Wright's adjusted compilation. (See Table 1.) This illustrates the fact that researchers should be careful when choosing a data set because the outcomes may vary considerably.[36]

VII. Openness in International Trade, Hegemony, and War

Two additional hypotheses, both of which have received a great deal of attention, will be examined in a preliminary fashion. The first is that

[33] Goldstein (fn. 31), 424.

[34] Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," *International Studies Quarterly* 27 (December 1983), 389-418.

[35] Thompson and Zuk (fn. 32).

[36] The causal connections between economic fluctuations and warfare (in both directions) remain ambiguous. Although these findings are interesting and potentially useful theoretically, one must be careful to distinguish between causality and correlation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an increase in openness in international trade results in a diminished likelihood of war. This position would seem to be consistent with the views of those who "believe that the mutual benefits of trade and the expanding web of interdependence among national economies tend to foster cooperative relations," but inconsistent with the view of economic nationalists and others who argue that an increase in openness and interdependence is "a cause of conflict and insecurity."[37]

To test this hypothesis, I used Stephen Krasner's classification of periods of greater openness and closure during the 19th and 20th centuries.[38] Only four of the seven data sets extend over all periods covered by Krasner. As shown in Table 3, the mean number of wars per year has tended to be greater during periods of greater openness than during periods of closure. This observation seems to support the position that "trade is not a guarantor of peace."[39]

Again, it is important to analyze international wars separately in the compilations by Small and Singer and by Wright because theories of trade relations, hegemony, and war do not purport to explain civil or extra-systemic wars. When Small and Singer's data on international wars are examined, the mean number of wars during periods of closure exceeds the mean during increased openness. Here is another case in which different data sets yield different results.

It is also important to determine whether the transition between periods of increasing openness and closure produces substantial changes in the amount of warfare. Because trade relations are symptomatic of political relations between states, there is reason to believe that this is the case. In order to test the hypothesis that transition periods are ones in which the incidence of war is higher than other phases, each of Krasner's periods of increasing openness and closure was divided into quarters, and the mean number of wars per year in each quarter was computed. For all seven data sets, the incidence of war tends to be higher during the last half of increasing openness than during the first half. (See Table 4.) This is consistent with the notion that the breakdown of economic relations is

[37] Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 56, 57.

[38] See Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 317-47. By increasingly "open" trading systems, Krasner is referring to those in which "tariffs are falling, trade proportions are rising, and regional trading patterns are becoming less extreme." *Ibid.*, 324. The time periods he utilizes and the commensurate degrees of openness and closure are: 1820-1879—increasing openness; 1879-1900—modest closure; 1900-1913—greater openness; 1918-1939—closure; 1945-1970—great openness.

[39] Gilpin (fn. 37), 58. Because a variety of other factors are not held constant in this exploratory analysis, this result can be regarded only as suggestive and tentative.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

MEAN NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING PER YEAR DURING PERIODS OF INCREASING OPENNESS AND CLOSURE, AND DURING PERIODS OF HEGEMONY AND NON-HEGEMONY

		Wright		*Bueno de Mesquita*		*Small and Singer*	
	Richardson	*All Wars*	*Interstate Wars*	*Unadjusted*	*Adjusted*	*All Wars*	*Interstate Wars*
Increased Openness[a]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	.58	.39	1.45	.40
Closure[a]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	.30	.30	1.14	.43
Gilpin's Classification							
Hegemony	.81	.89	.43	.51	.36	1.44	.40
Non-hegemony	.80	.52	.31	.33	.33	.97	.43
Modelski's Classification							
Leadership	.82	.65	.36	.47	.34	1.37	.39
Non-leadership	.57	.38	.23	.57	.57	.86	.71
Wallerstein's Classification							
Hegemony	.75	.85	.38	.57	.37	1.42	.35
Non-hegemony	.86	.53	.31	.38	.33	1.29	.46

[a] Krasner includes 1879 and 1900 in periods of both increasing openness and closure. For this reason, these two years were each employed in the analysis of both types of periods.

[b] Data are not available for Wright or Richardson for the period of 1945 to 1970, one that Krasner classifies as "great openness." Richardson provides data for wars begun in years up to 1949, while Wright's study terminates in 1941.

reflected in the breakdown of political relations between nations. In five of seven cases, however, the final quarter of periods of closure also appears to produce an increase in hostilities, which may suggest that transition periods are the ones that are most likely to witness the outbreak of war.

The second hypothesis is that wars are less likely to break out during years in which a hegemon exists than during years without a hegemon. This is in accord with power-preponderance theory, which posits that "an inequality of power is likely to prevent war"; it is contrary to balance-of-power theory, which argues that a relatively equal distribution of power makes war fairly unlikely.[40] Robert Gilpin, George Modelski,

TABLE 4
MEAN NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING PER YEAR DURING EACH QUARTER OF PERIODS OF CLOSURE AND INCREASED OPENNESS

	Closure (Quarter of Period)[a]				*Increased Openness (Quarter of Period)*[a]			
Data Set	*First*	*Second*	*Third*	*Last*	*First*	*Second*	*Third*	*Last*
Richardson	1.30	.40	1.00	.83	.61	.83	.74	1.11
Wright (all wars)	1.20	.20	.33	1.17	1.00	.83	1.00	.89
Wright (interstate wars)	.50	.20	.33	.58	.39	.44	.42	.42
Bueno de Mesquita	.20	.10	.17	.67	.46	.29	.69	.85
Buena de Mesquita (adjusted)	.20	.10	.17	.67	.21	.29	.62	.42
Small and Singer (all wars)	1.00	.90	1.08	1.50	1.29	1.25	1.73	1.50
Small and Singer (interstate wars)	.40	.20	.33	.75	.21	.29	.58	.50
Singer and Small	0	.10	.08	.42	.17	.25	.31	.15
Levy (involving major powers)	.10	.10	.08	.42	.17	.25	.23	.19
Levy (between major powers)	.10	0	0	.17	.04	0	.08	.08

[a] When the number of years in a period of increased openness or closure equals $4m + 1$, where m is an integer, the last $(m + 1)$ years in the period are regarded as the last quarter of the period. When the number equals $4m + 2$, the last $(m + 1)$ years are regarded as the last quarter, and the previous $(m + 1)$ years are regarded as the third quarter. When the number equals $4m + 3$, the second, third, and last quarters contain $(m + 1)$ years. Also see Table 3, note a.

[40] Randolf M. Siverson and Michael P. Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983), 473-94, at 474. Siverson and Sullivan present a good discussion of power preponderance and balance-of-power theory. For another thoughtful treatment of these types of theories, see Jack S. Levy, "Theories of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Immanuel Wallerstein each have specified periods during which a hegemon existed.[41] Table 3 shows that the mean number of wars begun per year tends to be higher during hegemonic periods than during others. For Gilpin's classification of years, this holds true in six out of seven data sets; for Wallerstein's, for five out of seven; and for Model-

General War," *World Politics* 37 (April 1985), 344-74. Not all power-preponderance and balance-of-power theories predict the same things concerning the distribution of power and war. For example, while both Henry Kissinger and Inis Claude argue that "the relatively equal distribution of power among the major actors in the international system brings about an equilibrium in which war is relatively unlikely," Kenneth Waltz's brand of balance-of-power theory makes no explicit argument concerning the distribution of power and the probability of war. Siverson and Sullivan, 474; also see Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979); Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962); and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

For leading examples of power-preponderance and power-transition theories, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978), 214-38; William Thompson, ed., *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983); A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980), 947-65; and Väyrynen (fn. 34).

[41] Gilpin (fns. 37 and 40); Modelski (fn. 40); Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 24 (No. 1-2, 1983), 100-103.

Gilpin's periods of hegemony are 1815-1914 (Great Britain) and 1945-1980 (United States). He does not specify exactly when or whether U.S. hegemony has ended; however, he asserts that "by the 1980s, American hegemonic leadership . . . had greatly eroded" (fn. 37, p. 345). For this reason, and because no data set extends beyond that year, 1980 is used as the final year of American hegemony. Modelski points out that he is interested in periods of "world leadership" rather than of hegemony. See George Modelski, "Long Cycles, Kondratieffs, and Alternating Innovations: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy," in Charles W. Kegley and Patrick McGowan, eds., *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), 64. In such eras, power is less highly concentrated than under hegemony. Modelski's periods are 1494-1580 (Portugal); 1609-1688 (United Provinces of the Netherlands); 1713-1802 (Great Britain); 1815-1937 (Great Britain); and 1945-1980 (United States). The beginning of each cycle is given by the year Modelski provides for the "legitimizing settlement." When more than one year is provided, the most recent is employed. The end of each cycle is marked by "landmarks of descent." For each cycle, the final year of the most recent landmark is utilized. See Modelski (fn. 40), 225. The war data employed do not extend beyond 1980; moreover, no landmarks of descent are provided for the United States. Hence, 1980 is used as the final year of American leadership.

Wallerstein's periods are: 1625-1672 (United Provinces of the Netherlands); 1815-1873 (Great Britain); and 1945-1967 (United States). Any data prior to 1600 were excluded for Wallerstein's periods because this is when he dates the start of the modern system and it would be inappropriate to compare wars in different systems. Levy has also designated three periods of hegemony: 1556-1588, 1659-1713, and 1797-1815. See Jack S. Levy, "The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis," in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., *Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 41-66. However, because Wright's data set was the only one to include wars that began prior to 1815, Levy's eras of hegemony were not included here (although they are included in the analysis of wars between and involving major powers).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ski's, for four out of seven.[42] This evidence thus does not seem to bear out the power-preponderance hypothesis; instead, it generally seems to support balance-of-power theory. The preliminary nature of this analysis is obvious, however.

Because these theories seek to explain only international hostilities, wars involving non-state actors must be excluded from this analysis. Using Wright's list of international wars only, the results are consistent with the earlier analysis: periods of hegemony produce a higher incidence of warfare. Using Small and Singer's data on international wars, however, we find that precisely the opposite is the case. (See Table 3.) Thus, here is still another case where the results differ, depending on whose data sets are used.[43]

These findings seem to lend credence to balance-of-power theory, though the evidence is mixed. However, it is equally important to know whether (as some power-transition theorists would predict) warfare is clustering around the transitions from non-hegemony to hegemony and from hegemony to non-hegemony. This might indicate that the breakdown of the existing system, rather than the mere presence or absence of a hegemon, helps to explain the onset of warfare.[44] To find out, I compared the mean number of wars during each quarter of a period of hegemony or non-hegemony. Table 5 shows that only in the case of Bueno de Mesquita's and Small and Singer's (interstate war) data does the last quarter of periods of non-hegemony tend to have a higher incidence of war than the other quarters. In very few cases does the first quarter of a period of hegemony have a higher incidence of war than the other three quarters. Thus, there seems to be limited evidence of such clustering.

It has also been hypothesized that the breakdown of hegemony is associated with a high incidence of warfare. If Wallerstein's classifications are used, the incidence of war is higher in the last quarter of hegemonic periods than in the other quarters of such periods (or of non-hegemonic periods). The evidence is much weaker when it is based on Gilpin's or

[42] If, in fact, a preponderance of power increases the probability of war, this could explain why the results based on Modelski's classifications are weaker than those based on the others. Modelski is referring to leadership, not hegemony (see fn. 41). Leadership is clearly a weaker form of power disparity than hegemony. Thus, the relationship might be expected to be weaker when his classification is used than when the others are used.

[43] Various datings of hegemony also elicit different results. When Modelski's periods are examined and only international wars are employed, the lack of leadership seems to be associated with a relatively high incidence of war; Gilpin's and Wallerstein's periods produce very different results.

[44] Power transition theorists generally conclude that most wars, and the most serious wars, tend to be fought during periods in which the system is shifting from a non-hegemonic to a hegemonic or from a hegemonic to a non-hegemonic distribution of power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5
MEAN NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING PER YEAR DURING EACH QUARTER OF PERIODS OF HEGEMONY AND NON-HEGEMONY

	Hegemony (Quarter of Period)[a]				*Non-hegemony (Quarter of Period)*[a]			
	First	*Second*	*Third*	*Last*	*First*	*Second*	*Third*	*Last*
Gilpin's Classification								
Richardson	.90	.68	.72	1.04	1.43	.57	.75	.50
Wright (all wars)	1.04	1.00	.80	.72	.64	.60	.48	.44
Wright (interstate wars)	.44	.44	.40	.44	.43	.31	.30	.25
Bueno de Mesquita	.21	.56	.48	.52	.29	0	.38	.63
Bueno de Mesquita (adjusted)	.13	.56	.20	.40	.29	0	.38	.63
Small and Singer (all wars)	.79	1.64	1.04	1.40	1.00	.86	1.13	.88
Small and Singer (interstate wars)	.08	.60	.28	.48	.43	0	.50	.75

Modelski's Classification								
Richardson[b]	.80	.74	.87	.94	—	—	—	—
Wright (all wars)	.59	.72	.63	.67	.35	.44	.59	.31
Wright (interstate wars)	.34	.37	.38	.35	.18	.33	.29	.19
Bueno de Mesquita[b]	.17	.77	.23	.45	—	—	—	—
Bueno de Mesquita (adjusted)[b]	.10	.55	.19	.39	—	—	—	—
Small and Singer (all wars)[b]	.76	1.61	1.10	1.23	—	—	—	—
Small and Singer (interstate wars)[b]	.07	.58	.32	.45	—	—	—	—
Wallerstein's Classification								
Richardson	.71	.80	.60	.87	.65	.94	1.17	.67
Wright (all wars)	.54	1.04	.74	1.07	.64	.47	.52	.48
Wright (interstate wars)	.31	.30	.41	.52	.34	.36	.27	.29
Bueno de Mesquita	.56	.05	.43	1.24	.12	.39	.44	.44
Bueno de Mesquita (adjusted)	.22	.05	.43	.76	.12	.28	.39	.44
Small and Singer (all wars)	1.22	1.00	1.48	1.95	.88	1.28	1.33	.94
Small and Singer (interstate wars)	.17	.05	.43	.71	.24	.39	.44	.56

[a] See Table 4, note a. For each of the three classifications, the final period was not broken into quarters because the period has not yet ended. The initial year for the analysis of each classification was 1495 for Gilpin, 1494 for Modelski, and 1600 for Wallerstein.

[b] Too few observations exist for non-hegemonic periods to permit reasonably reliable calculations of this sort.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Modelski's classifications. These results provide additional tentative support for balance-of-power theory; it is important, however, to recognize their roughness.

VIII. All Wars versus Wars Involving a Major Power

Up to this point, we have been concerned with the likelihood of war, without regard to the position that the nations involved occupy in the international system. For many purposes, we should focus primary attention on hostilities between and involving major powers. For 1495 to 1975, Levy provides data for wars (1) involving major powers and (2) between major powers; for 1816 to 1980, Singer and Small provide data for wars involving major powers.[45] Using these data, we can determine whether the results obtained in previous sections remain robust if we narrow our focus to wars with at least one major-power participant.

In many respects, the results, shown in Tables 4, 6, and 7, do not change appreciably. For wars with major-power participants, as for all wars, the Poisson distribution provides a remarkably good fit. (See Figure 11.)[46] When the number of wars per year is regressed on time, the value of r^2 is very low, and there is no evidence of autocorrelation of the residuals. There is a tendency for the mean number of wars per year to be higher during periods of increased openness than during periods of closure, although the evidence is not as consistent from one data set to another for wars involving major powers as for all wars. Wars that involve major powers seem to occur more frequently during periods of openness, whereas wars between major powers seem to begin more often during closure. Further, Table 4 shows that the incidence of war tends to be higher in the last half of periods of increasing openness than in the first half of such periods, although this tendency is quite weak for wars involving major powers. The final quarter of closure again witnesses much more war than earlier quarters of closure. As was the case for all wars, Table 7 indicates that, if Wallerstein's classification is used, the

[45] Singer and Small (fn. 1), 70, provide an initial compilation of thirty major-power wars. Using their coding scheme, I updated this list with the additional data they provide in *Resort to Arms* (fn. 1), thereby adding two other wars to their original data: the Russo-Afghan War (1979) and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979).

[46] The incidence of wars involving major states for Singer and Small's list, and between Great Powers in Levy's, was too small to conduct a Chi-square test for goodness-of-fit: if the expected number in each class exceeds 5, no degrees of freedom existed. The conclusions, then, are based on the comparison of histograms in Figure 11 showing the theoretical and observed frequency distributions. For Levy's data involving major powers, a Chi-square test was conducted ($X^2 = 1.69$ $.10 < p < .20$). Clearly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the data conform to the Poisson distribution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 6
LINEAR TREND AND EFFECTS OF KONDRATIEFF WAVES, OPENNESS, AND HEGEMONY ON THE NUMBER OF MAJOR-POWER WARS BEGINNING PER YEAR

		Levy	
	Singer and Small	*Involving Major Powers*	*Between Major Powers*
Linear Regression of Annual Number of Wars Begun on Time:			
Regression Coefficient	−.00019	−.00049	−.00053
t-statistic	−.24	−2.88	−4.40
r^2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom)	−.006	.015	.037
Durbin-Watson Statistic	2.06	2.22	2.14
Mean Number of Wars Beginning per Year:			
Kondratieff Upward Phase	.25	.24	.14
Kondratieff Downward Phase	.13	.25	.13
Increasing Openness	.22	.21	.05
Closure	.16	.18	.07
Gilpin's Classification:			
Hegemony	.19	.18	.05
Non-hegemony	.20	.27	.17
Modelski's Classification:			
Leadership	.18	.25	.14
Non-leadership	.43	.21	.11
Wallerstein's Classification:			
Hegemony	.23	.28	.12
Non-hegemony	.15	.18	.09
Levy's Classification:			
Hegemony	—[a]	.26	.17
Non-hegemony	—[a]	.24	.12

[a] No mean number of wars can be computed for Singer and Small's data using Levy's periods because Levy's final period of unipolarity ends in 1815 and Singer and Small's data begin in 1816. See Levy (fn. 39).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 7
MEAN NUMBER OF MAJOR-POWER WARS
BEGINNING PER YEAR
DURING EACH QUARTER
OF PERIODS OF HEGEMONY AND NON-HEGEMONY

	Hegemony (Quarter of Period)[a]				*Non-hegemony (Quarter of Period)*[a]			
	First	*Second*	*Third*	*Last*	*First*	*Second*	*Third*	*Last*
Gilpin's Classification:								
Singer and Small	.13	.40	.16	.12	0	0	.25	.50
Levy (involving major powers)	.16	.32	.16	.12	.37	.28	.23	.22
Levy (between major powers)	0	.08	.08	.04	.28	.15	.15	.09
Modelski's Classification:								
Singer and Small	.10	.39	.10	.16	—	—	—	—
Levy (involving major powers)	.27	.28	.26	.23	.24	.44	.11	.06
Levy (between major powers)	.12	.16	.17	.14	.12	.28	.06	0
Wallerstein's Classification:								
Singer and Small	.17	.05	.33	.38	.12	.06	.11	.33
Levy (involving major powers)	.23	.12	.39	.36	.16	.15	.18	.26
Levy (between major powers)	.10	.06	.15	.18	.09	.08	.08	.10
Levy's Classification:								
Singer and Small[b]	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Levy (involving major powers)	.32	.30	.19	.25	.25	.32	.20	.36
Levy (between major powers)	.28	.22	.07	.11	.13	.17	.15	.24

[a] See Table 4, note a. The initial year used for the analysis of Levy's classification was 1495.
[b] See Table 6, note a.

evidence that the incidence of war is higher in the last quarter of hegemonic periods than in other quarters is much stronger than when the other classifications are employed.

In three noteworthy respects, however, the results do change. First, although there has been a mild upward trend in the total number of wars per year, there has been a mild downward trend in the number of wars per year involving major powers.[47] Second, although for all wars the

[47] Levy also found a downward trend in the onset of wars between and involving major powers. See Levy (fn. 1), 112-49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mean number of hostilities per year during the upward phase of the Kondratieff cycle has been higher than during the downward phase, the mean number of wars per year involving major powers does not seem to have varied appreciably between these phases.[48] (See Table 6.) Third, although the presence of a hegemonic power seems to have been associated with a higher incidence of all wars than the absence of such a power, the results are quite ambiguous for wars involving and between major powers. When the four classifications (including Levy's) are compared across the three data sets, no clear relationship seems to exist between hegemony and wars involving Great Powers and between them.[49] Further, Table 7 indicates little evidence of clustering around changes from hegemony to non-hegemony and vice versa. In other words, although the data for all wars generally seem to be consistent with balance-of-power theory, the data for wars including and between major powers do not support either power-preponderance or balance-of-power explanations.[50]

IX. Summary and Conclusions

Because most of the research that has been conducted in the field of conflict studies has relied solely on a single data set of wars, one may question whether the findings from these studies are dependent on the particular compilation that is utilized. By retesting a number of central hypotheses using a comparative framework, the degree to which the results are sensitive to the data set that is employed can be established.

[48] Goldstein (fn. 31) makes the same observation, based on Levy's data. However, Singer and Small's data support the thesis that more wars tend to begin in upswings than in downswings of the Kondratieff cycle. (See Table 6.) Although I am not implying a causal relationship between Kondratieff waves, or international trade, and war, the results do seem to indicate that certain circumstances in the international economy are more conducive to the outbreak of warfare than are others.

[49] There do seem to be important differences across classifications of hegemony and non-hegemony. Gilpin's classification consistently elicits a higher mean number during periods of non-hegemony, whereas Wallerstein's and Levy's classifications provide consistent results that point in the opposite direction.

[50] These results are interesting in light of earlier findings by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey that, while power preponderance seems to have inhibited wars involving major powers between 1816 and 1965, the "goodness-of-fit was not very impressive." J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power Wars, 1820-1965," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 46. This would seem to lend support for their conclusion that no single theory concerning the distribution of power explains the outbreak of warfare very well over long periods of time. These authors therefore argue that, for a more fruitful approach, the data should be split between the 19th and 20th centuries. Similarly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has found that "*no particular distribution of power has exclusive claim as a predictor of peace or war either in theory or in the empirical record of the period 1816-1965*. See "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (December 1981), 541; emphasis in original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I have shown that there is a surprisingly low correlation between the number of wars begun in a particular year according to one data set and the number begun in that same year according to another data set. This indicates that these data sets should not be used indiscriminately or interchangeably to help analyze a particular problem. On the contrary, because the results may vary greatly, one must be careful to find the data set that is most appropriate. For example, the relationship between Kondratieff cycles, openness, and hegemony on the one hand, and the incidence of war on the other, varies from one compilation to the next.

Yet, in preliminary tests of various central hypotheses using each of these data sets, the similarity of the results is often remarkable. Regardless of which data set is used (for Bueno de Mesquita, the adjusted list must be employed), the Poisson distribution fits well. In all but one case, there is evidence of an upward trend (albeit a weak one) in the number of all wars beginning per year; in all cases, there seems to be no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals from the linear trend. In all but one compilation, the number of wars beginning during the upward phase of a Kondratieff cycle tends to be greater than or equal to that during the downward phase. When we focus only on wars between and involving major powers, however, the results are far more ambiguous.

Besides retesting a variety of well-known hypotheses on alternative data sets, this paper provides preliminary evidence concerning a number of important hypotheses that have not received as much scholarly attention. For example, my results indicate that hegemony does not seem to be associated consistently with either a decrease or an increase in wars with major-power participants, although it does appear to be strongly associated with a greater incidence of all types of war. In cases where warfare is not restricted to major powers, this lends support to balance-of-power explanations. To the extent that theories of international politics purport to explain the behavior of the main actors in the international system, however, these findings lend credence neither to power-preponderance theory nor to balance-of-power theory. For the four sets of periods of hegemony that are tested, the incidence of conflict seems to be associated less with the existence of a global leader when major powers are involved than when all wars are studied.

The findings provide some support for the old and much-debated hypothesis that the incidence of war is related to Kondratieff cycles. For all wars, there seems to be a statistically significant tendency for the number of wars per year to be higher in Kondratieff upswings than in Kondratieff downswings; but, if we consider only the wars between and involving major powers, there is no such tendency. Thus, to the extent that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kondratieff cycles really exist, they seem to have more influence on the incidence of war among smaller states than among major powers. Finally, both for major-power wars and for all wars, an increase in the likelihood of war seems to occur in periods of increased international economic openness. Taken at face value, this finding may be consistent with the views of those who caution that an increase in openness and interdependence does not necessarily enhance the probability of peace.

In conclusion, this paper counsels both caution and confidence. Because of the low correlation among the data sets, one must be cautious in choosing among them for the particular task at hand. On the basis of these preliminary statistical tests, however, one can be confident that, regardless of which data set is used, many of the central tests of important hypotheses yield much the same results. Moreover, although theorists have debated which types of hostilities should be included in compilations of war, many results are quite insensitive to whether the lists are restricted to major powers or not, contain civil wars, or include hostilities involving non-state actors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON WRIGHT'S DATA, 1480-1941



FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON WRIGHT'S DATA, 1480-1941

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 3
NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON RICHARDSON'S DATA, 1820-1949



FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON SMALL AND SINGER'S DATA, 1816-1980

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON SMALL AND SINGER'S DATA, 1816-1980



FIGURE 6
NUMBER OF MAJOR-POWER WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON SINGER AND SMALL'S DATA, 1816-1980

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 7
NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON BUENO DE MESQUITA'S DATA, 1816-1974



FIGURE 8
NUMBER OF WARS BEGINNING EACH YEAR,
BASED ON BUENO DE MESQUITA'S (ADJUSTED) DATA, 1816-1974

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 9
NUMBER OF WARS INVOLVING MAJOR POWERS BEGINNING EACH YEAR, BASED ON LEVY'S DATA, 1495-1975



FIGURE 10
NUMBER OF WARS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS BEGINNING EACH YEAR, BASED ON LEVY'S DATA, 1495-1975

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 11

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF YEARS, BY ACTUAL AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF WARS INVOLVING OR BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS, BASED ON THE POISSON DISTRIBUTION.

(FROM DATA DERIVED BY LEVY, AND SINGER AND SMALL)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AUTHORITARIAN STATES, CAPITAL-OWNING CLASSES, AND THE POLITICS OF NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES: The Case of Indonesia

By RICHARD ROBISON

Introduction

IN the 23 years since the military-dominated government of President Suharto seized power in Indonesia, the economy has been transformed from one based predominantly upon the export of primary agricultural products, petty trading, and commodity production to one with a rapidly developing industrial base. While agriculture declined from 53.9 percent of GDP to 26.4 percent between 1967 and 1983, mining (including oil) increased from 2.7 percent to 19.4 percent, and manufacture from 7.3 percent to 12.5 percent.[1] Nurtured by an authoritarian regime, a substantial capital-owning class has also emerged; the process has provided an insight into the complexity of relationships between authoritarian regimes and capital-owning classes in new industrial economies and the nature of the tensions that threaten these relationships. Although this paper will focus upon the ways in which the Indonesian regime provided the conditions for the development of industrial capitalism and the social power of the capital-owning classes, my analysis will take place in the context of theoretical debates about authoritarian states, capitalist industrialization, and the emergence of a bourgeoisie in newly industrializing countries.[2] In particular, it will examine two questions:

[1] World Bank, *Indonesia: Policies for Growth and Employment* (Jakarta: 1985), 185-86.

[2] Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978); Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Colin Leys, "Capital Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependency—the Significance of the Kenyan Case," *The Socialist Register* (1978), 241-66;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1. How can we explain the policies of the state toward the capital-owning classes when social power in civil society is separated from political dominance over the state apparatus—i.e., when the ruling class does not rule and the state apparatus is in the hands of its own officials?[3]

2. Is the authoritarian regime and state-centered capitalist industrialization a new and enduring form or a phenomenon of the period of transition from feudal or colonial to industrial society, in which the state provides the political and economic conditions for late industrialization and the protection for an emerging but fragile capital-owning class? Does the authoritarian regime embody characteristics which, at a certain stage, become both unnecessary to and a constraint on the expansion of industrial capitalism and the emerging capital-owning classes? Do the capital-owning classes, after incubation by authoritarian regimes, outgrow them?

State and Class

Authoritarian regimes have played a prominent and pivotal role in late capitalist industrialization; examples are Germany, Japan, and Eastern Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as well as the more recent cases of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and the rising industrial superstars of Asia: South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. In each of these cases, authoritarian regimes served vital political and economic functions. They ended the dominant political and social power of an entrenched but disintegrating feudal order and provided the emerging capital-owning and middle classes with protection from working-class and peasant-based reformist and revolutionary forces. In their paramount economic roles, they often supplied the essential investment for economic infrastructure and heavy industry, developing banking systems and generating growth through policies of economic and in some cases military expansion.[4]

In the recent Asian cases in particular, the regimes were instrumental in the growth of private, domestic capital-owning classes; they were responsible for tariff protection, trade monopolies, cheap credit, public util-

---

Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Towards an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44-77; Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986).

[3] Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," *Socialist Revolution* 33 (May-June 1977), 6-28.

[4] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962); P. N. Rodenstein-Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe," in A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh, eds., *The Economics of Underdevelopment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 245-55; Trimberger (fn. 2).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ities, state contracts for supply and construction, extensive state education systems, and disciplined low-wage labor.[5] In Latin America—despite greater fluctuation in the historical development of state policy toward the capital-owning classes, which saw periods of nationalist protection alternate with periods of support for the upper, often foreign-dominated, bourgeoisie—Huntington's observation of twenty years ago remains generally accurate: "They [the military] become the guardians of the existing middle-class order. . . . their historical role is to open the door to the middle class and close it on the lower class."[6]

Explaining the role of the authoritarian state in industrializing societies has been more difficult than recognizing it. Although there is a wide range of material on the subject, this paper will not be concerned with the more voluntarist analyses that concentrate on state power as primarily a function of institution building; rather, it will examine those approaches that explicitly focus upon the problem of the relationship between state power and social power. These approaches may be broadly divided into three major but overlapping schools of thought: instrumentalist, structuralist, and state-centered. Because I will be analyzing the Indonesian experience in terms of these three schools, some brief explanation is required.

The instrumentalist approach seeks to explain the state and its policies in terms of its subordination to instrumental control by the dominant social forces—whether through class-based parties, recruitment of members of the dominant class into the state apparatus, or the ideological hegemony of the ruling class.[7] In the case of Indonesia, significant numbers of political and bureaucratic power holders are also state managers of capital or substantial private owners of capital. However, any attempt to explain the military regime purely in such terms presents real problems because of the institutional autonomy of the state, the weakness of political institutions external to the state apparatus, and the poorly developed and defined class structures that existed in at least the initial stage of state formation.

[5] Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Nigel Harris, *The End of the Third World, Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1986); Stephan Haggard, "The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System," *World Politics* 38 (January 1986), 343-70; Clive Hamilton, "Capitalist Industrialization in East Asia's Four Little Tigers," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 13 (No. 1, 1983), 35-73; Alice Amsden, "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development," in Evans et al. (fn. 2), 78-106.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 222.

[7] Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in Robin Blackburn, ed., *Ideology in Social Science* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1972), 238-64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Structuralist approaches that recognize the relative autonomy of the state are more useful; autonomy is constrained, not by instrumental control, but by limits and imperatives placed upon state action through the very structures of society and economy. According to the structuralist position the state cannot, in the long term, contradict the logic of the economic system or override the interests of the dominant class.[8] The capital-owning classes have power, not in a formal political sense, but because they are the key to investment, production, and economic growth, and are essential to the economic survival of the society as a whole.[9] Their dominance is embedded in the very structure of the prevailing social and economic system. Consequently, the state is forced to intervene, by legislating and investing in troubled sectors, in order to mediate and resolve political and economic crises that threaten the health of the system as a whole.[10] Although structuralism avoids many of the difficulties inherent in instrumentalist approaches, it contains a mechanistic and determinist tendency that underestimates the significance of struggles at the political level, both within and between capital and the state, which play a formidable role in shaping power.

In Indonesia, the state and its officials constitute a coherent and identifiable political force of considerable autonomy and dominance. Here the state-centered approaches of writers like Skocpol, Trimberger, and Block are most useful—precisely because they recognize coherent and specific interests such as maintenance of power and revenue bases, and strategic and military objectives. The state can therefore be analyzed as a separate factor in the struggle for power and control over policy, which can (and does, when necessary) contravene the interests of the dominant class. Whether it is successful or not depends largely upon the conjuncture of state action and the configuration of social and economic power, thus bringing us back to the ultimate conditioning role of structural factors. At this level, we must also consider the political role of social forces. In Indonesia, a pact of domination had been forged between the politico-bureaucrats who dominate the state apparatus and the leading elements of the capital-owning classes based upon a complex conjuncture of interests. In times of stress, however, fissures have appeared in this alliance as the interests of the state have come into conflict with those of important

[8] Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89-127, 250-54.

[9] Block (fn. 3); Fred Block, "Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects," in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds., *Socialist Register* (London: Merlin Press, 1980), 227-42.

[10] Carnoy (fn. 8), 251-55; James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

segments of capital, and as these segments themselves have struggled for political advantage.

Authoritarian Regimes as a Transitional Phenomenon

The second question to be considered is that of the relationship between authoritarian states and specific stages of industrial development. Writers such as Gerschenkron, Moore, and, more recently, O'Donnell have noted the affinity between liberal democratic political systems and phases of capitalist development characterized by the free movement of goods, labor, and capital. Similarly, there is an affinity between authoritarian regimes and late industrialization involving investment in heavy industry.[11] In the latter case, authoritarian regimes are the result of pacts of domination between the larger bourgeoisie and the military. Such pacts are brought about in order to resolve political crises (i.e., popular and revolutionary challenges) and economic crises emerging from the system of import substitution industrialization; they also impose the discipline and control needed for a progression to large-scale investment in heavy industry. Pre-World War I Germany and Japan are traditional examples of the marriage of heavy industry and authoritarian rule; O'Donnell and others have also applied this model to situations in Asia and Latin America.[12]

Recent events in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, South Korea, and the Philippines indicate, however, that authoritarian regimes are making significant retreats. As Stepan remarks, referring to Latin America:

> Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes are still with us, but if the 1960s was the decade of the exhaustion of the early stage of import-substituting industrialization and parliamentary democracy in the southern cone, the 1980s appear to hold the promise of the "exhaustion" of the BA regime.[13]

Several reasons for a retreat from authoritarian rule are suggested by the prevailing theories. First, the phase of industrial deepening is being replaced by a phase of export-oriented industrialization and greater integration into the international division of labor, making the sort of eco-

[11] James R. Kurth, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes," *International Organization* 33 (Winter 1979), 1-34.

[12] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Changes in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 12 (Winter 1978), 3-38; Collier, ed. (fn. 2); Hyug Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," *World Politics* 39 (January 1987), 231-57; William Crowther, "Philippine Authoritarianism and the International Economy," *Comparative Politics* 18 (April 1986), 339-56; Fermin D. Adriano, "A Critique of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Thesis: The Case of the Philippines," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 14 (No. 4, 1984), 459-84.

[13] Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in Evans et al. (fn. 2), 317-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic and social regulation and control provided by authoritarian regimes irrelevant and counterproductive. Second, the rupture of the pact of domination as a consequence of the growing social and political power of the capital-owning and middle classes has resulted in a direct challenge to the regime. Third, the rupture of the pact of domination has, by its fragmentation and increasing internal conflict, weakened the social basis of authoritarian rule.

While the shifts of power in South Korea, Thailand, and Brazil were partly related to a strengthening of civil society and, in particular, to the power of the capital-owning classes, this was not the case in the Philippines and Argentina, where the new civilian governments are struggling to build social and political power bases of substance.[14]

Other differences in experience are demonstrated by specific cases: in Brazil, the capital-owning and middle classes pushed for a return to democracy; in Chile, a historically substantial middle and capital-owning class continues to give its support to the Pinochet regime. The authoritarian state in Indonesia has exercised power arbitrarily and pursued nationalist economic policies; the regimes of Singapore, South Korea, and Chile have been highly regularized, and their economic nationalism is circumscribed. The point illustrated here is that, while political systems may be conditioned by the international context in which they operate or the stage of industrialization over which they preside, the precise nature of regimes is the outcome of a specific history of social and political conflict.[15]

The retreat of authoritarianism over the past decade can only partly be explained by challenges from an increasingly powerful and well-organized civil society. A more pervasive factor in the recent weakening of the position of authoritarian regimes in industrializing economies may be found in their inability to handle the growing economic crises of the 1980s: debt, inflation, growing balance-of-payments deficits, fiscal crises, declining investment, and decaying infrastructure. These are important reasons behind the rush to hand over power in Latin America and to hand over economic responsibility to the private sector in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.[16] In such cases, the ideology and institutions of

[14] Kevin Hewison, "National Interests and Economic Downturn: Thailand," in Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Higgott, eds., *Southeast Asia in the 1980s: The Politics of Economic Crisis* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 52-79; S. K. Jayasuriya, "The Politics of Economic Policy in the Philippines During the Marcos Era," *ibid.*, 80-112; Stepan (fn. 13).

[15] Rhys Jenkins, "Divisions Over the International Division of Labour," *Capital and Class* 22 (Spring 1984), 28-57.

[16] Garry Rodan, "The Rise of Singapore's Second Industrial Revolution" in Robison et al. (fn. 14), 149-76; Jomo Kwame Sundarum, "Economic Crisis and Policy Response in Malaysia," *ibid.*, 113-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authoritarianism are likely to be in hibernation rather than in eclipse.

The political impact of economic crisis has been particularly severe on authoritarian regimes, and it is here that we may be able to identify some general inadequacies of such regimes as long-term political vehicles for industrialization. As O'Donnell and others have observed, the legitimacy of regimes is largely based upon their capacity to deliver economic growth; when this evaporates, so do most of the reasons for allies to remain loyal.[17] Ferdinand Marcos is a prime example of a ruler deserted by external and domestic allies as economic collapse deepened. O'Donnell explains this tendency as a product of the inherent inability of authoritarian regimes to build into the political system the mediations between the various factions of the capital-owning classes and between capital and labor that are necessary to hold the system together when economic conditions deteriorate.

The options, however, are not simply "authoritarianism" or "democracy." Authoritarian regimes take a variety of forms and preside over a wide range of economic policies and political alliances. The growing power of a bourgeoisie and the greater complexity and flexibility forced upon the state by a need to accommodate the international economy may result in a shift from a simple, narrowly based, and autonomous regime to one that is more complex and regularized, and yet less independent of market and dominant social forces. This is what is happening in Indonesia.

The Indonesian Case

Indonesia has experienced authoritarian rule since 1960, a major counterrevolution in 1965, and an oil boom in the 1970s, followed by a dramatic collapse in oil prices in the 1980s. These events have been combined with wild swings in economic policy and a constant process of economic struggle within and between the state and the capital-owning classes. As a consequence, Indonesia offers an important insight into the politics of capitalist industrialization and the relationship between the authoritarian state and the capital-owning classes.

Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Populism and Counterrevolution: 1949-1965

In 1949, Indonesia's new republican government inherited a commodity-based export economy already in serious decline. With the elimina-

[17] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in Collier (fn. 2), 285-318.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of the colonial regime, the dominant Dutch capitalist groups in banking, trade, and plantation estates were no longer guaranteed protection in the international marketplace and privileged access to land and labor within Indonesia. A rapidly growing vacuum was ready to be filled.

The domestic capital-owning classes were largely concentrated in the petty trading and small-scale commodity production sectors; they hardly constituted a promising basis for a strong bourgeoisie and capitalist industrialization. Because of their division into indigenous and Chinese elements, their political potential was seriously blunted. The indigenous group tended to be Muslim-oriented and strongly anti-Chinese; although it had proved able, from time to time, to force governments to introduce ad hoc protective legislation, it enjoyed little sympathy from state and party officials drawn from the bureaucratic middle classes who were wary of right-wing Muslim sentiments.[18] The Chinese, on the other hand, were more successful in building corporate, trading, and credit networks, but they were unable to play a formal, public political role.

At the political level, none of the fragmented parties of the 1950s had developed from a strong social base, and none could be regarded as representing the interests of the capital-owning class in any coherent way. Various governments had attempted to develop support of the indigenous petty capitalists by offering protection and monopolies in the import sector, but these experiments usually disintegrated into chaos and corruption. A few larger domestic groups were based on access to licenses, monopolies, and concessions provided by political patrons, but they remained almost exclusively tied to trade; none provided the cutting edge for industrial investment that economic planners hoped for.[19]

Under the guidance of Industry Minister Sumitro, an industrial plan was formulated that assumed and intended a significant degree of private participation.[20] The fact that none was forthcoming indicated that greater profits could be made by importing, and that private domestic capital had neither the resources nor the corporate organization necessary for large-scale, long-term industrial investment. Thus, the state came to occupy the center stage of domestic capital ownership by default rather than by design.

[18] Robison (fn. 2), 57-62.

[19] J. Sutter, *Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-55* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Data Paper No. 36 [4 vols.], Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1959), 1017-35.

[20] K. D. Thomas and J. Panglaykim, *Indonesia—the Effects of Past Policies and President Suharto's Plan for the Future* (Melbourne: Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 1973), 49-52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the government confiscated Dutch corporate assets in 1957-58, only a few ended up in private hands. The trading and plantation companies were largely appropriated by the military as sources of revenue. Furthermore, there was a widespread feeling that private and, particularly, indigenous capital had proven itself incapable of playing a responsible and effective economic role: if Indonesia was to industrialize, the state had to take the lead.[21]

The vacuum of power at both the social and the political level and the resulting entropy throughout the 1950s culminated in a political revolution from above, led by Sukarno with the support of the military. Parliamentary government was supplemented by an authoritarian regime, populist in style and corporatist in structure. However, the chaos was not over. Sukarno's political authority rested upon a highly personalized brand of patronage and charismatic populism that had neither an organizational nor a social base to sustain it. Continuing and deepening economic crisis and political conflict led to a military takeover in 1965, and to the elimination of both Sukarno and the growing Communist Party (PKD).

The military takeover resolved two crises. First, it settled a struggle for power between the military and the PKI, the two cohesive political forces that had emerged from the period of political disorder. Second, it reconstituted the path of capitalist development by bringing back international capital, the crucial and hitherto missing ingredient needed to clear up the crisis of investment and debt.

When the New Order came to power, the capital-owning classes were at low ebb. Since the nationalizations of 1957-58, foreign investment had been limited to the oil and minerals sector, where it operated under production-sharing agreements with the government. With the exception of relatively few domestic business groups that held lucrative trade monopolies, the bulk of domestic private capital remained locked into small-scale trade and manufacture. As the Sukarno regime encountered deepening economic crisis, even these groups were hard hit by surging inflation, lack of foreign exchange, and a collapsing infrastructure.[22]

The New Order inherited a large, rambling state-owned sector, for the most part located in trade and agriculture. Although the Sukarno government had attempted to use state corporations to develop an industrial base in manufacturing, including cement, steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, fertilizers, and engineering, these ventures had for the most part been rendered moribund by incompetent and corrupt man-

[21] *Ibid.*, 56-59.

[22] Robison (fn. 2), 80-85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agement, inflation, and a shortage of investment funds and foreign exchange for import of technology and spares.[23]

Economic Rehabilitation and the Early Stage of Import-Substitution Manufacture: 1965 to the mid-1970s

Although the land- and capital-owning classes and the salaried and professional middle classes supported the new regime of General Suharto, they were quickly disabused of any expectation that they would participate in government. The military, and selected civilian bureaucrats, rapidly assumed control of the state apparatus. They reinforced authoritarian rule by the consolidation of corporatist institutions and ideologies. The ideologues of the New Order attempted to legitimize the regime by arguing that a period of authoritarian rule, and hence, objective, scientific, and decisive policy-making was necessary to build an industrial base for the economy and provide the preconditions for future democratic government.[24]

Economic and industrial policy was hammered out in 1966 and 1967 by a team of technocrats appointed by Suharto to rehabilitate the bankrupt economy, solve the fiscal crisis and enable investment to begin again. The rescheduling of Indonesia's debts and negotiating of new loans made possible the resumption of commodity imports and thereby brought down runaway inflation. It also ended the desperate shortage of inputs that was strangling domestic production. In return for the assistance of international creditors, Indonesia's new leaders agreed to end the nationalist policies of state-led industrialization and to encourage private investment in the consumer-goods and agricultural sectors. Further, they agreed to draft a new foreign investment law that provided relief from taxation and other incentives for foreign investors. This was not a move toward free-market policies, but toward import substitution industrialization behind substantial tariff barriers in the hope and with the intention that private domestic and foreign investors would replace state corporations.[25]

Such policies were branded—by nationalist and radical critics alike—as a sellout to foreign capital and a victory of the international bourgeoisie over an attempt to achieve economic autonomy. The technocrats,

[23] Robison (fn. 2), 71-79; Thomas and Panglaykim (fn. 20), 56-75.

[24] Ken Ward, "Indonesia's Modernization: Ideology and Practice," in Rex Mortimer, ed., *Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated Modernization* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973), 67-82; Ali Moertopo, *The Acceleration and Modernization of 35 Years' Development* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1973): Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics of Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[25] Thomas and Panglaykim (fn. 20), 100-144.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most of whom had been trained in the United States, were charged with being agents of imperialist ideologies and with implementing policies that would crush domestic capital and allow domination by multinational corporations and the World Bank.[26] In fact, the adoption of these policies was a consequence of domestic considerations. After the political defeat of Sukarno and of the PKI, the new rulers sought an economic strategy compatible with the interests of the dominant political and social forces, which would at the same time address the fiscal crisis faced by the Indonesian state and a more general crisis of investment. Domestic capital, both state and private, was clearly unable to provide the engine for investment and growth that was so desperately needed. In the meantime, inflation and the balance-of-payments and revenue crises required urgent inputs of funds that could only be supplied from abroad.[27]

It is not correct to say that domestic capital in general was sacrificed to foreign interests. True, the domestic, Muslim-oriented petty bourgeoisie continued on its path of gradual decline in trade and small-scale manufacture. The political organizations that represented its interests were ignored by the state, which instead sponsored its own business organization, Kadin, under the directorship of military businessmen.[28] In fact, domestic investment grew substantially between 1965 and 1975; by 1975 it furnished around 50 percent of total non-oil investment.[29] Over half of this was provided by the state, but a significant development was the emergence of a large number of private corporations enjoying political patronage; they were located not only in trade, but in manufacturing, forestry, property, and transport.

Political patronage and state protection afforded privileged access to state bank credit, forestry concessions, trade and manufacturing monopolies, official distributorships of basic foodstuffs, and state contracts for supply and construction. The bulk of these new corporate groups were Chinese-owned; their directors generally had had long associations with the military, acting as financiers for army commands and individual generals, and de facto managers for corporations owned by the military. Several indigenous capitalists also emerged, not from the traditional Muslim petty bourgeoisie, but from the higher echelons of the civil and military bureaucracies.[30]

[26] Rex Mortimer, "Indonesia: Growth or Development?" in Mortimer (fn. 24); Bruce Glassburner, "Political Economy and the Suharto Regime," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 14 (November 1978), 24-51.

[27] Robison (fn. 2), 131-42.

[28] *Ibid.*, 323-27.

[29] Ingrid Palmer, *The Indonesian Economy Since 1965* (London: Cass, 1978), 111.

[30] Robison (fn. 2), 131-75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Industrial Deepening and Economic Nationalism: Policy from the Mid-1970s to the Early 1980s

Starting in the early 1970s, the government began to shift its industrial strategy toward the goal of creating an integrated industrial base embracing capital- and intermediate-goods sectors in addition to the established consumer-goods manufactures.

State corporations such as Pertamina and Krakatau Steel led the way in making extensive investments in petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel, and metal engineering. These were complemented by massive state investments in infrastructure, particularly transport and communications. Substantial benefits accrued for domestic private capital from this policy because the bulk of government spending involved the purchase of technology and provision of infrastructure and plant. Although international corporations secured most of the contracts for supply and construction, domestic corporations were given access to the limit of their capacity. The position of the latter was reinforced by policies that mandated the exclusion of foreign investors from sectors in which domestic capital had the capacity to operate, or by the requirement to take domestic joint-venture partners. Large private domestic corporate groups flourished during this period, aided further by the general buoyancy created by the injection of oil money into the Indonesian economy.

Why was such a change in the direction of industrial policy taken and, in view of the degree to which it benefited the new domestic corporate manufacturers, what role did the latter play in the development of the new policy?

The idea of an integrated industrial base for Indonesia was not new. It underlay the policies of Professor Sumitro in the 1950s and of Sukarno in the 1960s. The creation of a capital- and intermediate-goods sectors was conceived, not only to end economic dependence, but to allow strategic autonomy. In the early 1970s, General Ali Moertopo embodied the strategic aspect in the concept of "national resilience."[31] Since 1965, the architects of Indonesia's industrial policies—Ibnu Sutowo, Soehartoyo, Soehoed, Hartato, Ginanjar, and Habibie—have all argued the merits of protection and heavy state investment in major industrial projects. Without the base of capital- and intermediate-goods production and the backward and forward linkages offered by integrated circuits of industrial production, self-sustaining and self-generating industrialization was, in their opinion, not possible.[32] Such views were implemented in policy as

[31] Moertopo (fn. 24).

[32] B. J. Habibie, "Industrialisasi, Transformasi, Teknologi dan Pempbangunan Bangsa [Industrialization, transformation, technology and national development] *Prisma* (No. 1,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a result of the boom in state revenues and foreign earnings generated by oil. The corporate tax on oil grew from Rp. 344 billion in 1973/74 to Rp. 8,627 billion in 1981/82 (from 35.6 to 70.6 percent of total revenue).

The ideological commitment to industrial deepening also enhanced the financial base, economic power, and patronage of the major bureaucrats and state managers of capital because it was they who appropriated the authority to direct investment, allocate contracts, and grant import monopolies. Policies of industrial deepening and state regulation therefore became integrated into the political interests of the bureaucrats of the New Order.

Between 1975 and 1985, the role of private capital in the rapid state-led industrialization of Indonesia varied dramatically. The declining, Muslim-oriented small-business sector continued to slide despite its strident political resistance. In the months before the anti-Japanese student riots of 1974, associations and newspapers representing Muslim-oriented indigenous small capital had conducted a public and virulent anti-foreign, anti-Chinese campaign in an effort to halt their deteriorating position. After the riots in Jakarta in January 1974, several protective measures were introduced for domestic and indigenous capital, including the requirement that foreigners take indigenous joint-venture partners; such requirements, however, generally proved to be ineffectual and poorly implemented.[33]

Foreign capital investment continued to dominate in the oil and mineral sector, but declined in the non-oil sector between 1977 and 1985. Foreign corporate spokesmen put the blame on controls upon the sectors in which they were permitted to invest, joint-venture requirements, over-regulation by government, corruption, and bureaucratic incompetence.[34] Because the Indonesian government had access to huge amounts of oil money that made it less reliant on foreign sources of funding, it could now afford to impose stringent requirements on foreign investors.

This situation contrasts with the phenomenal growth of major domestic corporate groups. Led by Liem Sioe Liong, Willem Soerjadjaja, Tan Siong Ke, Bob Hasan, Hendra Rahardja, Ciputra, and various Suharto family interests including the Bimantara group, these corporate

1986), 42-54; A. R. Soehoed, "Japan and the Development of the Indonesian Manufacturing Sector," *Indonesian Quarterly* 9 (October 1981), 2-19. Ginanjar's views are best illustrated in the newspaper interview, "Penyebab Ekonomi Biaya Tinggi Tidak Bisa Langsung pada Proteksi" [The cause of the high-cost economy cannot be directly attributed to protection], *Kompas*, August 24, 1985, pp. 1 and 12.

[33] Robison (fn. 2), 164-69.

[34] *Jakarta Post*, August 5, 1986, p. 7; August 18, 1986, p. 7; August 22, 1986, p. 4; August 28, 1986, pp. 1, 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

groups extended their industrial activities—invariably in joint ventures with foreign partners—into auto manufacture, tires, batteries, components, cement, electronics, into the engineering sectors that grew around the oil industry, and into the manufacture of steel. Business groups with strong political connections, including Liem, Bob Hasan, and the Suhartos' Bimantara group, secured control of the import of technology and raw materials.[35]

The emergence of these groups would not have been possible without state policies that strictly regulated the penetration of foreign capital to allow a domestic dominance in certain areas such as foodstuffs, import and domestic distribution, logging, plywood, and cement. Controlled access was permitted to the technology- and capital-intensive sectors where domestic capital needed foreign technology, organization, and skills. Some domestic groups would not have grown so rapidly without privileged permission to form monopolies, or without concessions, licenses, and credit made available by political patrons in a heavily regulated economy.

These policies of protection and subsidy were not imposed upon the state by a politically cohesive and powerful bourgeoisie. Class action was politically difficult because the dominant element of the emerging domestic corporate giants was Chinese, and therefore not accorded a legitimate public role in Indonesian politics. Instead, the political strength of capital in this period derived from a combination of nationalist ideologies and alliances of individual capitalists with specific centers of politico-bureaucratic power. Highly profitable client corporate groups gave the politico-bureaucratic power centers access to revenues for political and personal needs, as well as entry to the world of corporate capitalism as shareholders and investors. Increasing numbers of officials and their families secured equity in client corporations, mostly Chinese-owned, and established trade monopolies. Because they were able to determine the flow of patronage in a heavily state-controlled economy, they could virtually guarantee huge profits at the corporate level. With the blurring of the boundary between political power and bureaucratic authority, an increasing fusion of politico-bureaucratic power and corporate capital ownership had developed, which constituted one of the driving forces behind the growth of private domestic capital in this period.

[35] Robison (fn. 2), 271-372; Paul Handley, "Coming to the Defence of the Family Business," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 22, 1986, pp. 40-42; Steven Jones and Raphael Pura, "Power and Privilege in Indonesia," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, November 24, 1986, pp. 1, 8; November 25, 1986, pp. 1, 9; November 26, 1986, pp. 1, 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Collapse of Oil Prices and the Emergence of Contradictions between Capital and State

Surging oil prices and the consequent boom in state revenues in the decade starting in the early 1970s enabled the state to finance an ambitious program of industrialization, built around large projects, for production of capital and intermediate goods. In 1982, however, oil prices declined from $38 to $28 per barrel, and in early 1986 they collapsed to $12 before climbing slowly and fitfully back to $18. This price collapse had a dramatic effect upon Indonesia's foreign earnings and state revenues, both of which went into deficit.[36] The Indonesian government was no longer able to underwrite the industrialization program; indeed, it was forced to look around for a non-oil domestic tax base.

The oil price collapse resulted in a transformation of the economic environment in which political conflict erupted over economic policy. Within the capital-owning classes, influence shifted from the major domestic corporate groups dependent upon state protection and regulation to international corporations with an interest in maximizing the free international movement of capital. At the same time, major differences developed between downstream producers, upstream producers, and importers of industrial inputs. Most important, there was a shift in the relationship between state and capital, and a weakening of the position of the politico-bureaucrats.

Domestic manufacturers suffered in the 1980s not only because the decline in state investment meant fewer contracts and orders, but also because a general world recession dampened demand both domestically and internationally. Domestic companies began to operate below capacity. The decline of state investment produced decline in the private sector; precisely at the time when the state looked to domestic private capital to take up a greater share of the burden of investment,[37] the latter was less able to do so. Indeed, the state was forced to come to the rescue of one of the largest industrial conglomerates, Liem Sioe Liong's Indocement, and to relieve it of the increasing burdens of servicing U.S. dollar debts when its domestic output and the value of the rupiah were both falling. The state purchased 33 percent of Indocement and made cheap

[36] Ross Muir, "Survey of Recent Developments," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 12 (August 1986), 1-27.

[37] " 'Pri,' 'Non Pri' dan Investasi Rp. 62, 500,000,000,000" ['Indigenous,' 'non-indigenous' and the investment of Rp. 67.5 trillion] *Tempo*, March 31, 1984, pp. 66, 67; "Mendorong Swasta ke Mana?" [Where is private business being pushed to?], *Tempo*, February 25, 1984, pp. 68-73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state credit available, enabling the firm to replace expensive dollar debts with cheap rupiah ones.[38]

Most significant were the divergent interests of the upstream producers of capital and intermediate goods and importers on the one hand, and on the other, downstream producers of consumer goods for both domestic and international markets. As the economic squeeze intensified, downstream producers argued that expensive inputs raised their costs of production, and they demanded the right to purchase on the open market. Because protected and subsidized domestic upstream producers would be unable to compete with foreign imports if tariffs and quotas were removed, such pressure was a threat to the state's plans to develop an integrated industrial base. The demands were also a threat to the extensive system of import monopolies that embraced the full range of imported inputs and was controlled by alliances of politico-bureaucrats and their corporate clients, including the Suharto family.

The government was forced to accede to some of the demands of the downstream producers—not because of their political strength, but because of the need to develop a viable sector of non-oil (and preferably manufactured) exports. Despite low wages, manufactured exports had been limited by high costs of production, due mainly to high input costs and bureaucratic inefficiencies and charges. The government introduced reforms in May and October 1986, reducing the number of import monopolies and permitting downstream producers to circumvent some of the import monopolies by independently importing inputs where these were required for export production and not available domestically.[39] The reform contained a second threat to the major domestic corporate groups, namely the concessions offered to foreign investors. The number of sectors previously closed to foreign investment was drastically reduced, and requirements for the transfer of equity to domestic partners were relaxed. Foreign companies were permitted to borrow from domestic banks and to engage in domestic distribution; tariffs were lowered across a wide range of sectors.

The struggle over policy and the shift toward a less protected national economy more closely integrated into the world economy was clearly conditioned by fiscal pressures and balance-of-payments deficits brought

[38] "Pembelian Saham P. T. Indocement Bukan untuk Membantu Dana" [The purchase of shares in P. T. Indocement is not intended to assist it financially], *Kompas*, August 14, 1985, p. 1; "Bubarkan Perusahaan Negara yang Tidak Miliki Potensi" [Dissolve state enterprises without potential], *Sinar Harapan*, August 22, 1985, p. 2.

[39] Muir (fn. 36), 18-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about by the oil crisis. At the same time, there was a very real political dimension to the conflict, in which several major forces and interests were involved, as follows:

1. Forces acting generally in defense of policies of state-led industrial deepening.
   a. Military and civil bureaucrats. Because of their political and economic position, they had the ability to appropriate the resources and authority of the state apparatus, and increasingly combined political power, bureaucratic authority, and capital ownership. Since considerable power and revenue is derived from the allocation of licenses, monopolies, and concessions within a complex system of state regulation, the erosion of this state control weakened the position of the politico-bureaucrats.
   b. Economic policy makers within the state apparatus with a political and ideological commitment to creating a broad industrial base for Indonesia, integrating capital, consumer, and intermediate goods. Over the past twenty years, these have included managers of the most important state corporations and ministers in charge of such strategic economic portfolios as Industry, Research and Technology, and the Capital Investment Board.
   c. Private and state-owned capital in the upstream sector. The bulk of these enterprises are state-owned: Krakatau (steel), Pertamina (oil and petrochemicals), PAL (shipbuilding), and numerous other projects in metal processing, cement, engineering, and chemicals. Private capital has moved increasingly into such industries as cement, plastics, tin plate, cold-rolled steel, pharmaceutical raw materials, and auto engines. Few of these industries would survive a removal of protection and subsidy.
   d. Importers of industrial inputs of both intermediate and capital goods. Because these inputs are invariably held as monopolies, importers are able to operate without competition in Indonesia. Some import monopolies are tied to domestic production, as already noted in the case of cold-rolled steel (Liem Sioe Liong), and plastics and tin plate (Bob Hasan). Opening up the import market and removing monopolies would spell disaster for the traders. Dominant among these importers is the Bimantara group, comprising members of the Suharto family.
2. Forces operating to reduce state economic control and to open up the market.
   a. Economic planners within the World Bank and various Indonesian planning bodies and universities who argue for deregulation and movement into industries that hold a comparative advantage. They themselves do not hold political power, but have had policy successes because economic conditions have made it increasingly difficult for the state to continue to finance its nationalist industrial policies.
   b. International capital, which—although complex and characterized by numerous internal divisions and conflicts of interest—has increas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ingly pressed for deregulation of the economy and the regularization of the state apparatus. The attractiveness of direct foreign capital investment and the influence of its demands grows as the domestic capacity to generate investment decreases. The position of foreign capital is also strengthened as Indonesia's accelerating foreign debt requires increasing access to foreign loans.

c. Domestic downstream producers forced to purchase their manufactured inputs at inflated prices, either from import monopoly holders or from protected and subsidized, but inefficient, domestic firms. These producers are also hardest hit by recent currency devaluations. Their commitment to the free market is selective, however, and we must assume that they would oppose free entry of consumer goods into Indonesia.

For five years, the struggle over economic policy has been one of the most public and controversial aspects of Indonesian political life. The level of passion and sensitivity can be gauged by the fact that one of the largest and most influential newspapers in Indonesia, *Sinar Harapan*, was banned—partly in response to a story that the government was set to abolish all non-tariff import barriers.

Finding themselves favored by the new economic situation, advocates of deregulation, including the World Bank and domestic economists such as Professor Sumitro, the influential and respected former Industry and Trade Minister, have become increasingly vocal in calling for dismantling of the large protected industries and a shift in policy toward export-oriented production based on comparative advantage.[40] Perhaps the most dramatic step by the government was its decision, in 1985, to take the responsibility for assessment of import duties away from the notoriously corrupt Customs Department and employ a Swiss survey company for this task.[41] This decree was a direct assault on the basis of the politico-bureaucrats' power—and a measure of the urgency with which the government was approaching the question of reducing the costs and increasing the competitiveness of industrial exports.

The whole issue of corruption represents a key factor in the changing relations between state and capital. Official corruption may have made possible the monopolies and privileges that have enabled the major do-

[40] Soemitro Djojohashikusumo, "Kebijakan Perdagang an dan Perindustrian Tidak Sejalan dengan Kebijaksanaan Pemerintah" (Trade and industrial policy is not in line with government strategies] *Kompas*, August 23, 1985, pp. 1, 12; Richard Robison, "After the Goldrush: The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Indonesia in the 1980s," in Robison et al. (fn. 14), 16-51; Anthony Rowley, "Economic Schizophrenia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 10, 1987, pp. 70-76.

[41] Sjahrir, "Privitasasi menuju Efisiensir" [Privatization leading to efficiency] *Prisma* (No. 7, 1985), 14-22; Howard Dick, "Survey of Recent Developments," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 23 (December 1985), 10-12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mestic private corporations to emerge, but its negative aspects in terms of production costs and political uncertainty now pose an increasing problem, especially for downstream producers entering the export market. The latter now represent a far more significant economic and social force than they did some twenty years ago when the New Order came to power. In 1974-75, gross private domestic investment was Rp. 571 billion; in 1980-81, Rp. 5,584 billion was invested by private domestic capital.[42] While the largest corporate concentrations were heavily involved in upstream production and importing, the manufacture of consumer goods for the domestic market by large and small producers had grown exponentially in line with the substantial general rates of economic growth in the 1970s.

Over the past two years, domestic downstream manufacturers have become increasingly and publicly critical, not only of official corruption and the import monopolists and upstream producers who contribute so much to the high cost of inputs, but toward the policies that underpin the development of a national, integrated industrial base. Critics have included some influential figures. One is Sukamdani Gitarsarjono, the present head of Kadin and publisher of Indonesia's major financial paper, who has close connections with the palace and major interests in hotels, cement, property, and construction. Another is Probosutejo, the President's brother, who has extensive holdings in trade, plastics, property, poultry, chemicals, glass, construction, and automobiles.

Perhaps the most cohesive institutional base for the political development of these interests is Kadin, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce. The intention of those elements of business that constitute Kadin has been to develop it as a corporatist institution in order to bring their influence to bear in a concerted way *within* the existing structures of power.[43] Business has not called for a change in the political system itself (which might have opened the door to participation by workers and peasants), but rather for a formal niche within the existing system. In 1987, Kadin was officially accorded the status of sole channel of communication between government and business. This enhanced status will undoubtedly strengthen its position within the business community and provide greater opportunities for business to influence policy making in a more direct and institutionalized way; but it is a two-edged sword which may also consolidate Kadin's position as an institutional channel by which the government may impose its control over business.

The resilience of economic nationalist ideas and the economic and

[42] World Bank (fn. 1), 180.

[43] *Buletin Kadin Indonesia*, August 15, 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political strength of the domestic upstream producers has proven to be considerable, however. As noted earlier, Capital Investment Board Chief Ginanjar, Research and Technology Minister Habibie, and Industry Minister Hartato continue to present strong defenses of the existing policies of industrialization, arguing that free-trade policies lead to dependence and stagnation. Self-sustaining and self-generating growth, they argue, requires complete industrial circuits able to generate backward and forward linkages; these can only be achieved by financing and protecting large industrial projects, particularly in capital and intermediate goods. Habibie's high-tech investment projects in aircraft, ship-building, and armaments have remained relatively untouched.

In a concrete sense, however, the strength of the existing industrial strategies and relationships between the state and capital is embedded in the political and economic interests of the major state managers, the large domestic corporate capitalists, and the state politico-bureaucrats. Huge assets are tied up in industrial projects that cannot be realized and transferred into other, export-oriented industries. A change of policy therefore constitutes a direct threat to the underpinnings of the political-economic alliance that dominates Indonesia. These interests in the military and the state apparatus can only be shaken or dislodged by a major and continuing fiscal crisis.

It is therefore not surprising that the state has postponed and abandoned major industrial projects only with the greatest reluctance, and has continued to fund key areas of investment in the capital- and intermediate-goods sectors despite the fiscal pressures and the increasing reliance on foreign loans.

Structural Change and Authoritarianism

Under Suharto, relations between state and capital have been characterized by the emergence of a pact of domination among the politico-bureaucrats who control the state apparatus, an upper bourgeoisie of major domestic client corporate groups, and those elements of international corporate capital that are integral to the state's industrial strategy: the oil companies and the manufacturing investors. This pact has been founded on policies of highly regulated, nationalist policies of state-led industrialization that place the levers of economic power firmly in the hands of the politico-bureaucrats and guarantee the economic position of domestic corporate clients.

The pact of domination has been bound together as well as threatened by a complex of elements. Perhaps the crucial factor in understanding

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the dynamics of these developments is the coherent identity and interests of the politico-bureaucrats themselves, an identity that is too complex to allow them to be categorized simply as either a state class or a political elite.[44] As officials of the state, they have a vested interest in securing the political and economic viability of the state apparatus—most importantly, a revenue base and the continuing economic growth necessary to legitimize the regime. As a governing elite wielding domination over the state apparatus, they are concerned with securing their own economic and political viability. They therefore require access to extrabudgetary funding that can be obtained either by directly appropriating state power and resources or by entering alliances with individual capitalists. As state managers of capital, they are concerned with the general process of capital accumulation and the protection of their corporate position within the economy. As individuals, families, and factions that hold trade monopolies and own shares or partnerships in corporations, they have a class interest in capital accumulation and the control of labor.

Alliance with major corporate groups (involving an exchange of funds or shareholding for concessions, contracts, or monopolies) has constituted the institutional basis of the symbiotic relationship between capital and the politico-bureaucrats. Because of their dependence on state patronage, client corporate groups are easily integrated into the state's broad industrial strategies: they become, in one sense, another arm of the state. Policies of economic nationalism and industrial deepening not only reflect the ideological commitment of politico-bureaucrats to national self-reliant development, but reinforce the power of the pact of domination by entrenchment in the complex network of control and regulations and the consequent opportunity for patronage and monopoly.

In the mid-1980s, the politico-bureaucrats and their corporate clients were nevertheless confronted by significant structural and political threats to their position and to the pact of domination, as well as to the autonomy afforded the state apparatus by oil revenues throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.

The collapse of oil prices created an urgent requirement for the development of non-oil export earnings and domestic revenue sources. This need was in direct conflict with the focus on basic industries, high production costs, and poor export performance that had become an integral part of the strategy of state-led industrial deepening, the system of

[44] C. Meillassoux, "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali," *Journal of Development Studies* 6 (January 1970), 97-110; Samir Amin, *Unequal Development* (Hassocks, U.K.: Harvester, 1976), 23-30, 52, 53, 372-74; I. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London: Heinemann, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state-allocated monopolies, and the protection of client corporate groups. The collapse of oil prices and the general recession also produced tensions and conflicts within the capital-owning classes: between the protected client groups and those excluded from the monopolies and state contracts, between domestic and international capitalists, and between upstream and downstream producers. The rapidly increasing national debt and reliance on foreign sources of loan and investment capital meant that international business was now in a more favorable position to dictate terms. The structural and political pressures unleashed on the state have had an impact on three areas: the mode of politico-bureaucratic domination of the state apparatus, the pervasive state regulation of the economy, and the strategy of integrated national industrialization. In other words, the pressures are mounting for regularization of the state apparatus and deregulation of the economy: a tantalizing combination of authoritarianism at the political level and liberalism at the economic. The state is not in a position to resist these pressures fully, as indicated by the reforms introduced into Pertamina and the Jakarta Customs Service, and the system of licenses, import monopolies, and tariff structures between April 1985 and December 1987, as well as the deregulation of the banking system.

What has happened is that the highly regulated and protected state-led economy of the oil era is increasingly at variance with the needs of capitalists operating in the new international division of labor, where the free operation of market forces and the free movement of capital are priorities. Without adequate oil reserves, the Indonesian state cannot avoid being drawn into this system, and the nature of Indonesian authoritarianism is beginning to change accordingly.

Clearly, the state's autonomy and its power to determine the structure of capital ownership and investment through regulation and allocation of resources has been diminished, as has the power of officials to appropriate the authority and resources of public office. The pact of domination established between the politico-bureaucrats and leading domestic corporate groups has also been breached with the process of economic deregulation and the retreat from policies of industrial deepening. These transformations have been achieved as a consequence not of political struggle, but of structural pressures upon the Indonesian economy that favor the interests of international capital, downstream domestic producers, and domestic private bankers. Neither the capital-owning classes as a whole nor any of their factions are able to impose institutional, instrumental dominance over the state apparatus. They remain fragmented and politically disorganized while their leading elements, Chinese and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign, are excluded from formal, class-based, political activity. Indeed, even domestic critics of the regime and its policies do not suggest democratic reform; rather, they are promoting a more formal accommodation of their interests within the existing authoritarian structures. This is a position consistent with relative political weakness, continuing economic dependence on the state, and the fear of opening the door to popular participation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL CHOICE AND SYSTEM STRUCTURE IN WORLD POLITICS

By JAMES D. MORROW*

ALTHOUGH we often discuss world politics with reference to the "world system," the world system is rarely studied as a process of social choice. The study of social choice processes analyzes how the preferences of individuals are collected into social outcomes. The questions in social choice theory are how collective outcomes occur, to what extent those outcomes reflect the will of the system's units, and how social processes could be reordered to the benefit of all. In this paper, we shall inquire into the implications of Arrow's theorem, the fundamental result in social choice theory, for international politics; review the results of formal analyses of international social choice processes; and illustrate the point with a critique of mainstream international theory.

To date, most work on social choice processes has analyzed democratic institutions such as elections and legislatures. Social choice theory, however, holds for any social process in which the outcomes are a consequence of the desires of its members. International politics resolves international issues (e.g., the organization of international trade and the location of borders) through a clash of interests; it is therefore a social choice process. Change on a particular issue occurs because some actor desired that change. In order to understand how social choice theory can illuminate that process, it is necessary to review Arrow's theorem.

The Relevance of Arrow's Theorem

Social choice analysis focuses on the interaction of preferences over possible outcomes, strategies (or actions) taken to achieve desired outcomes, and a mechanism that combines the strategies to determine the outcome. The fundamental result of social choice theory is the General Possibility Theorem of Kenneth Arrow.[1] Given a society with at least

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1986 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, in Washington, DC. I would like to thank Robert Axelrod, Harold Jacobsen, Keith Krehbiel, Michael McGinnis, A.F.K. Organski, and J. David Singer for their comments on that earlier draft. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors.

[1] The basic source here is Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1963). Two other useful sources are Amartya K. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), and Charles R. Plott, "Axio-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two actors and faced with at least three possible outcomes (x, y, and z), we would like to find a mechanism to produce a societal ordering over the outcomes by collecting the actors' preferences.[2] Arrow's theorem states that no process, or social welfare function, can satisfy all of the following conditions:

1. *Unrestricted Domain*: Actors can hold any possible preference ordering over the outcomes.
2. *Pareto Principle*: If all actors prefer x to y, society must prefer x to y.
3. *Independence of Infeasible Alteratives*: If all actors retain the same preference over a pair of alternatives, then the societal ordering of that pair cannot change.
4. *Nondictatorship*: There is no single actor whose preferences determine the societal ordering.
5. *Social Rationality*: The societal ordering is connected and transitive; that is, all alternatives can be compared and ranked; if x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then x must be preferred to z.

The essence of the proof lies in the contradiction between transitive social preferences and nondictatorship, assisted by the other conditions. Unrestricted domain forces us to consider preference cycles (i.e., where decisive sets of actors prefer x to y, y to z, and z to x) within the system; if these cycles are broken, a limited dictator is set up over just those alternatives. This limited dictator can then employ transitivity of the social preference to extend the dictatorship over all alternatives.

There are two interpretations of the implications of Arrow's theorem for politics. One—that social orders must be intransitive—implies that it is absurd to talk about collectivities taking rational action. When intransitivities exist in the outcome of a social choice procedure, the actors' preferences do not determine collective outcomes.

But how can we tell if intransitivities exist in social orders? If a cycle exists in a social ordering, then any outcome in that cycle can replace any other by setting the order of comparison so that the desired outcome is last. If the social order is $x > y > z > x$ (read x is better than y, which is better than z, which is better than x) and the outcome is y, z can supplant y if we first replace y with x and then x with z. When cycles occur, outcomes are susceptible to change without any alteration in either the social

matic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (August 1976), 511-96.

[2] Only ordinal preferences are considered in Arrow's theorem. That is, the actors each have a preference ordering that ranks the outcomes from first to worst without specifying the magnitude of the differences between outcomes. Cardinal preferences capture an actor's willingness to take risks in a utility function where expected utility translates to preference over lotteries. Thus, there are many possible sets of cardinal preferences for a given set of ordinal preferences.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decision process or any actor's preferences. Some actor will always have an interest in changing the outcome of such a cycle, so nontransitive social orders should produce transitory outcomes. But outcomes in international politics change only as a result of a major effort by aggrieved parties; the first interpretation seems unlikely to hold.

In the second interpretation of Arrow's theorem, social choice mechanisms create transitive social orders by violating one of the other conditions. For example, Sen has shown that if the members of a society have sufficiently restricted preferences, then transitive social decisions can be reached through majority rule.[3] In this view, social decision mechanisms can produce consistent choices only because they violate at least one of the first four conditions of Arrow's theorem.

Social outcomes cannot be determined from the actors' preferences alone; process matters as much as preferences.[4] Either certain considerations intervene and establish some outcome in a preference cycle as the best, or the mechanism itself violates one of the conditions in order to produce a transitive order. For want of a better term, and because of the implications involved, I shall refer to the processes that create transitive collective orders as "structure." Arrow's theorem tells us that there is no general procedure to break cycles in societal preferences (if the other conditions are met); instead, the structure of the system breaks these cycles in ways that may seem completely arbitrary.

However, structure does not produce outcomes without preferences: actors choose strategies to achieve their preferences by considering how structural mechanisms will produce outcomes. The chosen strategies and resulting outcomes reflect both preferences and structural constraints. Structure, then, provides some actors with the opportunity to use the cycle-breaking mechanisms to their own advantage. For example, legislative rules create the possibility of obstruction by committees that are at odds with the will of the whole legislature.[5] Committee systems do create stable outcomes out of the possible chaos of majority rule, but at the cost of endowing certain actors with powers they can abuse to manipulate

[3] Sen (fn. 1), 173-86.

[4] The point that preference and structure in conjunction produce social outcomes is developed by William H. Riker in "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 74 (June 1980), 432-46.

[5] The initial effort at the formal analysis of structure in legislatures is by Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (February 1979), 27-59. Formal analyses of how committees can use their position within the legislative process to obstruct legislation are given in Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackey, "Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior," *American Journal of Political Science* 27 (November 1983), 740-61, and Keith Krehbiel, "Obstruction and Representativeness in Legislatures," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (August 1985), 643-59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outcomes to their own benefit. If we are to understand social outcomes, we need to comprehend preferences, structures, and how they interact through the actors' strategies.

Even though Arrow's theorem appears simply to deny the possibility of a social choice rule, it actually directs us to analyze how existing processes shape the strategies the actors choose in pursuit of their preferences, and how strategies and processes lead to consistent social outcomes. Such an analysis requires careful attention both to the logic of individuals' actions and to how those actions produce collective outcomes. In a sense, even microeconomics can be thought of as the study of how individuals act within the constraint of one social choice procedure, the market. Arrow's theorem, rather than being a profoundly negative statement, leads to the formal study of how actual social choice processes work.

In domestic politics, the distinction between structure and preference is clear; structure is concerned with the institutions of government, including legislative and electoral rules, bureaucratic organization, and party systems. Preferences are concerned with the policy positions of political actors. As those positions and the actors themselves change (i.e., through elections), so does the set of preferences. Institutional rules and mechanisms constrain the actors' efforts to obtain their ends within the system. They also differentiate the actors, providing some, at the expense of others, with control over portions of the political process.

Even as we hold this image of the torrents of preferences swirling through the sluices of the dam of structure, we realize that the dam also changes over time. Like the failure of dams, structural change is often dramatic and sweeping.[6] Because structure acts to channel preferences toward some outcomes and to deflect them from others, structural changes should produce dramatic changes in outcomes. For instance, before the Reed rules were introduced in the United States Congress in 1891, the Democrats could block legislation on the floor by refusing to vote, thereby preventing a quorum. The Reed rules provided that all members present were counted to determine a quorum, and the Democrats could no longer block legislation by refusing to vote. Consequently, significantly more legislation was passed in the 52nd Congress than in the 51st.[7]

[6] On the topic of structural change in legislatures, a formal perspective is provided by Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., *Political Science: The Science of Politics* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 51-81.

[7] See William A. Robinson, *Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1930). I am indebted to Keith Krehbiel for this example.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the rules constrain the actors, the obvious question is why they do not adjust the rules to produce the desired outcomes. The consequences of structural change are not completely predictable; although changes in the rules can produce the desired outcomes, they can also unpredictably produce undesirable outcomes. In addition, rules changes in legislatures generally require greater support than other types of legislation. Structural change, then, is driven by the desires of actors to produce outcomes—but only when such change is absolutely necessary. In the words of William Riker, institutions are "congealed tastes"; they exist in order to realize certain outcomes, and they endure because the expected cost of changing them exceeds the expected benefit.[8]

Although the legislative analogy is illustrative of how structure, strategy, and preference jointly produce outcomes and how structure changes slowly over time, the analogy should not be stretched too far. In the international system, both structure and structural change are more difficult to see because structure does not reside in a set of rules or formal institutions as it does in domestic politics. In the latter, we think of social choice processes as being codified voting rules and procedures whose effect on outcomes can be calculated. In international politics, explicit social choice rules do not exist, but the lack of codified rules does not mean that a social choice process is not occurring.

In the absence of a central authority, implicit social choice procedures have arisen in the international system. These procedures regulate how the actors' preferences are aggregated into outcomes. Preferences are the actors' preferred resolution of the issues at dispute in the international system. International structure resides in those elements of the international system that resolve conflicts in preferences. One form of that structure is the way states use force or the threat of force to resolve issue conflicts. Like preferences and structure in domestic politics, international structure constrains the actors' pursuit of their preferences; compared to those preferences, it is quite durable.

Capabilities are the most obvious reflection of international structure: the ability of a state to impose its will on other states through military, economic, or political control. But capabilities or their distribution are not structure; they are shorthand terms for the actors that possess structural advantages in the implicit social choice process of coercion in international politics. In domestic politics, actors may possess structural advantages—such as committee chairmanships or presidential authority—that reflect how institutions favor these actors' preferences. But such in-

[8] Riker (fn. 4), 445.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stitutional rules and procedures are the structure, not the possession of positions in the structure. Similarly, capabilities are structural advantages as opposed to the structure itself.

The structure of coercion is also reflected in certain military alliances. Durable alliances, like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, reduce their members' freedom of action even though they continue only at the abidance of their members. The cost of breaking these alliances exceeds the constraints they place on action, so they continue and operate as structural constraints. Other alliances are pacts of temporary convenience and do not operate as structural constraints; the difference is one of durability.[9]

Bargaining structures are reflected in international regimes. Regimes, defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area,"[10] operate as structural constraints in the international political economy.[11] Although regimes are composed in part of rules and decision-making procedures, these procedures do not determine outcomes; rather, they serve as a focus around which the actors coordinate their strategies. Regimes reduce transaction costs and uncertainty among actors and facilitate coordination of action among them. In turn, the actors modify their behavior to help sustain the regime. Regimes, then, act in conjunction with the actors' policy goals to determine outcomes in the international political economy. They serve as implicit social choice functions because they do not lead to binding decisions over their members, but rather assist coordination.

Structure and Preference in World Politics

So far, we have considered the general implications of social choice theory for politics; now we turn to world politics specifically. Classically, the actors in international politics are assumed to be nation-states. The results of social choice theory, however, apply to the international system at any level of analysis. We can analyze how the international system operates as a social choice system in aggregating the preferences of individuals. In this paper, however, we will retain the classical focus on states

[9] Kenneth N. Waltz, in *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), argues that alliances can never be considered structural, but this opinion arises from his balance-of-power view, in which all alliances must be temporary.

[10] This well-known definition is from Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1-21, at 1.

[11] The following discussion draws heavily on Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 85-109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as actors for two reasons. First, consideration of how the preferences of individuals are aggregated into world-system outcomes pollutes the question of international structure with that of internal political structure. Second, the results on bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and war all require the assumption of a unitary actor. Eventually, analyses will have to be conducted that examine the links between internal and external political structures; but that lies beyond the present analysis.

Next, the outcomes should be considered. In order to preserve the generality of the argument, I shall assume that the possible outcomes of the international system are all the possible resolutions of international issues. Issues are defined to be those policies of a government that have international ramifications.[12] These policies could include narrow issues like territorial possession, international economic policies, and internal political conditions, as well as broad issues like the international distribution of income. The policies have international ramifications because some other state cares about them; some policies are not international issues because all other governments recognize that the outcomes are purely internal.

By their very definition, issues imply the existence of conflicts of interest. If only one state cared about a particular policy, that policy would not be an international issue. Young maintains that three main mechanisms exist in the international polity to resolve such conflicts of interest: bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and war.[13] I have already argued that the structure of international regimes encompasses bargaining, and the structure of coercion covers the latter two mechanisms. Although international organizations exist, they serve more as forums for multilateral bargaining than as social choice mechanisms. We shall now turn to a detailed examination of each of the three social choice mechanisms to see how the structures they educe violate the conditions of Arrow's theorem.

All rational choice approaches to bargaining conclude that any final agreement must fall between the bargainers' reservation levels (i.e., how they value the absence of agreement). No bargainer should ever accept an agreement that it believes to be worse than no agreement at all. But what determines the value of "no agreement"? The structure determines

[12] Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), contend that international politics is a struggle over the resolution of issues. My definition of issues corresponds to their definition of stakes: "objects that are seen as possessing or representing values" (p. 58). Elsewhere, I have presented an elaborate formal model of crisis in which the parties contest the resolution of international issues; see James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1131-50.

[13] Oran R. Young, "Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 241-63, at 250.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what is likely to happen in the absence of an agreement, and those possible futures are evaluated by each side's preferences. Reservation levels for a negotiation thus reflect both structure and preference. For example, if negotiations on the rescheduling of third-world debt collapse and lead to default, each country's evaluation of this failure will reflect both the strength of its economy to compensate for the resulting default and the ability of its polity to contain the political consequences of the default. A state with a vulnerable economy, for example, can compensate by having a political system that can channel the domestic effects to its own benefit. In this fashion, structural considerations (i.e., economic strength) interact with national preferences (i.e., the political will) to create the bargaining range.

Once a bargaining range is established, the bargain struck depends upon the order in which offers are made, and by which party. Because the order of bargaining is not determined, there is no general answer to the question. We can, however, examine the solution to certain bargaining problems as an example of what we should expect. In the Nash bargaining solution, if a side increases its willingness to take risks (a change in its cardinal utility but not its ordinal preferences) while holding all else constant, it will gain a larger share of the goods to be divided.[14] Recent work in sequential bargaining games shows that the value each side attaches to the stakes influences the final outcome,[15] an increase in the value each side attaches to its preferred outcomes thus enhances its chances for a favorable settlement. Although the settlements of negotiations reflect the organization of bargaining, they also reflect each side's preferences over those settlements.

The second and third social choice mechanisms Young identifies—coercive diplomacy and war—constitute the different faces of the structure of coercion. Here the distribution of power is the tangible manifestation of structure. Do superior military capabilities, deployed as well as potential, translate into success in crises? Does the distribution of power

[14] This conclusion follows from the correspondence between the Nash solution and the Zeuthen model of bargaining. In the latter, greater willingness to take risks will force the other side to make additional concessions at some point in the negotiations. The original source for the Nash bargaining solution is John F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica* 18 (April 1950), 155-62. John C. Harsanyi has shown that the Nash bargaining solution arises from negotiations where the party with more to lose makes an additional concession in each round of bargaining; see Harsanyi, "Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games," *Econometrica* 24 (April 1956), 144-56.

[15] See, for example, the distinction between soft and hard sellers and their consequences for the solution, in Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," *Review of Economic Studies* 50 (April 1983), 221-47. A fine source for further reading on recent developments in bargaining theory is Alvin E. Roth, ed., *Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determine whether or not crises escalate? The answer to both questions is no. The willingness to risk escalation and the anticipated consequences of war produce success in crises whether or not war actually breaks out.[16] Formally, the interaction of capability and preference produces the willingness to escalate.[17]

The case that best dramatizes this conclusion is the Vietnam War. The United States possessed every structural advantage when it intervened in Vietnam; dominant military strength and Asian allies who supported American efforts provided a distinct superiority in military capabilities over the North Vietnamese. But structure alone does not determine the outcome of a war. The government of North Vietnam was willing to suffer exceptionally high losses to continue the conflict until the American government was unwilling to continue.[18] The willingness to suffer losses (and its ability to get the population to support the war effort) reflects the importance that the North Vietnamese government attached to unifying Vietnam; it was a measure of its preference for achieving the goal of unification. In this case, a state with an intense preference prevailed over one with large structural advantages.

Similarly, strong preferences can overcome structural advantages in coercive bargaining. If coercive bargaining is a "competition in risk taking," the judgment concerning which risks are acceptable depends both on the objective reality and the subjective evaluation of the risk.[19] As a side's utility evaluation of the difference between the status quo and winning grows relative to the utility difference between losing and the status quo, it will be more willing to take risks.[20] We can characterize an actor's willingness to take risks by finding its critical probability. An actor's critical probability is the lowest probability of success it will accept for fixed winning and losing outcomes. The lower an actor's critical probability, the greater the risks it is willing to take. An actor's evaluation of a risk in coercive bargaining compares its critical probability, which reflects its

[16] Once again, this point follows from the Nash bargaining solution (fn. 14). Evidence to this effect is provided by Stephen Rosen in "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in Bruce Russett, ed., *War, Peace, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), and Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1815-1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (June 1983), 195-229.

[17] This point is examined formally in James D. Morrow, "A Continuous-Outcome Expected Utility Theory of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (September 1985), 473-502.

[18] For an elaboration of this argument, see John E. Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam," *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (September 1980), 497-519.

[19] The well-known phrase, "competition in risk taking," is from Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). This point is formally established in Morrow (fn. 17).

[20] For a formal discussion of this point and the link between the willingness to take risks in crises and prior alliance behavior, see James D. Morrow, "On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (No. 4, 1987), 423-38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preferences for the issues at stake, and the objective probability of success, which reflects the relative capabilities of the sides. An advantage in preference, as reflected in a state's critical probability, can compensate for a disadvantage in capabilities. Thus, both structure and preference determine the outcome of coercive bargaining.

As an example of how a strong preference for the issue at stake can compensate for a deficiency in capabilities, consider the Rhineland crisis. Germany's rearmament program had barely begun to show fruit in early 1936, and the Nazi government realized that it could not expect to win if France and Britain resisted its demand to remilitarize the Rhineland.[21] Germany overcame its deficiency in capabilities by bluffing on an issue where its opponents, particularly Great Britain, did not have a strong preference for preventing change in the status quo. The British government counseled the French government to allow the remilitarization of the Rhineland because certain elements in the British government viewed the German demand as legitimate. Without the support of Great Britain, France was unwilling to resist the German demand.

Attitudes toward risk as well as military capabilities matter in the resolution of crises. The condition of independence from infeasible alternatives assures that, if ordinal preferences between two alternatives do not change, the outcome cannot change. But changes in risk attitudes, which can alter the outcome of a crisis, do not change ordinal preferences. Consequently, bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and war violate the condition of independence from infeasible alternatives in Arrow's theorem.[22] This violation explains why these international social choice procedures can produce consistent outcomes over time.

To clarify this point with an example, let us return to the Rhineland crisis. For France, defeating Germany in a war was preferred to submitting to the German demands, which in turn was preferred to losing a

[21] Hitler is said to have commented about what would have happened if France had resisted German demands in the Rhineland crisis: "We would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance." Cited in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 173.

[22] Plott (fn. 1, pp. 539-42) contends that if we treat lotteries as outcomes, this problem disappears because then changes in risk attitudes are changes in ordinal preferences over lotteries. But this line of logic has to violate either the sure-thing principle that leads to Von Neumann-Morgenstern cardinal utilities, or the conditions of unrestricted domain. See Leonard J. Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics*, 2d ed. (New York: Dover, 1972), 21-22, 99-100, for a definition and discussion of the sure-thing principle. If any set of ordinal preferences over lotteries is admissible, then one can prefer a fifty-fifty lottery of winning or losing over winning for certain, which is preferred to losing for certain. Such a preference scheme clearly violates the sure-thing principle. Because the models discussed in the text assume Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, they will violate the condition of unrestricted domain if lotteries are treated as outcomes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war to Germany. When France had to decide whether or not to resist Germany's demands, it had to determine whether war was preferable to permitting the remilitarization of the Rhineland. War entailed some probability of winning and a complementary probability of losing. If the probability of winning had exceeded France's critical probability, France would have resisted. Because it did not, France acceded to Germany's demands. In theory, we could retain France's ordinal preference among the three possible outcomes and change its willingness to take risks by altering the cardinal utilities of the three outcomes enough to reverse its unwillingness to fight. The resulting French resistance to Germany's demands would have forced Hitler to back down (he had given orders to this effect), and the outcome of the crisis would have changed—without a change in any party's ordinal preferences.

Because intensities of preferences matter, the possibility of bluffing is always present in international politics. When a side can gain more favorable outcomes by adopting actions that communicate a greater willingness to take risks, a strong motivation for bluffing will exist. Arrow's theorem leads us to this conclusion. Gibbard has shown that nondictatorial social choice systems selecting one of at least three possible outcomes do not have dominant strategies.[23] In such cases, there is no best strategy to achieve an actor's goals; each actor can gain by playing different strategies, depending on the strategies the other actors employ. Consequently, bluffing and misrepresentation are the stuff of international politics.

To summarize the argument to this point: Arrow's theorem states that a social choice system cannot satisify all five conditions. If such a system produces consistent and decisive outcomes, it must violate at least one of the conditions. Generalizing from the literature on democratic institutions and social choice, structure—in the form of rules and institutions—creates these violations and allows decisive and consistent social choice.

Because we do not observe gross instabilities in the disposition of international issues (i.e., radical change is not constantly occurring), global social choice processes must violate other conditions. Three examples of structure in the international system are the capabilities of states, durable alliance systems, and international regimes. A detailed examination of three international social choice processes—bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and war—has revealed that the outcomes of each depend in part on the cardinal utilities of the actors; this, in turn, violates the condition

[23] Allan Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," *Econometrica* 41 (July 1973), 587-601. Although Gibbard discusses manipulation in voting, his theorem applies to game forms, thereby covering social choice processes in general.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of independence from infeasible alternatives. To put it differently: these processes utilize the actors' preferences as well as their capabilities to determine outcomes.

Preferences and Structural Outcomes

So far the discussion has been broad and general. To demonstrate the importance of the central point to an understanding of international politics, I shall critique two well-known recent theoretical works, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* and Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics*, in the light of the above argument.[24] These two works were chosen, not because they deserve exceptional criticism, but because they are well known to scholars of international politics and accepted as central theoretical works in international politics. By focusing on these two works, I intend to illustrate how the interaction of structure and preference determines outcomes (Waltz), and how social choice processes change (Gilpin).

Although Waltz is aware that both structure and preference are necessary to determine political outcomes, he makes an argument in *Theory of International Politics* that the structure of a system is self-preserving.[25] For Waltz, system structure falls into two categories: anarchic and hierarchical. He argues that anarchic systems are stable, in that "no consequential variation takes place in the number of principal parties that constitute the system."[26]

How often do the major powers change over time? In a table Waltz presents, the number of great powers changes dramatically over time as some rise from the ranks of the meek and others fall from the ranks of the strong.[27] Five of the twelve countries he lists as major powers at some point between 1700 and 1945 were not major powers in 1700, and only two retained their major-power status in 1945. Even *within* the six time periods into which he divides the 245 years, the change in the number of major powers is substantial; one-third (eleven out of thirty-three) of the major powers disappeared from Waltz's list between one time period and the next. The number of major powers also changes over time; the average at any one time is 5.8, with a standard deviation of 2.1.

[24] See Waltz (fn. 9), and Robert G. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[25] Waltz's argument that analysis must be conducted across multiple images runs parallel to the main thesis of this paper. The first and second images would be the source of preferences that, in conjunction with the structure of the third image, produce outcomes. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[26] Waltz (fn. 9), 162.

[27] *Ibid.*, Table 8.1, p. 162.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because these changes do not "lead to different expectations about the effects of structure on units," Waltz suggests that they are not consequential.[28] He must mean that once anarchic, an international system will remain anarchic. The emergence of Rome as a dominant state during the Hellenistic era contradicts this conclusion. Why does Waltz's argument about the stability of anarchic systems fail in this case?

As we have seen, in order to predict outcomes, a theory of international politics must consider both structure and preference. Because Waltz believes that structure alone (the anarchic character of the system) can determine certain outcomes in the international system (change), his argument is flawed.[29] We therefore must show how his supporting arguments are undermined by his ignoring the consequences of preferences.

Waltz advances the proposition that anarchic systems induce balances of power that preserve the nature of the system over time. By balance of power, Waltz means a system in which the parties gang up on states that attempt to change the status quo, thus making fruitless any attempt to change it. Flexible alliances are the tool that restores the balance and protects it from threats of disruption.

But, are alliances formed only to counter threats to the international structure? Even Waltz would deny that. Consider his discussion of the Franco-Russian pact of 1893:

> Russia would have preferred to plan and prepare for the occasion of war against Austria-Hungary. She could hope to defeat her, but not Germany, and Austria-Hungary stood in the way of Russia's gaining control of the Straits linking the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. France, however, could regain Alsace-Lorraine only by defeating Germany. Perception of a common threat brought Russia and France together.[30]

The first three sentences of the quote make it clear that a joint desire to change the status quo, rather than the common threat of Germany, brought France and Russia together. In other words, French and Russian

[28] *Ibid.*, 162.

[29] In fairness to Waltz, let us admit that he makes a distinction between a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy. The latter explains the specific actions of states, while the former explains systemic consequences stemming from systemic characteristics (*ibid.*, 121-22). Waltz also realizes that knowledge of preferences is necessary for a theory of foreign policy (p. 174). In this sense, this essay agrees with Waltz's central thesis.

Even with an emphasis on systemic-level explanation, preference can be included in what Waltz calls a theory of international politics. Drawing on the economic analogy of which Waltz is so fond, aggregate demand for specific goods indicates the accumulated preferences of many actors. Aggregate demand is not structural because it rises and ebbs with individual demands. The characterization of aggregations of preferences in international politics depends upon the particular theory employed.

[30] Waltz (fn. 9), 166.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preferences to pursue change to the status quo impelled them to join forces, for neither of them alone could hope to defeat Germany and to realize the desired changes. Even when states form alliances to defend the status quo, issue preferences help to determine which of the possible partners are acceptable.[31] Consequently, alliances cannot operate purely as devices for strategic balancing; the preferences of the aligning nations and the structural threat they face both matter.

For alliances to preserve the anarchic character of the system, the structural threat must take precedence over other preferences when an aggressor threatens to overturn the system. In the Hellenistic era, the Diadochi empires (Macedonia, the Seleucid Empire, and Ptolemaic Egypt) did not join forces to check the growing power of Rome after the Second Punic War. Instead, they continued to fight among themselves; the Seleucids and Ptolemaic Egypt fought the Fifth and Sixth Syrian Wars in the early second century B.C., and Macedonia joined Rome in its Syrian War of 192–189. Thus, the structural threat of Rome did not take precedence over the territorial struggles of the Diadochi empires. Alliances may be formed either to counter aggressive states or to advance desires to change the status quo. The expectation that alliances can create a balance to protect the structure of the international system ignores the critical role that preferences play in the formation of alliances.

Understandably, then, Waltz considers alliances to be unreliable protectors of the balance because they lead to blocs, and intra-bloc politics create uncertainty. This uncertainty leads to miscalculation and war.[32] Waltz therefore concludes that bipolar systems are more desirable than multipolar systems. Bueno de Mesquita, however, maintains there is no *a priori* reason to believe that uncertainty either deters, or leads to, war.[33] Arthur A. Stein contends that misperception, a byproduct of uncertainty, can lead either to war or to peace, depending on the nature of the misperception.[34] There appears to be no reason to think that bipolarity either produces peace or will not metamorphose into a hierarchical system.

To extend this point, consider the case of a system devoid of uncer-

[31] Michael F. Altfeld, in a discussion of the conditions for alliance formation, focuses on the trade-off between autonomy and security; see "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test," *Western Political Quarterly* 37 (December 1984), 523-44. Security and autonomy can be thought of as capturing a state's evaluation of the relative desirability of preserving issues as compared to changing them; see Morrow (fn. 20).

[32] Waltz (fn. 9), 168. Also, Waltz is unclear as to whether or not bipolarity makes systems more stable in the sense of being less likely to change their nature; he certainly seems to imply that.

[33] For this argument and its application to arguments about polarity, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Theories of International Conflict: An Analysis and Appraisal," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1980), 361-98.

[34] Stein, "When Misperception Matters," *World Politics* 34 (July 1982), 505-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tainty, in which all states know the probability distribution of the outcomes of all possible wars.[35] Each state considering war will calculate its expected utility for war by weighting its utility for each possible outcome by the probability of that outcome occurring and subtracting the expected costs of war. War will occur only if there is no compromise that both sides prefer to war.[36] Bargaining is perfectly efficient in the absence of uncertainty; any compromise that is acceptable to both sides will be reached. The condition for peace (when a feasible compromise exists) occurs when the two sides are jointly risk-averse, or when the expected costs are high enough to create a compromise. Both of these conditions for peace depend upon the sides' preferences: risk attitudes express the degree of preference, and the evaluation of costs versus benefits expresses relative preference between costs and benefits. Thus, the absence of uncertainty leads to peace only if additional assumptions are made about preferences.

One final argument can be made in favor of Waltz's structural position; systems determine outcomes because systems determine preferences through socialization of the units.[37] In view of the definition of preferences here (i.e., issue positions), there is great variation in preference among states in similar structural positions. Some minor powers, like Finland, modify their stands to conform with the desires of major powers; others, like Albania, deliberately flout the wishes of major powers that could quash them if they chose to. But there is a further, fundamental problem in the socialization argument. States will adopt actions in order to achieve their preferences within a social choice system. As Gibbard has shown, states can always find an incentive to misrepresent their preferences through a particular strategy.[38] To determine a state's preferences from its actions, strategic misrepresentations must be peeled away to reveal the true preferences. Waltz's discussion of socialization to the system focuses solely on the actions adopted, and not the preferences underlying those actions.[39] The position that structure determines preferences may be defensible, but Waltz has not advanced an argument sufficient to establish the point.

[35] Waltz never defines uncertainty or describes what a certain world would look like. I employ the definition of uncertainty used in decision theory—namely, that probabilities of future outcomes are unknown or meaningless; see R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: John Wiley, 1957). This definition does not imply that future events are perfectly predictable when uncertainty is absent; rather, that future events have probabilities known to all, as is the case with games of chance.

[36] For a formalization of this argument, see Morrow (fn. 17).

[37] Waltz (fn. 9), 74-77, 127-28.

[38] Gibbard (fn. 23).

[39] Waltz (fn. 9), 127-28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In summary, Waltz's thesis that anarchical systems are stable and that bipolar systems are less war-prone than multipolar systems ignores the role of national preferences in determining international outcomes. Still, Waltz is correct in attacking "reductionist" theories for neglecting the role of structure in determining outcomes. Reductionist theories try to establish the reverse of Waltz's argument: they emphasize preference (as reflected in or produced by national characteristics) and ignore structure. But if structure and preference jointly determine outcomes, both must be considered in any general theory of international politics.

Preferences and Structural Change

For Robert Gilpin, the distribution of power determines the international structure, and technological change drives changes in that structure and in the international system. Because Gilpin's thesis focuses on structural change in world politics, a critique of his analysis illuminates the argument here about structural change. Essential to Gilpin's discussion is the assumption that states pursue change in the international system on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. When no state expects to gain by challenging the system, that system is said to be in equilibrium.[40] Over time, technological changes, particularly changes in military technology, alter each state's cost-benefit calculation for an attempt to change the international system. Disequilibrium exists when "economic, political, and technological change have increased considerably the potential benefits or decreased the potential costs to one or more states of seeking to change the international system."[41]

One wonders whether disequilibrium could ever persist in Gilpin's world. If equilibrium means that no state believes that the expected benefits of challenging the system exceed the expected costs, then disequilibrium implies that there is a state that believes it can profitably challenge the system. By Gilpin's second assumption, that state *must* challenge the system.[42] The resulting challenge will either succeed by force, be agreed to, or be thwarted. In any case, the disequilibrium will then disappear: in the first and second cases because the challenger's demands will have been realized, in the third case because those demands were based on a set of incorrect beliefs about the likelihood of achieving change. Regardless of whether challenges to the system are met peacefully or not, the

[40] Gilpin (fn. 24), 10.
[41] *Ibid.*, 14.
[42] *Ibid.*, 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disequilibrium that drives states to challenge the system should disappear shortly after it has appeared.[43]

This absence of disequilibrium is particularly problematic for Gilpin's argument because the accumulation of disequilibrium is necessary to trigger the hegemonic wars that reestablish equilibrium in the system.[44] Gilpin contends that, starting from equilibrium, technological change drives changes in power. These changes in power create the disequilibrium that eventually triggers a hegemonic war, which is the eruption of a fundamental disequilibrium of the international system. Although the triggering dispute may be minor, the disagreement between the parties expands to encompass the governance of the international system.[45] A new international order generally rises from the cataclysm of hegemonic war—restoring equilibrium and starting the cycle anew.

The disequilibrium that drives a hegemonic war has to be massive to create the intense and extensive fighting that characterizes such a struggle. However, if disequilibrium cannot accumulate (as I have already argued), then how can hegemonic war occur in Gilpin's world? The first of three possible answers lies in the difference Gilpin draws between power and prestige. Prestige is "the reputation for power"; specifically, it "involves the credibility of a state's power and its willingness to deter or compel other states in order to achieve its objectives."[46] Reputations can differ from reality; in Gilpin's argument, they do. Power determines the outcome of wars and prestige the outcome of peaceful disputes. A system could thus be in equilibrium in prestige and in disequilibrium in power if perceptions of power lag behind the reality of its change. The consequence of such lagged perceptions would be that discontented states could not change the system peacefully, and disequilibrium would accumulate as the power of the discontented states grew.

This line of argument begs the question of why the discontented do not just declare war. After all, the existence of a disequilibrium in power implies that they expect to gain if they fight. If prestige represents perception of power, perhaps the discontented do not realize their power has grown and that now they can win. But then, why would they be

[43] A different interpretation of Gilpin would suggest that disequilibrium is simply a change in the expected costs and benefits of challenging the original position of equilibrium, rather than an expected net benefit. In this case, equilibrium and disequilibrium would coexist in the system, and the presence of disequilibrium would not trigger a challenge. However, this approach also has problems beyond its strange use of contradictory terms—as will be seen below.

[44] Gilpin (fn. 24), 14-15.

[45] *Ibid.*, 199-200.

[46] *Ibid.*, 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

willing to launch a hegemonic war later if they did not perceive that their power had grown?

A second possible means of accumulating disequilibrium involves different costs of challenging the system. These costs fall into two classes: one, the material costs that are incurred whether or not the challenge is successful; the other, the concessions the status quo powers will extract from the challenger if the challenge is unsuccessful. An example of the latter would be the territorial losses that Germany suffered as part of the Versailles Treaty.

The first set of costs is negligible if a challenge is resolved peacefully. If prestige lagged behind power, discontented states would be unable to challenge the system. Peaceful challenges would be deterred by the challenger's lack of prestige. Challenges by war would be deterred by the material costs of war, even when expected benefits exceeded expected costs of the second type. In other words, although the challenger could expect to win a war, the material costs of fighting would exceed the expected benefits. Then disequilibrium, in the sense that challengers could win wars, could grow over time until the expected policy benefits just exceeded the material costs, triggering a war.[47]

This line of reasoning also presents a problem. Hegemonic wars are long and bloody. To sustain a long and bloody war between rational actors, both sides must believe that they will obtain a better settlement by continuing to fight even after incurring losses from additional fighting; in Gilpin's terms, they must have positive expected benefits. As a war evolves, both sides gain a clearer idea of what the final military outcome will be. Wittman shows that this additional information can make agreement either more or less likely.[48] The determinants of the length of a war are the size of the discrepancy in the combatants' expected utilities for continuing the war and the manner in which they respond to the outcomes of battles. The former must be small and the latter is unspecified. Consequently, the second possibility cannot generate hegemonic wars as a consequence of disequilibrium.

This argument may be elaborated by the example of the First World War, which was a hegemonic war. If England, Germany, and the others were rational actors, why did they continue to fight in October 1914

[47] This approach allows the coexistence of equilibrium and disequilibrium, as discussed in fn. 43.

[48] For an excellent informal discussion of this point and its consequences, see Donald Wittman, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (December 1979), 743-63. Gilpin's expected net benefits for continuing to fight would be identified with Wittman's difference between expected utility of war and the utility of a negotiated settlement. See esp. pp. 749-51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when it became clear that the troops would not be home before the leaves fell? In 1916, when all realized that the costs of continuing the war were immense and the likelihood of a crushing military victory small, at least one state (Germany) increased its demands.[49] A rational model of state action may be able to explain these occurrences, but more is required than Gilpin builds into his argument.

Finally, disequilibrium could accumulate if states deliberately chose not to change the system when they could, in the hope of gaining even greater changes in the future.[50] A premature challenge might provoke a consolidation of power by the leading state that would prevent future claims against the system. It would then be rational for a far-sighted challenger not to challenge the system until its expected future gains were maximized. Disequilibrium would accumulate until that time, and hegemonic war would follow.

To judge expected future gains, we need a discount factor for the value of present benefits and costs relative to future benefits and costs. States will place greater value on future benefits and costs as their discount factors increase. If a growing power delays a challenge to the system, it must have a relatively large discount factor. On the other hand, why does the declining hegemon resist change in the international system? Presumably because its discount value is low; it values present consumption more than future consumption, and resists change to sustain its present situation.

These discount factors are assumptions about preferences; although ascending and declining powers may exhibit high and low discount factors, there is nothing in Gilpin's argument that leads us to believe that this assumption must be true.[51] If a rising power had a low discount factor, it would challenge the system as soon as it could, which would prevent the accumulation of disequilibrium. If a declining hegemon had a high discount factor, it would make concessions to the rising powers to prevent hegemonic war. Changes in power do produce changes in the outcome of world politics, but by themselves they cannot produce hegemonic wars.

Still, hegemonic wars do recur, preceded by critical shifts in the dis-

[49] Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967).

[50] I am indebted to Robert Axelrod for suggesting the possibility that strategic rationality leads to the accumulation of disequilibrium.

[51] This observation parallels Bueno de Mesquita's point (fn. 33) that Organski's power transition theory requires challengers to be risk-acceptant and dominant states to be risk-averse. See A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), 299-338, and A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 1-63, for the power transition theory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tribution of power. I have shown that Gilpin's argument is insufficient to demonstrate that hegemonic wars must be produced by such shifts of power among rationally acting states.[52] My conclusion about Gilpin's argument is the same as his about Modelski's long-cycle theory: "until the mechanism that determines and generates the cycles [in Gilpin, hegemonic wars] is defined, the idea must remain speculative, albeit interesting."[53]

One may wonder how the preceding discussion relates to the main point of this essay. Gilpin's argument ignores the role of preference in motivating structural change; consequently, it does not explain such change. Although I cannot demonstrate this point formally, I will draw an analogy to structural change in legislatures. As I argued earlier, legislators demand changes in the rules when they believe that they can no longer achieve their policy goals under the current rules. Because rules changes can generate a cascade of legislation—some desired and some unintended—legislators are reluctant to change the rules except under extraordinary circumstances.

Structural change in world politics can occur only when a critical mass of actors need that change to achieve their preferred policies. An analysis of preferences as well as of capabilities is necessary to explain change. Consider, for example, Britain's position in the late 19th century. It faced three growing powers that could challenge the Pax Britannica—the United States, Russia, and Germany. Britain reconciled itself to the demands of the first two, leaving only Germany as a challenger.[54] Any attempt at understanding this process and the resulting conflict has to consider why the British could compromise with American and Russian, but not with German demands for change.

Unlike the legislative analogy, the pursuit of structural change in world politics is not clearly distinguished from the pursuit of policy change. Structural and policy changes in legislatures call for different votes and can be easily distinguished. In world politics, both types of change require challenges to the status quo that threaten war. When a challenge is mounted, it is difficult to discern whether or not the demands will overturn the international system. Gilpin makes this point

[52] To give credit to Gilpin, he seems to realize this problem. When he discusses the onset of hegemonic war, he tries to argue that the actors no longer act rationally (fn. 24, p. 202). But if the actors are rational before the onset of hegemonic war and avoid unprofitable conflict, should they not continue to do so after the outbreak of such a war?

[53] *Ibid.*, 205.

[54] *Ibid.*, 196-97. A thorough treatment of the development of the Anglo-German rivalry is given in Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indirectly when he argues that hegemonic wars often start over a minor issue, and then the stakes of conflict expand to include the governance of the system.[55] In order to explain this expansion of the stakes, we must account for the reason why both sides are willing to pursue a larger conflict, even if they enter it by small steps rather than through conscious escalation.[56]

Conclusion

I have analyzed the international system as a social choice process. Both structure and preference are necessary to determine outcomes in that system. This insight directs research in international politics to the interaction of structure and preference. Three social choice processes that are operative in the world system—bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and war—utilize cardinal preferences to determine outcomes, and so violate the condition of independence from infeasible alternatives of Arrow's theorem. Each of these three processes introduces structural considerations (e.g., regime bargaining procedures, durable alliance ties, and military capabilities) in its aggregation of preferences.

What directions for further research does this analysis provide? Purely structural theories will be inadequate, as will those theories that examine only national preferences. Although structure has attracted much attention in theories of international politics, preference generally has not. Judging preferences can often be difficult. Classically, preferences are judged by revealed choice, using assumptions about their general nature and stability over time in the short run. Or, put more bluntly, the best prediction of tomorrow's action is yesterday's action. Revealed choice, however, presents problems when strategic choice is involved. To uncover the preferences underlying a set of choices, one has to control for the strategic situation first.[57]

[55] Gilpin (fn. 24), 199-203.

[56] I do not argue that I have been able to show why rational actors would expand a war for limited goals into a hegemonic war. Consequently, I cannot offer a complete explanation. Still, it seems to me that the critical questions are, why are all the major powers drawn into the struggle, and why do the issues at dispute expand to encompass all the issues? Expansion of a war to include most major powers seems essential to producing a hegemonic war. An insightful discussion of this point is given in Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 196-97.

[57] An excellent example of controlling for the strategic situation when determining preferences is given in Arthur Denzau, William Riker, and Kenneth Shepsle, "Farquaharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style," *American Political Science Review* 79 (December 1985), 1117-34. The authors argue that members of Congress will sometimes vote their preferences and sometimes not, depending on their vulnerability in their home districts in the next election; they illustrate the argument by reference to the Powell amendment to a 1956 bill providing federal aid to education.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One way to build models that tie national decisions to the strategic situation is the application of game theory.[58] By their very nature, game-theoretic models integrate both structure and preference to explain how their interaction drives choices. Payoff functions include both the consequences of the players' choices and their evaluations of those consequences. In Prisoner's Dilemma, the dilemma can be eliminated by changing the players' utility functions for the outcomes from self-interest to altruism. The determination of an appropriate game involves both the specification of the structure of the game (i.e., sequence of moves, informational conditions, and consequences of moves) and the preferences of the players for the consequences. As Snidal points out, we cannot determine preferences from the observed outcomes and still have an explanation of those outcomes.[59] Instead, preferences must either be assumed or determined from prior decisions.[60] In any case, game models are one obvious way of fleshing out the interaction of structure and preference.

Although much has been written about the need to include preferences in analyses, nothing has been said about the origin of national issue preferences. Analyses can be conducted by "black-boxing" preferences in a fashion similar to traditional analysis. Fixed preferences are assumed in microeconomics and social choice theory, making short-run changes driven solely by changes in rules and strategies. In the long run, changes in preferences can be included by assumption—for example, changes in the membership of legislatures through elections. But preference change in international politics occurs along with change in composition of a government. A complete explanation of international politics can be provided only if we can account for preferences and how they change over time. Such an accounting requires an examination of the internal politics of states. Positions on international issues arise from the demands of internal political groups that a government take action in the international arena.[61] Internal politics responds to such demands, elevating some to policy and suppressing others. To explain why some demands become international issues and others do not, we must understand how domes-

[58] See Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), for an example of the current interest in game theory as a model in several fields of world politics.

[59] Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *ibid.*, 25-57.

[60] One of the successes of Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 21) is the estimation of national preferences from one set of prior decisions—alliance commitments. Although the theoretical basis of this measure is not fully specified, the argument that alliance commitments reveal a state's preferences for other states' policies seems plausible.

[61] An ambitious attempt to deal with this problem is presented in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, *Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tic political processes work. We need not charge into this complicated task immediately; many interesting statements can be made without delving into the intricacies of internal politics. In order to have a complete understanding of world politics, we will eventually have to build models that relate the internal social choice process to the international social choice process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

"THE SPIRIT OF THE SIERRA MAESTRA": Five Observations on Writing about Cuban Foreign Policy

By TONY SMITH*

Jorge I. Dominguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming 1989 (reviewed in its penultimate manuscript form).

W. Raymond Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence*. New York: Praeger, 1985, 220pp.

H. Michael Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, 203pp.

Pamela S. Falk, *Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986, 336pp.

Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, *Castro, Cuba, and the World*. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, R-3420, 1986, 133pp.

Wayne S. Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1987, 308pp.

THE study of Cuban foreign policy is of particular interest today for the obvious reason that the country is of special importance in the contest between the superpowers. Since the late 1960s, Cuba has unreservedly put itself on the side of the Soviet Union and, through its actions in Central America and Africa, has helped to secure Moscow's most clear-cut foreign policy successes of the past fifteen years. For many students of Cuban policy, however, there is a more compelling reason to think about the subject other than as a sideshow to the superpower contest. These observers are astonished that a small, relatively poor country, situated in what was long considered to be the United States' foremost sphere of domination, should undertake such a forward policy in international politics—and be rewarded with such success. In this review, the focus is on our understanding of the sources of Cuba's role in world affairs.

* The author would like to thank Suzanne Berger for initially encouraging this article, and Robert Legvold for a careful, critical reading of an earlier draft.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite the importance and intrinsic interest of the subject, the conceptual frameworks that writers have put forth to explain the complexities of Cuban foreign policy ultimately lack in persuasiveness. To be sure, adequate chronological accounts exist that review the history of Cuba in world affairs, and students of the subject have produced useful analyses of specific issues of real significance (such as the character of Soviet-Cuban collaboration during the October missile crisis and later in Angola, Nicaragua, and Grenada). What is nonetheless lacking is an explanatory framework offering a comprehensive interpretation of the pattern of Cuban foreign policy in the three decades since the triumph of the Revolution. To date, the various writers who have addressed this theme have produced no more than partial explanations for Cuba's actions; most of their efforts have been made without a serious attempt to sustain an interpretive viewpoint systematically.

It is indicative of this state of affairs that writers in the field seldom appear to borrow from each other's conceptual approaches or to criticize them. Points of view may be repeated, but there is little sense of a community of effort whereby a cumulative integration of understanding has emerged as to why Havana acts as it does internationally. The field may change in future years as a result of the volume by Dominguez and the study by Gonzalez and Ronfeldt. Today, however, one looks in vain for lively debates on the relative contributions to Cuban conduct of such factors as Fidel Castro's personality, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the character of Cuban nationalism or the notion of Cuban national interest, the impact of domestic conflicts or interest groups, and the effect of Soviet influence. Discussions remain parochial, seldom able either to borrow from or to contribute to comparative case studies. Debate has become passionate only over the question of whether Washington should be more hard-line or more accommodating with respect to relations with Havana. Ironically, however, rather than stimulating deeper investigation into the sources of Cuban conduct, this controversy has tended to encourage fixed positions and to absorb energy that might otherwise have gone into more fruitful theoretical speculations on the nature of Cuba's role in world affairs.

In order to pinpoint problems in the field more precisely and to suggest what might be done to stimulate further inquiry, I have formulated my review of a number of recent books by North Americans as a set of five observations on writing that tries to establish the character of Cuban foreign policy. The first four observations indicate problems with certain approaches that have been taken; the fifth suggests how such studies might be more securely anchored.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Observation One

Despite their prevalence in the literature, classification systems of the origins or objectives of Cuban foreign policy should be avoided unless there is a clear sense of the central dynamic of Cuban policy that gives unity to such a framework of analysis.

Assume, for example, that an author announces in an introduction to the study of Cuba that the nature of Havana's globalism can be understood from its concern (1) to protect the island's independence; (2) to ensure its revolutionary project domestically; (3) to promote national liberation movements abroad; (4) to provide a larger stage for Castro's ego than Cuba can provide; and (5) to respond to Soviet promptings. Such a taxonomic device for organizing the record of Cuban foreign policy is undoubtedly helpful, for it suggests families of motives and opens the possibility that these may each be explained in turn and their relative contribution to the overall pattern of Cuban policy assessed. But a writer who stops with simply setting out various categories has not gone far enough. The taxonomy runs the risk of becoming a substitute rather than a vehicle for explanation. To avoid this, analysts should question themselves whether their list is exhaustive of the forces in play. How has each factor come to express itself in the making of Cuban policy? Are there contradictions among them? What is the character of interaction among these interests, and is there a center of gravity to policy—a kind of prime mover whose basic importance needs to be recognized? Finally, is a synthesis of these factors possible that establishes a pattern to policy in terms of its sources and accounts for its dynamic evolution over time?

Instead of addressing these issues, much of the field of Cuban studies consists of a proliferation of categories presented without adequate analysis. For example, H. Michael Erisman identifies five "main factors" that constitute "Cuban foreign policy motivations," and warns that "obviously these variables will occasionally overlap, and their importance will vary. . . . The result is policies within which these various threads are woven into subtle kaleidoscopic tapestries. . . ." After discussing four of these five variables for only three pages, the author concentrates on the force of nationalism, "the neglected dimension," as the conceptual theme of his book. But he leaves it unclear whether this variable deserves attention because it is "pivotal" or "too often ignored." In any case, nationalism itself receives but two more pages of discussion, during which the author admits that distinction between it and "ideological constraints" are difficult to make. Lack of clarity gives way to confusion—at least so far as this reader is concerned—when we are told that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> the Fidelistas function within a framework where ideological considerations are crucial in tempering the egocentrism normally associated with strong nationalism, thereby often enhancing Cuba's ability to achieve its most important goals abroad. . . . This idealism has diminished the perceived likelihood of the Fidelistas using any increased international leverage for purely selfish purposes (pp. 7-11).

Whatever the problems with this five-fold taxonomy, they do not seem to trouble the field; other writers apparently intend to generate their own categories of organization, contributing to the impression of an area of study without a clear sense of direction. Rather than accepting "subtle kaleidoscopic tapestries" of motivations shifting in importance, Jorge I. Dominguez insisted in 1978 on "an explicit hierarchy" of policy objectives and listed five such motivations with the comment, "Individual policies have varied; the pattern of choice has remained stable."[1] W. Raymond Duncan, writing in 1975, found neither a shifting nor a stable hierarchy of objectives, but such a degree of "contradictory responses to the world" in Cuban foreign policy that he spoke of a "unique case of apparent schizophrenia."[2] In 1985, he published a book with a taxonomic chart that must set a record in the field: three areas of "vital interests" (security, political, economic) are divided into three "levels of salience," creating a complex matrix of objectives for Cuban policy (p. 24). Cuban schizophrenia has apparently been cured, but at the cost of what would appear to an unwieldy number of categories of analysis. Pamela S. Falk declares Cuban foreign policy to be "based on four objectives," but then lists five, none of which receives sustained analysis (p. xiv). The number of such examples could easily be expanded.[3]

Observation Two

The influence of domestic interest groups may explain a good part of the logic of the foreign policies of some countries, but such an approach is ill-suited to the study of Cuba, where a single man makes the basic decisions. Nevertheless, the character of Cuban foreign relations may in

[1] Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Fall 1978), 88.

[2] Duncan, "Cuba," in Harold Eugene Davis and Larman C. Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 155.

[3] See, for example, Juan del Aguila, "Cuba's Foreign Policy in Central America and the Caribbean," in Jeannie K. Lincoln and Elizabeth E. Ferris, *The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 212; Robert K. Furtak, "Cuba: Un Cuarto de Siglo de Política Exterior Revolucionaria" [Cuba: A quarter-century of revolutionary foreign policy], *Foro Internacional* 25 (April-June 1985), 343-44; and Susan Eckstein, "Cuban Internationalism," in Sandor Halebsky and John M. Kirk, *Cuba: Twenty-five Years of Revolution, 1959-1984* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

substantial measure reflect Fidel Castro's domestic concerns. Domestic groups might then be thought of as the object, not the subject, of Cuban foreign policy.

As an example of the inappropriateness of attempting to interpret Cuban behavior on the basis of competition among domestic interest groups, consider the carefully structured analysis offered by Edward Gonzalez in 1977. At the time, Castro seemed to be institutionalizing a Leninist system in Cuba, with the adoption of a new constitution, a reform of the legal system, the expansion of the Communist Party, and experiments in political participation. The effort to seek the roots of Cuban conduct separate from Castro is therefore understandable. Trying to sort through what he called the "complexities of Cuban foreign policy," Gonzalez identified three "tendencies" within the Cuban ruling elite: one that was "pragmatic," preoccupied with economic development, and therefore looking for Cuba's stable, peaceful integration into the international order; one that was "revolutionary," dedicated (like Castro himself) to the spread of communism in the third world; and one that was born of a "military mission," looking for new fields of action abroad after a more competent civilian administration had begun to form in the early 1970s, which relieved the military of its domestic responsibilities.[4] Although Gonzalez recognized that other forces contributed to the formulation of Cuban foreign policy, he focused his analysis on one set of clearly identifiable sources of policy—actors with recognizable agendas—and offered a prediction, on the basis of this analysis, as to Havana's future behavior.

No matter how interesting this proposed framework of analysis may be, it will surely prove more useful once Castro has passed from the scene. It would appear premature to apply interest-group theory to this field, for as the study itself seems to suggest, ultimately Castro's will is policy. Gonzalez's efforts have not been duplicated.

Suppose we do something the literature appears reluctant to do and reverse the process—asking not what the impact of interest groups is on policy, but what the impact of policy is intended to be on groups in Cuban society. Then domestic politics may be shown to have an influence on foreign affairs—but as the target rather than as the source of the decision-making process. Analyzed from this perspective, two of Fidel Castro's chief domestic concerns find some resolution in an assertive foreign policy: establishing legitimacy for the Cuban Communist Party

[4] Gonzalez, "The Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* 11-12 (November-December 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(CCP), and engendering a populist commitment to "the maximum leader's" interpretation of a socialist society.

The problem of the CCP is a peculiar one in the annals of communist politics, for the Cuban Revolution and the benefits it has provided, such as in health and education, all came from the hands of Castro long before the party had any strength at all in Cuban political life. (By contrast, in the Soviet Union and China, the party shared the glories of the Revolution with the charismatic leadership.) Since the institutionalization of the party in 1975, when it had its First Congress, Castro's concern has been to transfer the mantle of his legitimacy, earned in the first decade of the Revolution, to a party born thereafter. Heroic exploits abroad provide candidates for recruitment into the party as well as achievements that can earn the party its stripes in the eyes of the population at large.

Similarly, the struggle against United States imperialism under the banner of proletarian internationalism can be interpreted in light of Cuban communist ideology as an effort with a domestic agenda: to raise the socialist consciousness of the Cuban people and thereby to fuse Cuban nationalism irrevocably to communism. We should recall that it was a staple of Cuban revolutionary belief that armed struggle taught the people the necessity of socialism. The deeply populist cast of Castro's Revolution—in contrast to traditional Leninism, which exalted the role of the party—has long tied the future of the revolutionary society to the commitment of the people to it here and now. Like Mao during the Great Leap Forward and the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, but unlike the leaders of the Soviet Union, Castro has repeatedly emphasized the possibility of having socialist consciousness *now* among the masses, not later after the creation of an industrial economic base. In order to achieve this degree of maturity, Castro has called for a particular style of behavior domestically that has tended to emphasize moral rather than material incentives.

The same end may be served by a foreign policy that calls for a courageous struggle against imperialism, where character can be built through risk and sacrifice.[5] Castro's bid is obviously chancy. It is conceivable that many Cubans might turn against communism rather than embrace it as good nationalists if they must prove their loyalty to the new system by dangerous involvements far from home. But as a moral purist, Castro may be determined to raise the socialist consciousness of his people and keep it at a high level by an activist foreign policy that brooks no

[5] Tony Smith, *Thinking Like a Communist: State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), chap. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contradiction. Failure to comply would mean that one is not only a poor communist, but a poor nationalist as well. The participation of roughly 15 percent of the adult male population in the Cuban army abroad may be seen as one means to that end. If there may be occasions when internal radicalization requires moderation in foreign policy, the reverse appears to be more likely—to radicalize Cuba domestically, Cuba must have a radical foreign policy.[6]

The moral of these considerations is obvious. Domestic politics should not be neglected as an aspect of Cuban foreign policy, but the relationship of internal to external considerations must be properly put. That is seldom the case in the literature as it now stands.

Observation Three

The role of national interest or national security, as traditionally defined, has had relatively little importance as a variable in the formulation of Cuban foreign policy. In discussing national interest, as in the case of domestic political concerns discussed above, care should be taken to respect the quite distinctive meaning it has acquired because of Castro's personality and ideological assumptions.

In the international relations literature it is often assumed that some kind of identifiable, objective national interest (usually geopolitical in definition) constitutes a source of motivation for the foreign policies of all states. Even in the shift from traditional to revolutionary regimes, these longstanding interests will presumably impose themselves on policy makers.[7] Thus, Pamela S. Falk observes in the foreword of *Cuban Foreign Policy* that "Cuba's interest in thrusting itself onto the world stage through its foreign policy was established long before 1959 and continued after the revolution" (p. xiv). In her concluding chapter, she observes that "Cuba's fundamental foreign policy premises have not changed much since Cuba's independence in 1898" (p. 151). In certain respects, this may indeed be the case; the compelling sense of a distinctive national identity requiring independent statehood would seem to have a pedigree that is over a century old in Cuba. (José Martí and Fidel Castro do share a strong distrust for the United States, for example.) But surely

[6] Commenting on the current period, Jorge I. Dominguez finds that "paradoxically, then, the internal radicalization under way requires at least temporary foreign policy moderation." See "Cuba in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Fall 1986), 126. For an account that stresses the conformity of internal with external policy, see Enrique Balyora Herp, "Internationalism and the Limits of Autonomy: Cuba's Foreign Relations," in Heraldo Muñóz and Joseph Stulchin, *Latin American Nations in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

[7] See, for example, the account of Soviet foreign policy in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

any such statement should be qualified by emphasis on the dramatic and abundant innovations in Cuba's role in world affairs since 1959, which no amount of reading of the prerevolutionary historical record could possibly prepare us to expect. Where else are we to turn but to the distinctive contributions of Castro's character and the teachings of Marxist-Leninist thought?

Alternatively, the national interest may be interpreted as the well-nigh universal concern of states with their survival as regimes and with national security. The notion here is that any government's first responsibility is to provide for its defense; otherwise a vulnerable state may find any mission compromised before it begins. Thus it is a commonplace in textbooks on international relations to suggest that the basic source of a country's foreign policy is its interpretation of its national interest in terms of its preoccupation with national security. Such considerations are often depicted as objective, self-evident, age-old, and essentially defensive in character.

In the case of Cuba, it might thus be maintained, the immediate concern of Castro's revolutionary government was to protect itself from the fate of Guatemala's: attempts by the C.I.A. to overthrow it. Seen in this light, Cuban foreign policy has been fundamentally defensive, ranging from its opening to the Soviet Union to its support for revolutionary movements armed against other governments in Latin America. Accordingly, Duncan posits his "first level" of "vital interests" as essentially defensive. He finds it "quite natural" that, given Cuba's "size, geographical location, culture and history," its foreign policy "not surprisingly . . . assumed a predominately military emphasis. How else might the small island defend itself against the northern threatening neighbor?" (p. 34). There is an abundant literature maintaining that without hostility from the United States, Cuba would not have developed such close ties with the Soviet Union.[8]

Other writers are more sensitive to the initiatives taken by Castro in Cuba's foreign policy as early as 1959—decisions that were sure to place Havana on a collision course with Washington. For example, Carla Anne Robbins documents Cuba's "revolution for export" early in its revolutionary history, though she criticizes the United States for exaggerating and over-reacting to Castro's challenge. The problem with Rob-

[8] See, for example, William M. Leogrande, "Foreign Policy: The Limits of Success," in Jorge I. Dominguez, ed., *Cuba: Internal and International Affairs* (Santa Monica, CA: Sage Publications, 1982); Marjorie Woodford Bray and Donald W. Bray, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Third World Struggle," in Halebsky and Kirk (fn. 3); and Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations*, pp. 7-8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bins's account lies in its failure to address adequately the logical issue of why Washington should seek accommodation with such a hostile regime; the origins of this problem would appear to stem from the book's more basic failure (one it shares with virtually the entire literature) to explain systematically just why Cuban policy has been what it has been.[9] A more interesting interpretation is provided by Wayne S. Smith in *The Closest of Enemies*. He is categorical in his assertion that the initial worsening of Cuban-American relations was caused by Castro's determination to have a global foreign policy that would contest the international order dominated by the United States; he maintains, however, that the basis for detente between Cuba and the United States now exists because Castro has mellowed over the years (compare chapters 2 and 11). Smith is not nearly as thorough as one might wish in explaining the logic of Cuban policy, but he has made a credible effort.

Jorge I. Dominguez in his forthcoming book, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, presents a most complex and interesting account of the Cuban leadership's perception of Cuban national security and how to secure it. On the one hand, Dominguez states clearly that the first priority of Cuban foreign policy has always been the survival of the revolutionary regime in Cuba. On the other, he is unequivocal that this determination first led Castro to initiate an aggressive foreign policy; it included attempts at the subversion of other states in the region through Cuban-style guerrilla tactics and a confrontational pose with Washington that involved Cuban efforts to gain Soviet support (Introduction and chapter 1 especially). The title of Dominguez's book connotes the Cubans' effort to preserve their own revolutionary vocation (a defensive stance) by carrying the struggle against the United States to any parts of the world that beckoned.[10] In other words, they considered the best defense to be a good offense—or, to rephrase an expression, "to preserve peace, wage war."

Some students of the subject may find such a complex treatment satisfying. For this reader, the problem with Dominguez's interpretation is that it is ultimately unable to resolve the obvious tensions involved in

[9] Robbins, *The Cuban Threat*, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1985), chaps. 2 and 7.

[10] The same approach appears earlier in Dominguez's writing. Thus in 1978, he identified the first objective of Havana's foreign policy as "the survival of revolutionary government," and directly linked the decision to "go global" to its comprehensible and legitimate sense of a threat from Washington. In the case of Cuba's subversive activities in Latin America, for example, the weakest regimes there were the most likely to be dependent on Washington, and hence hostile to Havana. As a consequence, Cuba "had the most concrete of national interests in supporting the opposition to those governments that sided with the United States against Cuba." Dominguez (fn. 1), 85-86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

making such an assertive policy appear as a logical defensive position for Cuba to take. In effect, Dominguez wants it both ways: he depicts the enormous ambition of Cuba's foreign policy while trying to make it appear not only understandable but even sensible and prudent. He allows in his opening line, "This is not a book of fiction, yet much of the story seems a fantasy." Later in the Introduction, he states that "Cuba is a small country, but it has the foreign policy of a big power." Yet these brave words seem irreconcilably at odds with an analysis that shows Havana to be cautiously and cagily respectful of the power at its disposal. At one point, for example, the author devotes several pages to comparing the rational calculations involved in Cuban overseas involvements with the assessments made by a multinational corporation before it decides to invest abroad (the investment in this case being the Cuban army).

"World revolution" has been the battle cry of many a communist militant in this century; presumably, many of those possessed of the spirit saw themselves as acting, in good measure, defensively. But that does not mean that those of us less swept up in the enthusiasm of nationalist-communist passions have to agree with this assessment. Dominguez's book is more detailed, knowledgeable, and nuanced than any of the studies of Cuban foreign policy that have appeared so far. It nevertheless fails to communicate the passion of the revolutionary enterprise itself and the risk-taking, messianic heroism that is so basic to its purpose (though Dominguez recognizes they exist). Because he focuses on what might be called the "operational code" of Cuban foreign policy (which he shows to be shrewdly aware of the limits of Havana's power and programmed in terms of rational calculations of success) rather than on the "emotional" and "intellectual" codes that propel policy (terms to be discussed below), Dominguez presents an account that for this reviewer is neither complete nor balanced. It is not enough to cite Che's call for "one, two, many Vietnams," or Castro's boast that "the Andes will be the Sierra Maestra of Latin America," or his equally famous assertion that "the duty of the revolutionary is to make a revolution." The logic and the passion of such a "defensive offense" remain to be explained, not simply acknowledged.

Because of these considerations, it is difficult to understand how Cuba's national interest can be interpreted as being an important source of that country's foreign policy, at least so far as the term has any traditional geopolitical meaning. A focus on the issues of national security and the revolutionary regime's concern for its survival may bring us much closer to a satisfying explanation of Cuban behavior, provided care is taken not to beg certain difficult and fundamental questions. These issues take us

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not only to the operationalization of Cuban policy—which Dominguez handles masterfully—but to the basic reservoir of emotions that dictate the style of foreign policy and of intellectual presuppositions that serve as a world view, organizing and legitimizing conduct. What still needs explaining is the genuine commitment expressed in a declaration by the First Communist Party Congress in 1975: "the starting point of Cuba's foreign policy . . . is the subordination of Cuban positions to the international needs of the struggle for socialism and for the national liberation of peoples." Similarly, Article 12 of the Cuban Constitution, adopted the following year, opens with the statement, "The Republic of Cuba espouses the principles of proletarian internationalism and of the combative solidarity of peoples," before launching into a long list of the progressive causes it supports.

In the case of the stepped-up Cuban intervention in Africa in the mid-1970s, neither a national interest based on the survival of the regime nor any recognizable objective concern accounts for much of Cuban behavior. Instead, an idealistic proletarian internationalism, explicitly contrasted to the narrow self-centeredness of national interest, has long been a staple item in virtually all of Castro's speeches about Cuba's role in world affairs. Of course, Cuba's national interest was served by the applause its policies gained in the third world, the support it garnered from the Soviet Union, and the pride and commitment it generated in its population at home. But that was the *result* of policy, not the source; if it had been anticipated by Castro, we would still have to return to his character and his way of viewing the world in order to comprehend Cuban conduct. What we will find is a very particular concept of national interest, one that is quite foreign to any of the standard definitions and that can only be communicated by insisting on the singularity of Castro's self-conceived mission.

Observation Four

Concern with United States or Soviet policy should not cloud the issue of the character of Cuban globalism.

Many writers on Cuba's role in world affairs appear to have an inclination to prescribe proper United States policy. Although this ambition may be an altogether worthy undertaking, it often results in a diversion of attention: if one adduces an interpretation of Cuban policy in line with the policy one prefers, the reading given to Cuban conduct is biased before it even begins. More space may be spent lecturing Washington on the "myths" it allegedly holds about Cuba than on establishing an explanatory framework analyzing why Havana acts as it does. Yet how can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one "debunk the myths" if the truth has never been carefully established?[11] A tendency to sermonize in books on foreign affairs may well serve a purpose on occasion. But in this reviewer's experience, the penchant of writers on Cuba to "get preachy" must set some kind of record—in most cases, to the detriment of analysis.

Even more likely to shortcircuit serious discussion of the character of Cuban foreign policy are the multiple efforts to dispute Soviet control of Havana's role in world affairs. While it is undeniably important to present an accurate picture of the degree of Cuban autonomy in its relations with Moscow, so much time is often spent exposing errors in the thinking of the conservative right that more insightful analyses are often preempted. The "surrogate myth," as it is often called, has taken on mythical proportions of its own. Did anyone actually say, as Cole Blasier tells us, that "the USSR, using the Cuban communists, and later using Castro, engineered a successful plot to take over Cuba as a Soviet instrument in the hemisphere?"[12] Erisman asserts that "advocates" of the "surrogate thesis" maintain that the

> Soviets have capitalized on Cuba's strategic and economic vulnerabilities to penetrate the country and create a dependency relationship that gives them a predominant role in Havana's decision-making processes. Thus the roots of Cuban globalism are seen as lying in the Kremlin—the Soviets hand down the marching orders and Castro . . . has little choice but to obey (p.3).

Blasier offers no sources; Erisman's citations themselves turn out to be questioning the "surrogate myth." Though some writers may perhaps be interpreted as overemphasizing the role of Soviet influence in Havana, they hardly depict affairs in the lurid light suggested above.[13]

Such lines illustrate the widespread practice of setting up a strawman—in this case the "surrogate thesis." The author then demonstrates Cuban independence of action (in the 1960s especially), and concludes that Cuban interests coincide or converge with those of the Soviet Union, but are not dictated by them, even though Soviet hegemonic influence

[11] See, for instance, Robbins (fn. 9), chap. 7.

[12] Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 101.

[13] The origin of the term "surrogate myth" or "thesis" would appear to be in Gonzalez (fn. 4). (It should be noted that Gonzalez recognizes Soviet influence over Cuban policy.) I was able to trace two of his three sources. One essay is quite alarmist about Soviet intentions in Angola, but says very little at all about Cuba: Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," *Strategic Review* (Summer 1976). The other is George Volsky, "Cuba's Foreign Policy," *Current History* (February 1976). Volsky does indeed declare that Castro "was 'persuaded' to dispatch troops to Angola by the Kremlin," but he goes on to describe Castro's room for maneuver as so great that "any change of [Cuban] policy, however drastic, is always within the realm of possibility."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over Cuba is considerable. After several studies have appeared detailing Havana's autonomy in varied respects, these new reviews are only flogging a dead horse.[14] There should be a moratorium on the term "surrogate myth" as well as on superficial putdowns of the alleged "thesis" that supports it in scholarly publications.

These remarks are not meant to discourage serious efforts to analyze the character of Soviet influence in Cuba, such as Dominguez's forthcoming book. Soviet-Cuban cooperation exists, after all, and it is a legitimate undertaking to explore its character. Moreover, in the early 1970s the Cubans adopted the Soviet model of organization for the institutionalization of their state, and did so with the support of Soviet experts. There is every reason to think that the Soviet Union has attempted to penetrate the Cuban army, party, and intelligence networks and has identified factions in these institutions that it favors. In view of Castro's undisputed authority in Havana, studies of these matters may not at present tell us much about the nature of Cuban foreign policy, but the day may come when the sources of Cuban conduct will be better understood in these terms.[15]

Observation Five

As the preceding remarks on Cuban national interest and domestic interest groups indicate, Fidel Castro's emotional, intellectual, and operational codes appear to be the chief factors that should be investigated in the search for the central dynamic of Cuban foreign policy. Because of the power in Castro's hands since 1959 and his evident enthusiasm for using it, the study of Cuba in world affairs should have as its center of gravity Castro's personality, the intellectual presuppositions implicit in his fusion of Marxist-Leninist thinking with Cuban nationalism, and the pattern that has evolved in the operationalization of his thinking. Whenever we read about Cuba's foreign policy without explicit reference to Castro (as we often do), we have a case of what Marxists call reification—the attribution of an active undertaking to an essentially contingent reality. The obvious danger is that such an analysis may be a reductionist

[14] Probably the earliest work that clearly establishes Cuba's autonomy in foreign affairs is D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

[15] Other useful accounts include Jiri Valenta, "Soviet and Cuban Responses to New Opportunities in Central America," in Richard E. Feinberg, ed., *Central America: International Dimensions of the Crisis* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982); Robert S. Leiken, "Soviet and Cuban Policy in the Caribbean Basin," in Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); and Robert A. Packenham, "Cuba and the USSR since 1959: What Kind of Dependency?" in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *Cuban Communism*, 7th ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

study; but in the Cuban case, the argument in favor of according primacy of place to Castro seems compelling.

Moses, Napoleon, Bolívar, Nietzsche's Übermensch or Zarathustra, Weber's charismatic leader—Castro bears comparison with them all. Whatever the tenets of orthodox Marxism about the insignificance of great men in the making of history, Castro himself has never doubted the crucial role that inspired leadership can play in the life of a people. His position has never degenerated into a cult of the personality on the lines of Stalin or Mao, but he did avoid the trammels of sharing power and ruled with only a coterie until the mid-1970s. Even now, more than a decade after the institutionalization of the Communist Party and a great expansion in its membership, sudden and dramatic shifts in policy can depend wholly on his decision. It comes as no surprise, then, that Castro likes to evoke Ernest Hemingway's heroes in terms that might be used for himself when he describes the North American writer as

> an adventurer in the genuine sense of the word—something which in itself is beautiful because it speaks of a man who does not conform to the world, and who assumes the duty to change it. A genuine adventurer has to break with conventions and launch himself into adventure, quickly learning if he does not know it already. He will not remain unharmed: mutation is inevitable and is part of the risk which one has to accept from the start. . . . We also have been vulnerable and exposed to destruction for decades. . . . Hemingway was right; a man can be destroyed, but never beaten. For us that was the message of his books.[16]

Nietzsche's description of the aristocrat, the noble man, also comes to mind:

> He feels contempt for the cowardly, the anxious, the petty, those intent on narrow utility; also for the suspicious with their unfree glances, those who humble themselves, the doglike people, above all the liars. . . . The noble type of man experiences himself as determining values; he does not need approval; he judges, "what is harmful to me is harmful in itself"; he knows himself to be that which first accords honor to things; he is value-creating. Everything he knows as part of himself he honors: such a morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow. . . . The noble human being honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness.[17]

[16] Cited in Peter G. Bourne, *Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), 204.

[17] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (New York: Random House, 1966), 205.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Here we find expressed a spirit similar to Castro's in its disdain for the weakness of the corrupt, the soft, the vain, the degenerate, the bureaucratic, the self-interested, the materialist. Here we sense the spirit of Castro's respect for those who are convinced of their moral rightness, whose courage knows no limits, not even fear of death, whose sense of self and personal mission is equaled only by their selfless dedication to a great, historic purpose. Here we find the man of the July 26, 1953, attack on the Moncada barracks, of the December 1956 landing of the *Granma*, of the April 1961 Bay of Pigs, of the ill-fated ten-million-ton sugar harvest of 1970; and, in foreign policy, the man who supports revolutionary movements undertaken against great odds in places as different as Angola and Nicaragua. In the words of Danton, "*de l'audace, encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace*" (audacity, audacity again, audacity always), quoted by Guevara in the dedication of his manual *Guerrilla Warfare* (1960). Or, in Foch's phrase, "*On s'engage, et puis on voit*" (Leap, then look). To understand Castro is to think again of what it means to take the hero in history seriously (or, if Hemingway is the model, of the macho role assumed by an insecure, overcompensating man).[18]

If Castro is in fact the self-evident locus of Cuban foreign policy, why has his character not been related to the subject more systematically? There are of course biographies and other studies that faithfully document his sense of self-importance and his central place in the Revolution.[19] But analyses of his role in world politics have yet to be as insightful as one might hope, as illustrated in the account of Wayne S. Smith, who certainly acknowledges Castro's significance. To be sure, an important part of this lack of analysis is due to lack of information. Yet I suspect there is more to it than that. Thanks to Marx's teachings, the "left" simply refuses to credit historical significance to charismatic leaders. Moreover, the conservative right in the United States often wants to stress the East-West character of Cuba's global involvements; a clear focus on Castro's contribution takes away from an emphasis on Soviet strategy and geopolitical realities. In addition, Castro points the finger at the painful realities of third-world existence: the corrupt regimes, the grinding pov-

[18] See Kenneth S. Lynn, *Hemingway* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

[19] Earlier accounts that appreciate Castro's significance include Herbert Matthews, *The Cuban Story* (New York: Braziller, 1961), and Matthews, *Fidel Castro* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969); Lee Lockwood, *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); as well as abundant references in Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), and Edward Gonzalez, *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), chap. 8. More recent studies include Carlos Alberto Montaner, *Fidel Castro y la Revolución Cubana* (Madrid: Playoral, 1983); Bourne (fn. 16); Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Biography* (New York: William Morrow, 1986); and Carlos Franqui, *Diary of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

erty, and North American indifference to or collaboration with this state of affairs. The conservative right does not care to dwell too much on such realities. What might be called the liberal left also has its reasons for avoiding recognition of Castro's responsibility for Cuban policy. This group frequently explains Cuba's conduct as a reaction to the United States' arrogance and aggression. A stance that focuses too clearly on Castro as the originator of policy, as the powerful, self-confident, aggressive anti-Yankee that he is, makes him less of a victim and hence discourages the sympathy that these writers often try to elicit for the Cuban Revolution.

Thus, attempts to establish frameworks of analysis for the study of Cuban foreign policy have been repeatedly obscured by writers who are more concerned with influencing U.S. policy than with looking at Cuba on its own terms. In this respect, we may surmise that writers on the conservative right and the liberal left have been partners in obscuring Castro's paramount role in the formulation of Cuban foreign policy. To depict him as the primary actor would detract from the focus on Soviet or North American policy—matter of greater urgency to many members of these two constituencies than Cuba itself.

An important exception to these remarks is the short but stimulating book by Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, appropriately entitled *Castro, Cuba, and the World*. As the authors assert at the outset, "To understand Cuban foreign policy one must first understand Fidel Castro." Using a concept they call "the hubris-nemesis complex," Gonzalez and Ronfeldt seek to integrate the Cuban leader's chief personality traits: they show him to be, among other things, power-hungry, manipulative, moralistic, and risk-taking. Castro's character is then related to the pattern of his foreign policy, especially to his "tactical pragmatism," which coexists with his "revolutionary maximalism" (Sections I and II).

Interesting as this approach is, it has its limitations. Ultimately, what is lacking in this study is a sense of the historical context of the international relations out of which Castro's policy has grown, and the explicit, rationally conceived, deliberately calculated policy that has emerged under his guidance. Gonzalez and Ronfeldt move from psychoanalytic categories (and even these are rudimentary if one compares, say, the concept of the "authoritarian personality"—which they cite—with their account of the hubris-nemesis complex) to policy positions without enough sense of the intervening variables or the inevitable nuances and contradictions that so often color action. The Castro we encounter here has more emotions than ideas, and there is little sense of the subtlety with which he orchestrates his policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although Dominguez is far less committed to seeing Castro as the prime mover of Cuban policy than Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, or this reviewer, believe is correct, his book has the virtue of showing how complicated the reasoning is that guides Castro's behavior. Only one brief section of Dominguez's long book is devoted to an examination of Castro himself. As in his analysis of the offensive and defensive aspects of Cuban foreign policy, Dominguez hesitates between according Castro his full due and making Cuban policy a product of other forces. On the one hand, he finds that "Cuban foreign policy making remains one of the most centralized areas within a highly centralized regime," and that "Castro designs the framework for Cuban foreign policy. He makes the boldest and riskiest decisions and, at times, oversees implementation in minute detail." On the other hand, he also insists that Cuban policy "results from the coordinated actions of many agencies, groups, and individuals; it is not just the extension of one person's thoughts, inclinations, and actions . . ." (chap. 9). Gonzalez and Ronfeldt often simplify Castro's policy as if it responded to little more than shifts in the East-West balance. The implication throughout their book is that a more aggressive stance in Washington works to restrain Cuba (see, e.g., chap. 5). Dominguez shows clearly that Castro's concerns are far more sensitive to local conditions and long-term calculations.

Thus, these two books complement one another: Gonzalez and Ronfeldt are especially insightful with respect to Castro's core personality; Dominguez portrays how astutely Castro makes his moves on the world stage. To put it differently, Gonzalez and Ronfeldt make useful suggestions toward the interpretation of what might be called Castro's "emotional code" while Dominguez is superb in demonstrating what could be called Castro's "operational code." What is missing to form a complete portrait is an "intellectual code" that could furnish a picture of the fundamental world view that the Cuban leader holds.

Despite references by some writers to the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Cuban nationalism in the study of Cuban foreign policy, no one has advanced an explicit framework to explain how these various ideas have been translated, as a Leninist would say, "from theory to practice."[20] Part of the reason for this lack of effort may come from a general prejudice that exists in the field of Cuban studies against taking ideology seriously. "Actually, there is little of the Marxist in Castro," declared Hugh Thomas in 1977.

[20] Recognition of the importance of ideology is expressed in Gonzalez (fn. 19), chap. 7; Nelson P. Valdés, "Revolutionary Solidarity in Angola," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds., *Cuba in the World* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979); and Duncan (fn. 2), 160ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> He has a strong social conscience and a contempt for bourgeois institutions. But otherwise he seems a traditional South American caudillo or military leader, more honest and hard working than most, and much more occupied by practical questions of agricultural management than any Marxist.[21]

Or, as Theodore Draper put it in 1965, Castro always "had a deep, persistent feeling of intellectual inadequacy and inferiority, a tendency to depend on others for fundamental values or systematic thinking."[22] Neither one of these writers presents any evidence to defend such cavalier observations.

Yet another part of the failure to link theory with practice may stem from lack of familiarity with the logic of communist argumentation. The recurrent tendency to describe Castro as "pragmatic" in foreign relations—and to assume that this contradicts communist practice based on principle—suggests an ignorance of united-front strategies, for example. Moreover, it would be an error to suppose that Castro had a detailed plan of action to be put into effect once he assumed power. As Che Guevara declared early in 1960 (debating Lenin's dictum that without a revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary movement), "the principal actors in this revolution had no coherent theoretical criteria." We might therefore assume that, whatever his leanings toward communism, Castro's view of the world had not been fully formed in 1959 and that it has continued to evolve ever since, making the contribution of theory to practice difficult to determine. Since we have no detailed records on which to base judgments of how Cuban leaders deliberate policy, any such undertaking is sure to prove hazardous.

Even though the connection between Castro's world view and Cuban policy is difficult to establish with any assurance, Castro has repeatedly declared his faith in Marxism-Leninism. The analyst of Cuban foreign policy needs to provide some account of the relation between theory and practice in at least three separate domains: in the basic assumptions of Cuban policy; in the modes by which policy is operationalized theoretically; and in the dedication which it has inspired since 1959.

In the domain of ideology, a theme that has priority is that which sees the world in a Manichaean fashion: the reactionary forces of evil arrayed by predatory, expansionist capitalism with its headquarters in Washington, opposed by the progressive forces of good organized by international communism with its headquarters in Moscow. The so-called "depen-

[21] Thomas, "Marxism in Latin America," in Shlomo Avineri, ed., *Varieties of Marxism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 393.

[22] Theodore Draper, *Castroism: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1965). For other sources that dismiss the matter, see Smith (fn. 5), 223, n. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dency" school of analysis provides an extended account, based on an orthodox Marxist reading of history, of the alleged character of the forces of evil in contemporary Western and Japanese imperialism. The details of this analysis need not occupy us here, but its complexity and sophistication are such that it offers a complete justification for the most outraged feelings of nationalist revolt against the plunder and humiliations of capitalist imperialism. This type of justification is bound to be attractive to a certain kind of intellectual in a country like Cuba whose culture, social organization, and political structures were profoundly shaped by outside forces before the Revolution.[23]

By contrast, the utopian promises of Marxist communism offer a compelling expectation of redemption from the world of class exploitation. Freedom, justice, equality, and fraternity are to be embodied in "the new man" created in the character-building struggle to resist imperialist exploitation. We may thus understand the formula of so many of Castro's speeches, in which the past of a humiliated people subject to voracious imperialist exactions is contrasted with a Cuba that has stood up, taking charge of its destiny, proud and confident in its self-affirmation. Here the theme of "proletarian internationalism" is of key significance, offering the path to salvation by acts that are fundamental to Castro's commitment to communism (a point developed under Observation Two).[24]

Finally, there is the Leninist instruction in the tactics of the united front, the most crucial of communist strategies in converting theory into practice. Castro may be said to have come of age as a Leninist by 1970: the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia (in 1967) and the failure of the ten-million-ton sugar harvest three years later seem to have helped to persuade him of the dangers of his adventurist undertakings. But, as he demonstrated by his brilliant and courageous acts in defense of his comrades in Angola in the mid-1970s and in Nicaragua slightly later, Castro has not lost the resolve to strike again when a more sober reading of the overall correlation of forces between East and West reveals an opportunity. In this respect, the record now provides some indication of the assumptions Cuba makes on how best to instrumentalize a "united anti-imperialist front" in the context of a particular kind of class analysis appropriate to third-world countries deeply penetrated by the world capitalist system maintained by Washington. The fact that Leninism pro-

[23] For further discussion, see Tony Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain and the Late-Industrializing World since 1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 2, and Smith, "Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies?" *World Politics* 37 (July 1985), 532-61, at 544-53.

[24] For the account here and immediately following, see Smith (fn. 5), chap. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vides for authoritarian leadership politically must make it all the more appealing for a messianic figure such as Castro.

In the course of his struggles against imperialism, Castro has worked unremittingly to fuse Cuban nationalism with Marxist-Leninist categories of historical understanding. Thus, as I indicated earlier, to be at one with the revolutionary efforts of the 1860s, the 1890s, and the 1930s, one must embrace the Revolution of 1959—and communism. To be a nationalist, one must be a communist; logically speaking, no other conclusion is possible, nor is any other discourse permissible. Moreover, the history of precommunist Cuban nationalism is deeply impregnated with anti-North Americanism so far as intellectual thought is concerned. "I know the monster for I have lived in its entrails; my sling is the sling of David," wrote the great Cuban nationalist José Martí, who lived in the United States for many years. Grafting a Marxist account of the history of international relations onto traditional Cuban nationalism did not constitute too taxing an intellectual endeavor.

Cuban nationalists outside Cuba may rightfully feel differently, maintaining that communism and the alliance with the Soviet Union have been the betrayal of their country's independent, democratic promise. Moreover, public opinion polls taken in 1960 demonstrate that the level of hostility to the United States was very low within the Cuban population at that time.[25] Since the national interest of Cuba and that of the Soviet Union may on occasion conflict, it is not unthinkable that Cuban nationalist sentiment could one day be turned against the Soviet Union, as was the case in China and Yugoslavia. Unlikely as this is under Castro, it is even more improbable that any such break would be accompanied by a kind of internal evolution leading to a split between Cuban nationalism and communist ideology; their fusion is the bedrock of the current regime's legitimacy.[26]

The role of Cuban foreign policy is central in this marriage of passion and reason that Castro has tried to accomplish by combining Cuban nationalism with communist thinking. Before the Revolution, so Castro can maintain, Cuba was without a firm national identity, its past the humiliating story of its subordination to powerful outsiders. Unlike countries such as the Soviet Union or China, where communism came to be blended with ancient cultures of established tradition, Cuba's most

[25] Jorge I. Dominguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 142.

[26] Erisman insists on the distinction between nationalism and communist ideology, however. See also Mark Falcoff, "How to Think about Cuban-American Relations," in Horowitz (fn. 15).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

substantial past as recalled by Castro was one of valiant efforts to overthrow foreign subjugation—and little more. In this view, since the same force that conquered Cuba—the world system of international capitalism—continues to thrive today, the Cuban people will have triumphed only when, as Dominguez puts it, they have indeed made the world safe for revolution. Their fate is indissociably linked today, as yesterday, with the ruling forces of the international order. Hence (as was indicated above in Observation Three) to be a Cuban nationalist *is* to be a communist, and to be a communist is to dedicate oneself without reserve to the duties of proletarian internationalism. Surely this is part of the explanation of what would otherwise be an incomprehensible engima: that a small, poor, vulnerable country such as Cuba should show such commitment and take such risks in foreign affairs.

In the foregoing comments I have suggested that the analysis of the pattern of Cuban foreign policy since 1959 should find its center of gravity in the study of the mind and character of Fidel Castro. To be sure, the nature of Castro's importance to Cuban foreign policy has changed with time. Suppose Castro had been killed in the early 1960s by one of the several C.I.A. plots against his life. If such an assassination had occurred during the first months of the Revolution's triumph, its consequences would surely have been dramatic. After the mobilization against the Bay of Pigs invasion in the spring of 1961, it is probable that any such act would only have confirmed the anti-Yankee, pro-Soviet cast of the Revolution. Since the mid-1970s, with the greater institutionalization of the state and the party and the expansion of the military's role in Africa, the anti-North American course of Cuban foreign policy seems increasingly fixed, though it is hard to believe that its forward policy abroad would survive Castro's departure. But, even with respect to relations with Washington, appearances may be deceiving. Castro continues to be a charismatic leader, and just as perhaps he alone can hold the country to the dangerous and complicated path on which he has set it, so perhaps he alone could give it a sudden and dramatic turn toward an opening with Washington should the occasion present itself. Today, three decades after the Revolution, despite all the institution building and attitude formation that have occurred, Castro's central role appears undiminished in all essential respects.

Of course, like any policy maker, Castro has at times been reactive and has improvised—all the more so because he has been forced to operate in the context of circumstances largely beyond his control: the possibilities and limitations for action were determined by the givens of Cuban history, the reality of third-world poverty and oppression, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force of the superpower contest. Moreover, he undoubtedly understands the world differently today than he did three decades ago, and there have surely been unintended consequences from his actions (although probably far less so in foreign than in domestic affairs). It would be an error to suppose that he is static in his thinking. Finally, it is clear that Castro was himself shaped by historical forces that must be understood; he was not alone in his conviction that radical change was called for in Cuba and that the United States was the enemy. Nevertheless, the essential ingredients out of which Cuban policy is born are a revolutionary government, led by a charismatic leader who has blended nationalism with Marxism and has established a Leninist form of government. National interest and the play of domestic forces may have exercised some influence on the emergence of a Cuban identity in world affairs, but they appear to be secondary factors whose meaning or definition has been decided by the leader and his way of thinking. If others, in later analyses, dispute the tenor of these comments, so much the better. In view of the importance of Cuba's role in world affairs for East-West relations and the interest inherent in a virtuoso performance such as Castro's, more focused debate is called for on the nature of a foreign policy inspired primarily, so far as this observer understands it, by the continuing force of the spirit of the Sierra Maestra.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DILEMMAS OF CHANGE IN MEXICAN POLITICS

By KEVIN J. MIDDLEBROOK*

Alejandro Alvarez, *La crisis global del capitalismo en México, 1968-1985* [The general crisis of capitalism in Mexico, 1968-1985]. Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1987, 178 pp.

Roderic A. Camp, *Mexico's Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980, 259 pp.

Roderic A. Camp, ed., *Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, 279 pp.

Abraham Nuncio, ed., *La sucesión presidencial en 1988* [The presidential succession in 1988]. Mexico City: Editorial Grijalbo, 1987, 476 pp.

Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 384 pp.

THE continuing fascination that Mexico's authoritarian regime holds for students of comparative politics is largely due to its remarkable postrevolutionary stability despite diverse pressures for political and socioeconomic change. The founding of a broadly inclusive, government-sponsored political party in the aftermath of the 1910-1917 revolution created a mechanism to regulate intra-elite competition and mobilize popular support for the new regime. Although various opposition political parties compete with the "official" Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),[1] its candidates have never lost an election for the presidency or for state governorships. The defeat of a Catholic-based rural rebellion in the 1920s and of military revolts in 1923, 1929, and 1938 effectively consolidated civilian rule. The armed forces' political role since 1940 has generally been limited to symbolic representation in certain public offices and regular, behind-the-scenes consultation on issues of national importance. Consolidation of state controls over organized labor and the peasantry in the 1930s and 1940s contributed significantly

* I wish to thank Alejandro Alvarez, Wayne A. Cornelius, David Collier, Jorge I. Domínguez, and Peter H. Smith for helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.

[1] Mexico's governing political party was founded in 1929 as the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (Revolutionary National Party). In 1938 it was restructured as the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (Mexican Revolutionary Party) on the basis of labor, agrarian, military, and "popular" sectors. The military sector was formally eliminated in 1940 and became part of the popular (middle-class) sector after the latter was reorganized in 1943. Further internal reforms were effected in 1946, and the party was renamed the PRI. Organized business has never been formally part of the party, although business interests and the military are both important elements in the broader "revolutionary coalition."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the country's post-World War II industrialization, and economic dynamism from the 1940s through much of the 1970s underpinned a tacit state-private sector "alliance for growth." The Mexican system may be characterized as an authoritarian regime because of the state's active intervention to regulate and limit sociopolitical pluralism, mass political mobilization, and the articulation of socioeconomic and political demands.[2]

Despite the regime's past resilience, the severity of the post-1982 economic crisis has raised major questions concerning the future direction of Mexican politics. Real economic growth rates (which had averaged 7.2 percent per year from 1961 to 1970, 5.0 percent per year from 1970 to 1977, and 8.4 percent per year from 1978 to 1981 during a petroleum-led economic boom) fell to an average −.3 percent per year from 1982 to 1987. Per capita growth rates declined sharply. The reduction (or elimination) of government subsidies for many basic commodities and public services and large, repeated currency devaluations helped push inflation rates to the highest levels since the revolution, averaging 94.4 percent per year from 1982 to 1987.[3] The government's harsh economic stabilization program has provoked intense popular discontent at a time when financial constraints imposed by domestic austerity measures and international creditors severely limit its capacity for negotiation on major policy issues. Even more important, continued economic stagnation threatens existing political alliances and undermines the regime's legitimacy by challenging the postrevolutionary promise of sustained economic progress. The search for an alternative development model that will address Mexico's multiple socioeconomic problems and improve its international economic position has also produced considerable division among key political constituencies.

This essay examines recent developments affecting two key members of Mexico's governing revolutionary coalition, the political elite and organized labor. The ruling coalition's ability so far to withstand the pressures of economic crisis has been due in large part to continued overall unity among the elite and the durability of state-labor ties. However, shifts in education and recruitment patterns pose new challenges to the

[2] This characterization of the Mexican system draws on Juan Linz's theoretical discussion of authoritarian regimes. See Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. III (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 175-411, at 264-69.

[3] The 1961-70 and 1970-77 growth rates are from The World Bank, *World Development Report, 1980* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1980), Table 2, p. 113. The 1982-87 growth and inflation rates are author's calculations based on data presented in *El Mercado de Valores* 48 (February 15, 1988), 20, and (April 1, 1988), Table 2, p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elite's cohesion, and uncertainty regarding the country's economic future accentuates extant intra-elite tensions. Prolonged stagnation also represents a serious threat to organized labor and the established pattern of state-labor relations. Workers have paid a heavy price under the government's austerity program, and changes in national development policy raise new questions concerning organized labor's long-term political and economic position. These developments have important implications for the future course of Mexican politics.

Elite Cohesion Under Stress

Despite considerable rivalry within Mexico's national political leadership, the governing elite's underlying unity has been a significant source of regime stability since the consolidation of postrevolutionary rule. Several factors explain the *clase política*'s durable cohesion. The PRI has generally served as an effective framework for mediating intra-elite conflict, and its sector organizations have removed most labor and peasant groups from potential mobilization by competing elite factions. In addition, sustained economic growth during much of the post-World War II period greatly facilitated agreement among the elite on broad national development goals. Cultural values may also have played an important role in this regard by establishing shared expectations and common behavioral norms. More specifically, however, the Mexican political elite's cohesion has been significantly enhanced by a quite homogeneous socioeconomic background, shared educational experiences, family and kinship ties, the historical division between political and economic elites, and a range of widely accepted political practices. Comparatively long-term political stability has, in turn, ensured continuity in recruitment patterns that further increase the elite's cohesion. Nevertheless, whether the ruling elite can weather the challenges posed by internal sociopolitical change and economic crisis is an unresolved question.

Peter H. Smith's *Labyrinths of Power* and Roderic A. Camp's *Mexico's Leaders*, though published nearly a decade ago, remain the preeminent studies of Mexico's national political leadership. Both authors conclude that Mexico's almost exclusively male political elite is drawn predominantly from an urban middle-class background (Smith, 77; Camp, 42, 62).[4] Despite the country's revolutionary heritage, restricted access for

[4] Smith and Camp offer somewhat different operational definitions of the Mexican political elite. Smith's study includes individuals holding major national office at any time between 1900 and 1971: presidents, vice-presidents (an office abolished by the 1917 constitution), cabinet members, heads of major decentralized agencies and state-supported companies, PRI executive committee members, governors, federal senators and deputies, and ambassadors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lower-class individuals to higher education and the concentration of opportunities for socioeconomic mobility in urban areas have sharply limited the number of workers and peasants holding national office in the postrevolutionary period. In fact, the more prominent the political position, the more likely it is that the officeholder is from an urban, middle-class background.[5] The prevalence of such individuals in key government positions in part explains why the established regime is so well attuned to urban middle-class demands and interests.

The tendency to recruit political leaders from urban, middle-class backgrounds and occupations (lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers and university professors, engineers, journalists, and so forth) has become more pronounced over time (Smith, 74-75, 77-80, 87-96). Similarly, the Federal District and the northern states have provided a disproportionately large share of high-level officeholders, particularly since the 1970s. The closed, highly personalistic process through which major positions are filled—a process largely dominated by past and current officials and political influentials—increases the likelihood that this pattern of recruitment will persist over time. In Camp's view, more emphasis is now placed on loyalty within a relatively nonideological system than on the representation of diverse economic and political interests. Because individuals from middle- and upper-class backgrounds dominate positions above the level of federal deputy (*diputado*), mobility depends on factors other than socioeconomic background, including educational credentials, interpersonal skills, loyalty and reliability, and affiliation with a successful clique (pp. 1, 47, 63, 70-73, 76).

Shared educational experience has been a second important factor contributing to the Mexican elite's internal cohesion. University education has become a prerequisite for access to high-level political positions, and by 1970 one-third of top government officials had received postgraduate training. During the period from 1935 to 1976, 95 percent of leaders with a university degree received their education at public institutions,

(Appendix A, pp. 15-27). In addition to those positions identified by Smith, Camp's study of the period from 1935 to 1976 includes Supreme Court justices, second-tier positions in major government ministries, and leaders of major PRI-affiliated mass organizations (Appendix A, pp. 1-4).

[5] Camp demonstrates (pp. 41-45) that the political generation born immediately after the revolution (1920-29) had the highest proportion of individuals with lower-class backgrounds (42.1 percent).

Although neither Smith nor Camp addresses this point, it is likely that individuals with lower-class backgrounds hold a higher proportion of elected and appointive offices at the state and local levels, particularly in those regions where major labor and agrarian organizations have considerable political influence. At the national level, the federal Chamber of Deputies is usually the highest position attained in a labor or agrarian leader's political career (Camp, 214).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and two-thirds of all political elites with university or professional degrees graduated from the National University of Mexico (UNAM) alone (Smith, 80-87, 113-16, 127; Camp, 8-9, 47-48, 63, 70, 76). Contacts and friendships initially made in preparatory schools and at UNAM (particularly in the law and economics schools) frequently become the basis for subsequent recruitment to political positions. Indeed, prominent government officials find the opportunity to recruit followers for public-sector positions to be the major incentive for part-time, often unpaid, university teaching. Camp argues persuasively that a common educational experience, often under the same professors, has been a major form of socialization and a source of shared values for future political leaders (Camp, 95-98, 101, 103, 113, 121-22, 168-70, 192-94; see also Smith, 86, 120-21).

Kinship ties also play an important unifying role for Mexico's *clase política*. Camp finds that more than 25 percent of political leaders during the period from 1935 to 1976 had blood relatives or in-laws in important political positions at one time or another. Sixty percent of these ties were intergenerational, most commonly involving father and son. Furthermore, the more frequently a person had held high-level office, the more likely he was to have relatives in similar positions, often including multiple generations. For example, 18 percent of first-time, high-level officeholders in the López Portillo administration (1976-1982) had kinship ties to at least one other public official; the figure was 36 percent for fifth-time officeholders (Camp, 29-32; see also Smith, 307-10). The significance of these ties is magnified by the relatively small number of persons (approximately 1,300) who held high-level government and PRI positions from the mid-1930s through the mid-1970s. As in other countries, such ties clearly add to the coherence of the governing elite.

The historical division between political and business leaders is a fourth major source of the elite's unity. The revolution permanently ruptured the tradition of formal participation in government by business leaders that had been established under Porfirio Díaz's conservative rule (1876-1911). As a result, although both political and economic elites are drawn predominantly from urban, educated, middle-class backgrounds, they represent two distinct class segments. Considerable social distance exists between them, and their career patterns and modes of interaction also differ significantly. For example, public-sector officials have traditionally been recruited mainly from public universities, while business professionals are drawn largely from private universities. The centralized character of Mexican politics is a powerful incentive for future leaders to concentrate their energies from the outset on full-time political careers. Thus some government officials may pursue a professional ca-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reer or enter business after leaving office, but it is atypical for an established businessman to rise to a prominent political position (Smith, 195, 199-201, 203-13, 215). The historical division between political and economic elites has frequently been a source of tension and conflict, which further reinforces political leaders' sense of shared identity.

Finally, although Smith and Camp are mainly concerned with such issues as leadership composition and recruitment patterns, both authors recognize the important role that well-established political practices play in preserving the elite's unity. For example, regular rotation of office during the postrevolutionary period has greatly increased the Mexican regime's capacity to provide access to important political positions and the symbolic (and sometimes illicit economic) rewards they convey. The 1917 constitution and subsequent constitutional reforms barred elected officials from holding the same post for two successive terms, though only the president is prohibited from returning to the same position at a later date. The federal executive's authority to fill top-level administrative positions and control key PRI nominations means that the passing of each six-year administration (*sexenio*) regularly opens up significant new mobility opportunities. Smith estimates that there is a 90 percent renewal of the political elite over the period of three presidential terms; indeed, most high-level careers are limited to one term, and few last beyond two terms (pp. 164-66). Regular personnel change and the prospect of future success are powerful stimuli for loyalty to the established system.

In addition, the regime's diffuse ideology and the availability of political and economic rewards in exchange for renewed loyalty have contributed greatly to the governing elite's capacity for cooptation. Camp's data on political elites in the period from 1935 to 1976 demonstrate that a number of former high-level leaders have been reintegrated into the national elite after leading major military or political challenges to the system (pp. 32-35). The possibility that former officials might one day return to office gives them a strong incentive to avoid an irreparable break with the regime and emphasizes loyalty as the essential rule of behavior for Mexican politicians. Similarly, the long-established tradition of negotiation and compromise in the policy-making process ameliorates discontent and generally keeps alienation low, even among those officials ousted from top-level positions in periods of high political tension.

These factors still contribute significantly to the cohesion of Mexico's political leadership, but recent shifts in education and recruitment patterns challenge the elite's continued unity. Moreover, the tensions resulting from sociopolitical change within the political elite have been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accentuated by sustained economic crisis, resulting in the most serious intra-elite conflict in many years. The remainder of this section examines these developments and their potential consequences for Mexican politics.

Technocrats versus Politicians: The Challenges of Leadership Transformation

Considerable public and scholarly attention has been devoted to the consequences of sociopolitical change within Mexico's national political leadership, particularly the growing number of high-level government officials without substantial (or any) previous experience as PRI leaders or PRI candidates for such major elective positions as state governor and federal deputy or senator. The most conspicuous examples of this phenomenon include presidents Luis Echeverría (1970-1976), José López Portillo (1976-1982), Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1992)—all of whose political careers were limited to administrative positions in the federal bureaucracy. Although appointment to a number of task-specific cabinet positions (especially those concerning economic policy making and development-related responsibilities) has often depended on technical expertise, the prevalence of such backgrounds has grown steadily since the 1970s. Indeed, two-thirds of all cabinet secretaries and over one-half of all cabinet undersecretaries in the de la Madrid administration had completed some postgraduate study before assuming office.[6] The increasingly frequent selection of high-level officials whose principal qualification is technical expertise demonstrated in an administrative career (*técnicos* or "political technocrats"[7]) rather than broad experience in electoral politics and/or representation of PRI-affiliated labor and peasant organizations (*políticos*) marks a significant departure in Mexican politics.

The growing prominence of *técnicos* in part reflects a major shift in the educational experiences of Mexican political leaders. Enrollments at public universities expanded dramatically after the late 1960s as the government sought to address middle-class demands for increased educa-

[6] Roderic A. Camp, "The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System," *Latin American Research Review* 20 (No. 1, 1985), 97-118, at 101; see Camp, "The Cabinet and the Tecnico in Mexico and the United States," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3 (August 1971), 188-213, at 192-93, for data concerning the technical orientation of some cabinet positions since the 1930s.

[7] Camp (fn. 6, 1985), 98, uses this last term to suggest that virtually all high-level Mexican decision makers have some political skills, even though some individuals' education, career experience, means of recruitment, and sources of influence emphasize professional training and technical expertise. In this essay, the term "political technocrat" is used interchangeably with *técnico*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional opportunities. However, as Daniel C. Levy notes (in Camp, 1986, pp. 19-46), rapid growth in enrollment and the politicization of institutions such as UNAM devalued the status of public university education and encouraged upwardly mobile middle-class students to seek more selective private higher education and/or graduate study (in Mexico or abroad) as a way of maintaining preferential access to employment opportunities. Private universities in Mexico often have close financial and administrative links to business groups, and their curricula frequently emphasize conservative approaches to economics, administration, and other professional specializations. Qualified private university graduates (who also represent a disproportionate share of students pursuing postgraduate education abroad) encounter strong demand for their professional skills at such "technocratic" government agencies as the Bank of Mexico, the Ministry of Planning and Budget, and the state-owned petroleum company (PEMEX) (pp. 21-26).

Some analysts are quite pessimistic about the long-term implications of these trends. For example, Levy notes that this shift in the educational experience of future political leaders seriously challenges UNAM's previously dominant role in political recruitment and increases the heterogeneity of the elite's socialization experiences. He also argues that private university graduates are "not socialized with the curriculum, class mix, political activity, and bargaining that . . . characterized the experience of their public university predecessors and contemporaries" (pp. 26-27). In office, political technocrats are presumably more adept at the small-group leadership skills appropriate to an administrative environment than the mass-mobilization and negotiating skills associated with the more traditional *políticos*. Levy fears that, as a result, Mexico's political elite may lose the interpersonal and organizational abilities necessary to preserve labor and peasant groups' loyalty to the regime during a lengthy period of economic crisis. He also suggests that these tendencies are likely to become more pronounced over time as highly placed *técnicos* promote individuals with similar background characteristics and professional qualifications to key government positions. Thus traditional recruitment mechanisms—including public universities, the PRI, labor unions, and the armed forces—may continue to decline in importance, and the shift in leadership orientations away from those expressed by traditional politicians may erode the strengths of the established regime and increase the danger of political instability (pp. 25-27, 36-38).[8]

However, several factors indicate that technocrats' participation in na-

[8] See Camp (fn. 6, 1985), 97, 106, 112-14, for views similar to those expressed by Levy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional decision making may be less inherently destabilizing than this view suggests. First, as previously noted, *técnicos* have long held a prominent position within the political leadership. Some 47 percent of all cabinet positions were held by political technocrats as early as the period from 1940 to 1946; this proportion has not dropped below two-thirds since then.[9] This is certainly ample time for any administrative or policy shortcomings attributable to technocrats' presumed lack of political experience to become apparent, yet there is no persuasive evidence of significant failures of this kind. Nor is it clear that political views and policy orientations among *técnicos* are as homogeneous as some analysts have suggested. It is more probable that, despite similarities in their educational background and professional training, *técnicos*—like traditional *políticos*—vary considerably in their ideological tendencies and political preferences.

Second, in view of the intensity of competition for high-level posts, *técnicos* who rise to key decision-making positions surely must evidence considerable political skill. The success that political technocrats have enjoyed since at least the 1940s is ample confirmation of this point. *Técnicos*' educational background and career experiences may lead them to differ from traditional politicians in their evaluation of and response to political and socioeconomic problems, but like *políticos*, they must demonstrate loyalty to superiors and the established system, discretion, skill in alliance-building, and a capacity to avoid errors and resolve concrete political and socioeconomic problems while preserving diverse constituencies' loyalty to the regime.

Third, the Mexican regime offers aspiring political leaders a number of structured opportunities through which to learn the rules of the game. PRI nominees to national, state, and local office normally take part in election campaigns that draw on government resources for transportation, financing, publicity, and personnel. These campaigns both mobilize popular support for the PRI nominee and provide citizens access to future officeholders. Candidates travel extensively and meet representatives of widely varying constituencies, an intensive lesson in practical Mexican politics. For a substantial number of PRI candidates, the campaign is their first (and sometimes last) significant contact with lower-class groups. These late socializing experiences may not always compensate fully for a lack of prior in-depth political exposure, but they constitute a major countervailing influence to political technocrats' distinct professional values. In recognition of the socialization value of elec-

[9] Camp (fn. 6, 1971), 211.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toral campaigns, the top national leadership has responded to frequently expressed concerns regarding *técnicos*' political preparation by ensuring that fast-rising technocrats also have practical (often electoral) political experience.

Peter Smith (in Camp, 1986, pp. 101-17) doubts that *técnicos*' increasing prominence constitutes an immediate threat to political stability. However, he does argue that changes in patterns of recruitment to the elite may have important long-term consequences for the Mexican regime by disrupting the established balance among competing groups. If technical expertise (perhaps validated by a private university degree and/or foreign graduate study) becomes the principal criterion for holding high-level office, then mobility opportunities for aspirants from more modest backgrounds may be substantially reduced, narrowing the political elite's social base. Smith also notes that recruitment of political technocrats on the basis of technical training rather than the gradual construction of political alliances and long experience in electoral politics means that they often attain prominent office at a younger age than traditional politicians, thus introducing a generational dimension to changes in the political leadership (pp. 103-4, 111-12). The 1988 presidential succession offered traditional politicians an opportunity to restore balance in the governing elite, but the election of Salinas de Gortari further consolidated the influence of political technocrats.[10]

The "Democratic Current" and Intra-Elite Conflict

The formation of the "Democratic Current" (Corriente Democrática) in 1986 marked the most serious division in the Mexican political elite since the early 1950s. Organized by dissident PRI loyalists, the Democratic Current called for the democratization of the governing party's method of selecting presidential candidates and a more equitable model of economic development. Documents published by the Democratic Current offered a general critique of the country's major problems and called for increased citizen participation, although they did not constitute a specific program of political and economic reform. The movement's supporters repeatedly espoused loyalty to the PRI and described their initiative as an example of disciplined criticism designed to promote internal party reform. Nevertheless, the PRI hierarchy considered the Democratic Current's activities a veiled attack on the de la Madrid

[10] Salinas de Gortari, an economist educated at UNAM and Harvard University, served as Minister of Programming and Budget in the de la Madrid administration. He was thirty-nine years of age at the time of his nomination by the PRI, and he had never previously held elective office.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration and attempted to limit the movement's political impact by threatening to expel its supporters from the party. The Democratic Current's most conspicuous initiative was its nomination of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas and governor of Michoacán from 1980 to 1986) as the PRI's presidential candidate in July 1987.[11] Not since General Henríquez Guzmán's unsuccessful candidacy in 1952 (protesting the decline of military influence in party affairs, the absence of effective party participation in the selection of its presidential candidate, and rampant government corruption)[12] had a dissident PRI faction backed an independent presidential candidate.

Abraham Nuncio's *La sucesión presidencial en 1988* offers the best available analysis of the Democratic Current and the political context surrounding its formation. In his introduction (pp. 13-43), Nuncio argues that the movement's organizers sought to capitalize on urban middle-class discontent with the PRI's established political practices—particularly the traditional mechanism for nominating the party's presidential candidate, in which the incumbent president chooses his successor (*tapadismo*)—and a widespread desire for change. The Democratic Current's demand that the PRI adhere to its formal, democratic rules in candidate selection (including public delegate conventions and the nomination of multiple candidates) rather than unwritten, authoritarian practices had particular resonance because of popular protests during the years 1983 to 1986 against the PRI's conduct in municipal and state elections (pp. 15-18, 23). Francisco Paoli (in Nuncio, 219-34) suggests that this shift in public expectations was due to accumulated sociopolitical change (especially increased levels of urbanization and education) and the consequent erosion of a "providential" political culture that passively accepted authoritarian rule so long as the regime continued to offer tangible benefits, ranging from general economic growth to the symbolic distribution of material goods during electoral campaigns (pp. 220-22).

The Democratic Current's critique of national economic policy received considerable attention because of the depth of Mexico's continuing economic crisis and the widely shared assumption that the 1988 presidential succession represented a turning point in the country's develop-

[11] Jorge Laso de la Vega, *La Corriente Democrática: Hablan los protagonistas* [The Democratic Current: The protagonists speak] (Mexico City: Editorial Posada, 1987), offers a chronology of the Democratic Current (pp. 193-99) and reproduces the movement's two published working papers (pp. 257-60, 315-20).

[12] For details on Henríquez Guzmán's movement, see Olga Pellicer de Brody, "La oposición en México: el caso del henriquismo" ["The opposition in Mexico: The case of *Henriquismo*"], in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, ed., *Las crisis en el sistema político mexicano* [Crises in the Mexican political system] (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1977), 31-45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment strategy. The de la Madrid administration's economic program sought to end stagnation and promote efficiency by reducing state participation in the economy and limiting government production and consumption subsidies in many areas; accelerate industrial development by offering private-sector investment incentives, reducing tariff barriers on imports of capital goods, and relaxing restrictions on direct foreign investment; and expand the share of manufactured exports in foreign trade. These measures and an accompanying austerity program were applauded by international creditors and the private sector, but in the short term they provoked widespread sociopolitical discontent by contributing to sharply reduced real wages, increased unemployment, and high inflation rates. The debate in Mexico concerning development priorities was certainly not new. Yet the prospect that de la Madrid's successor might pursue this same technocrat-dominated course made the Democratic Current's call for a development model consonant with the Mexican revolution's populist and nationalist roots (however ill-defined) an attractive alternative for groups adversely affected by prevailing economic policy, particularly those elements that resented attacks by *técnicos* on state economic intervention and a mixed economy. As Enrique Semo notes (in Nuncio, 47-61), the rivalry among different political factions representing alternative economic strategies made the 1988 presidential succession the sharpest confrontation over the future direction of national economic policy since the bitterly contested 1940 presidential election (pp. 52-57).

Despite the significance of the issues raised by the Democratic Current, few observers expected the movement to have much political impact once the PRI's presidential candidate had been selected. The Democratic Current's close identification with such well-known figures as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, 1972-1975; PRI president, 1975-1977; Minister of Education, 1976-1977; and ambassador to the United Nations, 1979-1981, 1982-1985) suggested that one motive for the movement's formation was merely to offer former officials an opportunity to resume an active political role at a particularly sensitive time. The presence of former presidents Luis Echeverría and José López Portillo at the PRI's national assembly in March 1987, demonstrating their support for the de la Madrid administration, also seemed to indicate that the Democratic Current had little chance of sparking a broad-based protest movement. Moreover, shortly after the PRI named Carlos Salinas de Gortari as its presidential candidate in October 1987, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas accepted the presidential nominations of two discredited minority parties historically identified as PRI electoral allies, the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion (PARM) and the Socialist Workers' Party (PST). PRI supporters charged that the Democratic Current's unwillingness to support the official nominee belied the movement's original claim to be a loyal internal opposition. The political left maintained that Cárdenas's action forestalled the possibility of a unified opposition candidate and betrayed the dissident movement's own democratic principles by accepting the PARM-PST candidacy without participation in an open, competitive nomination process.[13] Such criticisms from across the ideological spectrum challenged the Democratic Current's political credibility.

Nevertheless, the Democratic Current surprised many observers by winning considerable political support as the presidential campaign progressed. In late 1987 the PARM, PST (reorganized as the Cárdenas Front for National Renovation), Socialist Popular Party (PPS), and several smaller political organizations joined the Democratic Current to form the National Democratic Front (FDN). The FDN's members shared some programmatic goals and supported common candidates for some elective offices, but their main purpose in forming the coalition was to expand the opposition's electoral strength by uniting behind Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's presidential candidacy. The PARM, PST, and PPS saw this as an opportunity to win a larger political base by capitalizing on the Cárdenas name and its mythic association with Mexican nationalism.[14] Similarly, when the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) and the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT) refused to withdraw their own presidential candidates to unite behind Cárdenas's candidacy, dissenting elements in both parties formed the Socialism Movement (MAS) in March 1988 to link the FDN to Marxist parties and organizations. MAS supporters argued that the Cárdenas candidacy offered a unique historical opportunity for the political left to channel popular discontent with

[13] *Uno Más Uno*, October 21, 1987, p. 4; *La Jornada*, October 29, 1987, pp. 1, 6. Cárdenas was expelled from the PRI after accepting the PARM's presidential nomination; *La Jornada*, October 17, 1987, p. 23.

[14] Former president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) is remembered primarily for his progressive economic and political policies and his expropriation of foreign-owned petroleum companies in March 1938.

PARM, PST, and PPS support for the Democratic Current also reflected their concern that the PRI would no longer need to rely on them to assure majority political control of the Federal Electoral Commission and state and district electoral commissions. Reforms to the federal electoral code in 1986 effectively guaranteed PRI majority control in these bodies, thus reducing PRI/government interest in sustaining the PARM, PST, and PPS as loyal "opposition" parties. With their political future in doubt, these minority parties backed the Democratic Current. For details, see Juan Molinar Horcasitas, "El futuro del sistema electoral mexicano" ["The future of the Mexican electoral system"] (paper presented at a conference on "Mexico's Alternative Political Futures," Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California—San Diego, March 1988), 41-43. See *Excélsior*, May 16, 1988, pp. 1, 30, for a list of the political organizations comprising the FDN.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the economic crisis and austerity measures toward more specifically political ends. In response to growing public support for the FDN and continued calls for a unified leftist opposition movement, the PMS finally withdrew its presidential candidate in early June 1988 and pledged its support to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.[15]

The Democratic Current failed to alter the 1987 presidential succession process,[16] but it did lead to the formation of a multiclass opposition coalition dedicated to broad political and socioeconomic reform. The FDN's criticism of concentrated presidential power, public corruption, and electoral fraud received considerable public support, particularly among urban middle-class groups increasingly opposed to such entrenched political practices. Concerted efforts by the FDN and other opposition parties to mobilize anti-PRI discontent also made the 1988 elections the most vigorously contested in Mexican history.[17] Moreover, the opposition's vigorous electoral campaign strengthened the position of elements within the PRI committed to further political liberalization.

The emergence of the Democratic Current also revealed the tensions that prolonged economic stagnation has produced in Mexico's governing elite. Economic crisis challenges one of the regime's most enduring bases of legitimacy, the promise of sustained economic progress. Economic performance became the principal claim to rule for governments once order had been restored following the 1910-1917 revolution. Indeed, the political alliances that permitted the successful resolution of major political conflicts from the 1930s through the 1960s presumed sustained economic growth. Ricardo Pascoe argues (in Nuncio, 249-66) that specific policies adopted by the de la Madrid administration (including partial indemnification of bankers following the 1982 bank nationalization; orthodox management of foreign debt obligations; and adherence to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) contributed to the political tensions that gave rise to the Democratic Current (pp. 260-62). But widespread uncertainty regarding Mexico's economic future has been the principal cause of intra-elite discord on national development goals. Continued economic stagnation has discredited the *técnicos*' claim to su-

[15] *New York Times*, June 6, 1988, p. 3. The PRT refused to follow the PMS move.

[16] The most notable change in the succession process, a series of televised public appearances by the principal presidential candidates in August 1987, had been discussed as early as 1981; see Emilio Rabasa Gamboa, "La sucesión presidencial: Perspectivas" ["The presidential succession: Perspectives"], *Excélsior*, June 27, 1981, pp. 4, 20.

[17] According to official sources, the FDN received 31.1 percent of valid votes cast in the July 1988 presidential election. The PRI's share of the presidential vote, 51.4 percent, was its lowest ever. The opposition also broke historical precedent by winning four seats in the federal Senate, and it expanded its representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies to 240 of a total 500 seats; *New York Times*, July 15, 1988, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perior management skills and heightened disagreements about the appropriate focus of national development strategy. The 1988 presidential succession served as the catalyst that brought these tensions into the open. Whether the Democratic Current episode portends even more severe intra-elite conflict over these issues largely depends upon how adroitly future administrations manage development policy.

State-Labor Relations in Transition

The pattern of state-labor relations established in the 1930s and 1940s has long served as a principal support for Mexico's authoritarian regime. The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM—the PRI's labor sector and the country's largest, politically most important labor confederation since its founding in 1936) and the Labor Congress (the national umbrella organization created in 1966 to give formal representation to the organized labor movement as a whole) represent the regime's most powerful mass constituency. Yet state control over union formation and strike recognition places labor in a subordinate role in decision making on wage levels, income policies, and economic development strategies—issues that directly affect workers. The government's defense of CTM hegemony in the labor movement is predicated on the CTM leadership's willingness to control rank-and-file economic and political demands. Nonetheless, in periods of economic prosperity the CTM (and the "official" organized labor movement more generally) has parlayed its support for the regime during political and economic crises into significant benefits for its membership, but not always for the working class as a whole. These benefits have included government subsidies for housing, health care, and basic commodities; representation in key elective and administrative bodies; and favorable provisions in federal labor law. Despite its dependence on the state, the CTM exercises considerable autonomy in the conduct of its internal affairs. Even presidential administrations that openly criticize the CTM's internal practices find its support essential in times of crisis.

Prolonged economic difficulty has placed severe strains on state-labor relations. Government austerity measures and economic contraction in the private sector resulted in an estimated unemployment rate of 17.6 percent in 1987. At least another 25 to 35 percent of the working-age population is employed in only marginally productive activities. Tight government control over wage increases and high inflation rates have together produced a precipitous decline in real wages, and government subsidies for basic goods, mass transportation, electricity, natural gas, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gasoline have also been drastically reduced or eliminated. As a result, incumbent labor leaders face increasing pressure from the rank and file. The prospect of continued economic stagnation and government efforts to redefine the country's model of economic development raise important questions regarding organized labor's long-term position in Mexico's governing revolutionary coalition.

Alejandro Alvarez's *La crisis global del capitalismo en México, 1968-1985* examines these issues in terms of the structural changes affecting workers. The Mexican working class is notably heterogeneous, with a mix of labor-intensive and capital-intensive employment; wide variations in work-force concentration and productivity; geographical differences in rates of unemployment; and great disparities in working conditions, wage and fringe benefit patterns, and educational levels. Alvarez demonstrates that this heterogeneity largely explains the considerable sectoral variation in the impact of the post-1982 economic crisis. Workers in relatively privileged positions have faced the most severe pressures, and employers have increasingly hired lower-paid personnel (especially women) to fill new employment openings. Alvarez argues convincingly that such pervasive problems as unemployment and declining real wages—although greatly aggravated by the crisis—are evidence of long-term tendencies toward economic stagnation dating from the 1970s. Heightened efforts by workers to combat these problems, particularly their search for improved economic conditions and greater union autonomy (which often involves challenges to entrenched labor leaders), date from that period (pp. 50-53, 55, 58-59).

Alvarez also documents the de la Madrid administration's use of labor policy—particularly wage controls—to manage the post-1982 economic crisis. Departing from established practice, the government employed the percentage increase in the official minimum wage (revised when conditions warrant by a tripartite commission that includes business, labor, and government representatives) not as a reference point for contract negotiations conducted by individual unions and firms, but as an absolute limit on annual wage increases (pp. 121-23). The CTM, heavily dependent on government political and financial support, initially supported this policy of severe wage restraint (as it had under similar, if less dire, economic circumstances in 1954 and 1976-1977) as a necessary part of a general economic stabilization program that also promised (but failed) to control prices. The state's position as the single largest employer significantly increased the effectiveness of wage restraint as a means of controlling inflation. Combined with a sharp decrease in government social spending, the de la Madrid administration's wage policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resulted in an extremely rapid erosion of workers' living standards; real minimum wages fell 41.9 percent between 1982 and 1987, and the wage share of national income declined from 45.5 percent in 1982 to 32.3 percent in 1986.[18]

Unions have had relatively little success in combating this economic downturn.[19] The "official" labor movement led by the CTM is partly constrained by structural weaknesses, including the relatively small average size of company-level unions; the heterogenous, multisector composition of regional federations and national confederations; and the frequent absence of a coherent organizational framework linking labor leaders to rank-and-file union members. It is also hampered by its dependence on a wide range of government economic and political subsidies, such as financial and material assistance; political support in the government's regulation of union formation; and privileged access in the distribution of government-supplied social welfare benefits such as housing and medical care. Leftist-oriented labor groups initially won widespread popular support for a series of protest actions in 1983 and 1984, but they failed to form a viable opposition political force because of continued ideological differences and organizational rivalries. In addition, the economic crisis has affected most severely several of the industries in which dissident unions were particularly active in the 1970s (including metalworking, electrical products, and automobile manufacturing), thus reducing the organizational base for opposition labor activities.

Moreover, as Alvarez notes, government-induced internal divisions and selective repression have limited the labor movement's overall bargaining effectiveness. By early 1983 the CTM leadership, facing growing rank-and-file pressure, had assumed a more critical position regarding the government's austerity policy and was calling for emergency wage increases to compensate for the effects of inflation. In response, the de la Madrid administration used its union registration authority to challenge the CTM's organizational strength by favoring rival labor confederations in their unionization efforts; in turn, these other confederations openly backed the government's austerity program. Previous administrations

[18] Alejandro Alvarez, "La crisis económica y el movimiento obrero en el México de los años ochenta" ["The economic crisis and the Mexican labor movement in the 1980s"], Tables 1, 5, in Kevin J. Middlebrook, ed., *Unions, Workers, and the State in Mexico* (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California—San Diego, forthcoming 1989); Antonio Gershenson, "Economía y elecciones" ["Economy and elections"], *La Jornada*, "Perfil Político" supplement, September 22, 1987, pp. 11-12.

[19] See Barry Carr, "The Mexican Economic Debacle and the Labor Movement: A New Era or More of the Same?" in Donald L. Wyman, ed., *Mexico's Economic Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities* (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California—San Diego, 1983), 91-116, for an early assessment of this issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had also manipulated the union registration process for political purposes, but in the context of a national economic crisis that in itself reduced labor's bargaining leverage, the resulting internal divisions prevented the organized labor movement from presenting a unified front in negotiations with the government. Similarly, the de la Madrid administration's selective use of repression against striking workers and dissident unions limited labor's capacity for mass mobilization to protest draconian economic policies. Renewed labor unity and a cessation of open labor-government conflict after mid-1983 encouraged the CTM to shift its emphasis from wage increases to employment protection and a consumer-oriented strategy advocating the creation of social-sector enterprises such as union stores and cooperatives to safeguard workers' purchasing power. This approach offered a less confrontational means of combating the effects of inflation, but such measures were limited in scope and the administration of union-owned enterprises reinforced the position of the entrenched labor leadership (pp. 122-25).

The turn toward more conciliatory labor-government relations culminated in the adoption of an "Economic Solidarity Pact" (Pacto de Solidaridad Económica) on December 15, 1987. The pact sought simultaneously to control inflation, protect workers' employment and earning power, and restore stable economic growth.[20] In the first stage of implementation, the government reduced deficit spending, increased revenues, and further cut import tariffs. Prices for government goods and services (including electricity and gasoline) and basic commodities were raised by as much as 80 percent in December 1987, and government subsidies in other areas were further reduced. Workers received compensatory wage increases (a 15 percent raise in contract wages in December 1987, and a 20 percent raise in minimum wages in January 1988) to restore earning power. These steps were taken to correct relative prices at the outset in order to increase the likelihood that the economic pact would significantly reduce inflation over a short period, and the rate of inflation indeed fell sharply in early 1988.

Both the CTM and the Labor Congress had long demanded vigorous government efforts to control inflation, and the Economic Solidarity Pact formally recognized organized labor's continuing importance in the Mexican regime. Nevertheless, the adoption of the pact represented a

[20] *El Mercado de Valores* 47 (December 21, 1987), "Pacto de Solidaridad Económica" supplement. For additional details concerning the plan's purposes and its early implementation, see *El Mercado de Valores* 48 (February 1, 1988), 3-7, and *New York Times*, March 1, 1988, p. 43. See also Laurence Whitehead, "The 'Economic Solidarity Pact' in Comparative Perspective" (paper presented at a conference on "Mexico's Alternative Political Futures," fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government concession to labor's interests during a politically sensitive period rather than a substantial recovery of organized labor's bargaining leverage. The CTM leadership was clearly unhappy with Salinas de Gortari's selection as the PRI's presidential candidate, and for some time after his nomination major labor unions openly questioned whether their members would support him in the July 1988 presidential elections.[21] Although the economic pact granted important wage concessions in exchange for continued labor discipline, it did not compensate for the post-1982 decline in real wages.[22] Indeed, the pact's original provision for wage indexation after March 1, 1988 (until inflation fell to 2 percent per month) was dropped in late February in exchange for temporary stabilization of the exchange rate and government-controlled prices, and real wages continued to fall. Nor did the pact require significant changes in either private-sector behavior or the government's commitment to structural transformation and the progressive implementation of the de la Madrid development strategy.

Alvarez concludes that the de la Madrid administration's labor policy severely damaged the state-labor alliance that for a half century has helped sustain Mexico's political and economic order. He implies that the crisis-induced transformation of this relationship may greatly constrain the regime's capacity for flexible responses to mass demands and therefore necessitate an increased reliance on repression to control developments in the labor sector. However, other than noting the generally erosive effects of continued economic crisis, Alvarez offers few comments regarding future political or economic problems and their possible consequences for the organized labor movement and state-labor relations.

Developments in two areas may have a substantial impact on organized labor's future position in Mexico's governing coalition. First, the Confederation of Mexican Workers must soon face its first major change in national leadership. Fidel Velázquez (born in 1900) and his principal allies have dominated the CTM since soon after its founding, and their position as spokesmen for the organized labor movement has not been challenged since the late 1940s. Velázquez's power is not easily transferable because it is based primarily on a time-tested network of political

[21] *La Jornada*, October 5, 1987, p. 6; October 12, 1987, p. 1; October 16, 1987, p. 7; October 19, 1987, p. 4; and *Uno Más Uno*, October 21, 1987, p. 5.

[22] The pact's failure to improve labor's general economic welfare more effectively sparked a number of political protests, among them some actions coordinated by the FDN. These initiatives included the formation of a "National Resistance Front" by opposition political organizations and dissident labor unions; *Excélsior*, February 19, 1988, p. 1; March 29, 1988, pp. 1, 12; *El Cotidiano* 22 (March-April 1988), 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alliances and personal loyalties. Although Velázquez and his close allies have encouraged the emergence of a new generation of well-educated, professionally trained labor leaders, most of these younger leaders are unlikely to figure prominently in the impending transition because their support base is in the CTM national bureaucracy rather than in major unions with significant mass memberships.

If the CTM can conduct the transition (however disorderly) without extensive government interference, the most probable outcome is that the leader of a major industrial or public-sector union will win control of the CTM with considerable internal support. However, if the change in leadership occurs at a time of pronounced economic crisis, government officials will be unlikely to tolerate the economic and political disruption that might accompany an unmediated transition process. The result may be an open attempt by government authorities to structure the outcome, even to impose a politically acceptable leader who may not necessarily have a solid support base within the labor movement. Given the overall character of state-labor relations and the exigencies of Mexico's ongoing economic crisis, the latter alternative may well be the most likely of the two. Such a turn of events would considerably erode one of the Mexican organized labor movement's historical strengths—its relative autonomy from extensive government intervention in the conduct of its internal affairs. Without such relative autonomy the CTM leadership would lack internal legitimacy, and its ability to regulate members' economic and political demands would almost certainly decline. As a consequence, a major pillar of the regime's stability would be weakened.

Leadership transition in the CTM may coincide with a second major challenge—significant long-term change in organized labor's overall position in the Mexican regime. As previously noted, the de la Madrid administration vigorously pursued a policy of economic reform and industrial restructuring.[23] The supporters of this policy argue that Mexico's future prosperity depends on the elimination of rigidities associated with the post-1940 development model, and some proponents of economic restructuring advocate policies that would substantially redefine organized

[23] For analyses of Mexico's emerging development strategy, see *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 1983-1988* [National Development Plan, 1983-1988] (Mexico City: Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto, 1983), 117-49; Jorge Buzaglo, *Planning the Mexican Economy: Alternative Development Strategies* (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Miguel Angel Rivera Ríos, *Crisis y reorganización del capitalismo mexicano, 1960-1985* [The crisis and reorganization of Mexican capitalism, 1960-1985] (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1986); Alejandro Dávila Flores, *La crisis financiera en México* [The financial crisis in Mexico] (Mexico City: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1986); José Valenzuela Feijóo, *El capitalismo mexicano en los ochenta* [Mexican capitalism in the 1980s] (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1986). For de la Madrid's summary of steps taken to implement this strategy, see *El Mercado de Valores* 48 (January 1, 1988), 3-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

labor's economic and political position. These measures include the elimination of "union shop" provisions in labor legislation and increased state administration of labor affairs. The de la Madrid government's policy of limiting wage increases in order to make workers' low compensation levels a basis of comparative advantage in international markets was an important element in this strategy. Organized labor's capacity to resist the implementation of such measures would be further reduced if the national labor leadership is paralyzed by a lengthy and factious succession struggle.

Generational change in Mexico's political elite may also shape future developments in these areas. The individuals rising to high national office in the 1980s on the basis of their educational background and technical expertise are members of a generation far removed from the violent transformation that produced the Mexican regime. Even those leaders who held power in the 1960s began their political careers at a time when memories of the revolution, fears of instability, and an appreciation of the role played by major postrevolutionary political institutions were still fresh. However, as the regime's founding era recedes in time and those memories fade, new generations have begun to question the usefulness of organizations such as the CTM that have long served as major supports of the established order. The possible redefinition of state-labor relations under the influence of these new generations may be of central importance to the Mexican regime's capacity to respond flexibly to changing socioeconomic conditions and future political problems.

Implications for Future Change

The Mexican regime's ability to adapt successfully to sociopolitical change and intermittent political crises is widely recognized. From the mid-1930s through the late 1960s the power of the president and the "official" party, the pattern of state-labor relations, and the regime's general governing practices all faced serious challenges. In each case, the political elite employed a combination of selective repression, leadership cooptation, and policy compromise to end the crisis. Even more important, throughout this period the national political leadership demonstrated a capacity for organizational and procedural innovation that permitted the regime to respond flexibly to diverse pressures.

Mexico's governing coalition so far has been able to manage the problems resulting from economic crisis, but long-term economic stagnation poses special difficulties for the regime. No segment of society has escaped the consequences of the post-1982 financial collapse. Persistent eco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic crisis has increased sociopolitical discontent, yet the financial constraints imposed by austerity measures limit the efficacy of the regime's traditional responses. For example, the elite's ability to coopt political opponents through access to public employment, government contracts, and similar rewards has been sharply reduced. Because external factors such as international oil prices and economic conditions in industrialized countries continue to affect the course of the Mexican crisis, the impact of domestic recovery strategies is often limited.

Political problems that are difficult but manageable under normal circumstances may become intractable under highly adverse economic conditions. For example, although the growing prominence of *técnicos* reflects the long-term evolution of the national political elite, their presence in major decision-making positions and their distance from Mexico's revolutionary past assume special importance at a time when the organized labor movement faces generational leadership transition and the prospect of significant change in its position in the governing coalition. The inclination of some *técnicos* to question the utility of established state-labor linkages might normally be merely a source of tension. But at a time when economic crisis has greatly reduced labor's bargaining leverage, such views might increase the possibility of destabilizing change by encouraging policy makers to pursue economically efficient development policies that threaten the regime's most important source of mass political support.

The heightened prominence of such contradictory tendencies within the Mexican regime will test its future capacity for flexible adaptation to shifting conditions. Economic crisis has hardened the conviction of conservative actors that concentrated power, not institutional and policy innovation, is the most appropriate response to increased sociopolitical tensions. In 1985 and 1986, for example, pressures within the regime to defend the status quo forced the de la Madrid administration to limit the scope of its political reform policy and reverse electoral gains made earlier by opposition parties. At the same time, increased intra-elite conflict and more contentious state-labor relations may make the regime more prone to political immobilism, perhaps leading to increased repression to contain pressures for change. The preservation of a broad-based governing coalition and political openness while managing the economic crisis and conflicting development priorities remains the central dilemma in contemporary Mexican politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY



Where the experts find the facts.

Recognised and respected by specialists as the major journal in its field, Third World Quarterly provides comprehensive coverage of the fundamental issues affecting the Asia/Pacific region, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East.

- **Informative** analysis, comment and evaluation of social, political and economic issues.
- **In-depth** articles, reviews and coverage of recent events.
- **Invaluable** as a regular source of up-to-date academic knowledge.
- **International** in outlook and unbiased in judgement.

Trust the experts - Read Third World Quarterly.

Subscription Order Form Please allow 6-8 weeks for delivery.

Send your completed order to: **Circulation Manager, Third World Foundation, 13th Floor, New Zealand House, 80 Haymarket, London SW1Y 4TS, England. Tel: 01-930 8411**

Please enter my one-year subscription to Third World Quarterly:

Name _____

Address _____

_____

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: UK £20 USA and all other countries US$30.00

PAYMENT DETAILS:

☐ I enclose a cheque for £_____ / US$_____ made payable to 'Third World Foundation' ☐ Please charge my credit card

Name of card _____ Name of cardholder _____

Card account number Expiry date ☐☐☐☐☐☐

Signature _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How do states influence one another? Can economic sanctions force change in important policies? Did the Arab oil weapon of 1973-1974 change the foreign policies of the industrial democracies toward Israel?

POLITICAL POWER AND THE ARAB OIL WEAPON

The Experiences of Five Industrial Nations

ROY LICKLIDER

Licklider probes the behavior of the industrial democracies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute during the 1970s, focusing on five countries that varied widely in their dependence on Middle Eastern oil, their relations with the Arab states, and their potential influence on Israel. $38.50

"A great help in reducing the gap between Public Choice and economics on the one hand and sociology on the other."
—Public Choice

PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLIDARITY

MICHAEL HECHTER

New in paper—"An important work in contemporary theory and essential reading for all of those who are interested in developing a general theory of human social organization." *—Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* $10.95

At bookstores or call toll-free 800-822-6657. Visa & MasterCard only.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS • *BERKELEY 94720*

The Mershon Center of The Ohio State University announces a Postdoctoral Fellowship for research in international security studies.

Mershon Center is seeking applicants with experience and interest in one or more of the following fields:

- arms control and disarmament
- international conflict resolution
- military relations
- U.S. foreign and strategic policy

Preference will be given to applicants with a solid design for completing a book-length manuscript during the fellowship year.

The appointment will be for up to twelve months beginning July 1, 1989. The stipend will be at least $29,000 per annum. Persons holding a doctorate awarded since June 1984 are eligible to apply. (Ph.D.s from Ohio State are excluded.)

If interested, request an application package from:
Fellowship Coordinator
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
199 West Tenth Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201-2399

Applications due November 14, 1988

MERSHON CENTER

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton University Press

Citizens, Parties and the State

A Reappraisal

Alan Ware



A major analysis of the role of political parties in the development and promotion of democracy. Alan Ware offers a highly original discussion of the impact of parties on democratic life. He successfully combines a comparative study of parties with a comprehensive discussion of democratic theory.

"Citizens, Parties and the State is an important statement on a vital scholarly issue. Ware's purpose is to restore the scholarly tradition in which the study of parties was connected to analysis of theory of democracy. . . .One considerable merit of the work is its comparative breadth. In contrast to most works on parties, it is truly worldwide in its coverage."

—Gerald M. Pomper, Rutgers University

Cloth: $39.50 ISBN 0-691-07763-0

Violence and Law in the Modern Age

Antonio Cassese

Translated by

S.J.K. Greenleaves

This remarkable and thoughtful book examines some of the most shattering events in recent history, from the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to mass murder in Sabra and Shatila, from the hijacking of the "Achille Lauro" to torture and murder by officials of the state. In each case Cassese tries to understand why states—Nietzsche's "cold-hearted monsters"—acted as they did, and what this bodes for the future.

Cassese also raises questions of a more general legal and political kind: why do states use force with impunity? Is the first use of nuclear weapons prohibited by international law? Should one obey superior orders and perform a criminal act, as Abraham was prepared to do, or should one respect the moral laws of one's people, as Antigone did?

The picture of world events presented here is vivid, and Cassese's analysis is clear and provocative.

Cloth: $29.95 ISBN 0-691-07783-5

Available in the U.S., the Philippines, and Canada.

Change and Stability in Foreign Policy

The Problems and Possibilities of Détente

Kjell Goldmann

Kjell Goldmann identifies the factors that may have an impact on whether a specific foreign policy is likely to endure or change and develops them into a theory of foreign policy stability. He then uses this theory to explore the reasons why West German-Soviet détente during the 1970s proved to be more enduring than the improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, he outlines a hypothetical scenario for a fully successful process of détente stabilization and examines the extent to which this scenario is realistic.

Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07778-9

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mobilizing for Peace

The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe

Thomas R. Rochon

The crusade against nuclear weapons in Great Britain, West Germany, France, and the Netherlands in the early 1980s dwarfed all previous protest movements in Western Europe in the postwar period. Contrary to the frequent claim that such political movements are a symptom of governmental crisis in the advanced industrial democracies, Thomas Rochon develops the idea that they arise from a creative impulse and perform crucial functions of innovative criticism. Rochon concludes that the West European peace movement has ignited a public debate in which reduction or elimination of certain categories of nuclear weapons is taken seriously for the first time.

Cloth: $29.95 ISBN 0-691-05671-4

Resisting Protectionism

Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade

Helen V. Milner

Why didn't the protectionist spiral of the 1920s reappear in the 1970s in light of similar economic and political realities? In *Resisting Protectionism,* Helen Milner analyzes the growth of international economic interdependence and its effects on trade policy in the United States and France.

Milner argues that the limited protectionist response of the 1970s stems from the growth of firms' international economic ties, which reduces their interest in protection by increasing its cost. Thus firms with greater international connections will be less protectionist than more domestically oriented firms. The book develops this thesis by examining the international ties of export dependence, multinationality, and global intra-firm trade.

After studying selected U.S. industries, Milner also examines French firms to see if they respond to increased interdependence in the same way as American firms, despite their different historical, ideological, and political contexts.

Cloth: $29.50 ISBN 0-691-05670-6

Security and Economy in the Third World

Nicole Ball

Do military expenditures by third-world governments aid their economic development or retard it? Nicole Ball examines in detail how the potential negative consequences on development outweigh the potential positive effects.

Part I reviews theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues about security expenditure itself. The strategic, political, and bureaucratic determinants of security expenditures are then described. Part II focuses on the interaction of security expenditure and growth and development in four areas: the availability and effective use of resources, security assistance as a source of capital, human capital formation, and military-led industrialization.

Cloth: $39.50 ISBN 0-691-07782-7

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • 609-452-4900

ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Faculty, students, administrators, business and governmental leaders
are cordially invited to become members of the
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY,
a non-profit educational corporation chartered
by the Board of Regents of the State of New York.

JOIN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

The first national public policy research center with its primary focus on the American Presidency. With historical and analytical perspective, the Center examines both domestic and foreign policy, decision-making, relationships with the Congress and organization.

Membership includes: Invitations to Annual Leadership Conference, Annual Student Symposium, and Lincoln Center Lecture Series, Regional Conferences, and the following publications:

Presidential Studies Quarterly.
Distinguished board of editors including Harry A. Bailey, Jr., Kenneth E. Davison, Hedley W. Donovan, Henry Graff, Fred I. Greenstein, Stephen Hess, Dorothy B. James, Barbara Kellerman, Richard S. Kirkendall, Louis W. Koenig, Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvey C. Mansfield, Ruth P. Morgan, Richard E. Neustadt, and Aaron Wildavsky.

Center House Bulletin

Proceedings Volumes.

Name _____

Mailing Address _____

_____

_____ Zip _____

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form, the Center will mail you a membership card and begin a year's membership. Membership is tax deductible in whatever category you elect. Add $5 for foreign postage.

☐ Student $22 ☐ Faculty $27 ☐ Contributing $32
☐ Supporting $50 ☐ Friend $100

Please send with remittance to:
Membership Secretary

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY
208 East 75th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 0020 - 8345

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS
DOCUMENTATION POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE
27, rue Saint-Guillaume, 75341 PARIS CEDEX 07, France

Published since 1951 by the International Political Science Association **(all back volumes are available),** the *Abstracts* is the **major source of bibliographic information in political science.** It publishes abstracts of articles in specialized and non specialized periodicals, including major yearbooks. Articles in English are abstracted in English; those in other languages (about one fourth of the total) are abstracted in French, with all titles translated into English. In 1986 it published over 6000 abstracts from over 800 journals, in *six issues.* Each issue carries a detailed subject index and a list of the periodicals examined. The final issue of each volume provides a **cumulative subject index** and an **author index.**

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER

TWO YEARS AT HALF PRICE

WITH ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR FREE

FREE EXAMINATION COPY

For volumes 37 (1987) and 38 (1988), new institutional subscribers will be granted a 50 percent reduction, and pay only US $ 95 per volume, instead of approximately US $ 190 (the equivalent of French francs 1135). Payment may be made for volume 37 only, or for volumes 37 and 38. On request, new subscribers will receive all issues of volume 36 (1986) as an introductory gift. Do not hesitate to write for a *free examination copy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Security



Published quarterly by
The MIT Press for the
Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University.

Ashton B. Carter
Steven E. Miller
Co-Editors

A major journal in today's international arena, **International Security** provides timely and creative analyses of critical world issues. Join those who develop, analyze, and implement defense policy and activities in the U.S. and abroad: discover, through **IS**, new insights and directions in arms control, military strategy, nuclear weapons proliferation, alternative non-nuclear strategies, foreign defense policies, satellite warfare, the peace movement, and more.

Enrich your perception of world powers, their defense policies, and the effect they have on you! Subscribe today to **International Security**!

Yes! I need to know more about world policy. Begin my subscription to **International Security** right away!

Name _____
Address _____
Zip _____

Yearly Rates:
☐ Individuals $20.00
☐ Institutions $52.00
☐ Students & Retired $18.00
Outside USA and Canada add:
☐ $ 4.00 surface mail
☐ $18.00 airmail

AF86

Enclosed is $ _____
☐ Renewal
☐ Please charge my VISA or MasterCard Account
Number _____
Expiration Date _____
Signature _____

Mail to:
International Security
The MIT Press
28 Carleton St.
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
617-253-2889

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES

Call for papers and Subscriptions
Quarterly Journal with Occasional Double-sized Special Issues on Specific Problems

Articles from recent issues include:
Richard Falk, Nuclear Weapons and the Renewal of Democracy. . . J. D. Singer, The Missiles of October-1988: Resolve, Reprieve, & Reform. . . Håkan Wiberg, The Other Side of the Coin: Dialogue on Development. . . Andre Gunder Frank, Crisis and Transformation of Dependency in the World System. . . Winston E. Langley, Needed Institutions for the International Community. . . Samir Amin, On the Transition to Socialism. . . Erik Allardt, Shifting Sources of Discontent: The New Subjectivism. . . Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, The Strangulation of the Humanist by Anthropoligical Culture in Sweden. . . Amit Bhaduri, Class Relations and the Pattern of Accumulation in an Agrarian Economy. . . Rajni Kothari, Concept of Common Security and the Reality of Common Insecurity. . . L. Alschuler, Multinationals and Maldevelopment, Alternative Development Strategies in Argentina, the Ivory Coast and Korea. . . Ulrich Albrecht, The Military Use of Research and Development: A Global Perspective. . . Björn Hettne, Self Reliance and Destabilization in the Caribbean and Central America: The Case of Jamaica and Nicaragua. . . Ted Lewellen, The Lie File: The Political Maniputlation of Central American Data by the Reagan Administation. . .Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israeli Violations of Palestinian Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of United States Human Rights Policy Toward the Palestinians, Israel, and the Soviet Union. . . Hibbert R. Roberts, The Reagan Administration and the Middle East: Peace, Palestinians, and Israelis. . . Michel Beaud, The Crisis of Development in the Light of Economic Systems Analysis. . .

This is a journal of interdisciplinary social sciences specially devoted to the studies of genuine development related to basic human needs satisfaction such as socio-economic problems, conflict and peace, human rights, migration, environment, North-South relations and anthropological views.

Subscription Rates
Institutions Skr 400 + 25
Individuals Skr 200 + 25

Please send your orders to:
Managing Editor
Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives
Post box 7444,103 91 Stockholm Sweden

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Published quarterly
by the
Foreign Policy
Research Institute

Daniel Pipes
Editor
John H. Maurer
Executive Editor

ORBIS explores some of the most compelling issues of our times, including arms control, the making of U.S. foreign policy, Middle East conflicts, and new issues in Latin America. As a quarterly journal, ORBIS provides perspective on the mass of daily information. It also offers well-defined opinions by informed commentators.

Recent issues have featured Zbigniew Brzezinski's confidential White House diary; Edward J. Epstein on secrets from the CIA archive in Tehran; Guenter Lewy on subversion in the United States; and Kenneth Adelman on chemical weaponry.

ORBIS **A Journal of World Affairs**

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____ Country _____

Yearly rates:

☐ Individual Subscription/Membership	$25.00
☐ Institutional Subscription	$50.00
Outside USA, add	$ 5.00

☐ New ☐ Bill me later
☐ Renewal ☐ Payment enclosed

Mail to:
ORBIS
Circulation Manager
3508 Market Street
Suite 350
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 382-0685

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

國際關係研究

THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The Korean Institute of International Studies is a non-profit independent academic body, founded in 1965, aimed at promoting multinational and interdisciplinary research in the fields of peace and development. KIIS endeavors, through publications, meetings, seminars, conferences, joint research projects and exchange programs with institutes abroad, to encourage discussion and cooperation among researchers both within and outside of the country, and to effectively contribute to the study of peace and development.

The Korean Journal of International Studies

Publisher & Editor: Chong-Ki Choi

An English-language quarterly founded in 1970, the *Journal* includes articles by both Korean and overseas specialists, review articles and source materials.

● **Submission of Manuscripts:** The *Journal* welcomes the submission of manuscripts on all aspects of contemporary international affairs. Manuscripts typed in double space should be submitted to the Editorial Board.
● **Exchange Program:** The *Journal* welcomes regular exchange with academic periodicals on international relations and related fields.
● **Subscription:** Institutes and libraries U.S. $40.0 a year; individuals U.S.$35.0 a year. Foreign currency at the official rate will be accepted.
● **Back Issues:** Back issues are available at U.S. $9.0 a copy.

Contributors to the *Journal* include

C.F. Alger, W.J. Barnds, A.D. Barnett, Z. Brzezinski, J.W. Burton, J. Galtung, M. Haas, D. Hellmann, K.J. Holsti, G.K. Kindermann, L.W. Pye, E.O. Reischauer, R.A. Scalapino, D. Senghaas, J.D. Singer, G.C. Smith, N. White, A.S. Whiting, J.A. Yager, D.S. Zagoria.

The Korean Institute of International Studies
K.P.O. Box 426, Seoul, Korea

Cable Address: 1234 Seoul, Korea; Tel. 752-7727, 7728, **755-7726**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Journal of Political and Military Sociology

J P M S **Founded in 1973**

■ The JPMS is an independent, interdisciplinary, critical, and biannual publication which has withstood the test of time and has entered its second decade of publication. In 1977, the JPMS initiated a policy of guest editors to provide expertise and diversity in the selection process of manuscripts. In 1985, the JPMS became loosely affiliated with the political Sociology section of the American Sociological Association. In the words of Seymour M. Lipset, "The Journal of Political and Military Sociology is clearly the leading publication in political sociology."

■ The JPMS prefers short over long and quality over quantity articles not to exceed 20 to 25 double-spaced pages including footnotes and references. The author should submit four copies along with an abstract of 100-150 words for each manuscript. There is a $10.00 submission fee to help defray costs of processing manuscripts. Address all correspondence about the editing of the Journal and manuscripts submission to either:

☐ Betty A. Dobratz, Department of Sociology,
Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011

☐ George A. Kourvetaris, Department of Sociology
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115

■ Address all business correspondence to: JPMS C/O Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115

SUBSCRIPTIONS:

■ For institutions $25.00, individuals $15.00, and for students $9.00. Single copy: $13.00. Add $2.00 to cover postage outside the U.S., $8.00 for airmail to Europe and Latin America, $11.00 elsewhere.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton University Press

The Weary Titan

Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905

Aaron L. Friedberg

How do statesmen become aware of unfavorable shifts in relative power and how do they seek to respond to them? These are puzzles of considerable importance to theorists of international relations. As national decline becomes an increasingly prominent theme in American political debate, these questions have also taken on an immediate, pressing significance.

The Weary Titan is a penetrating study of a similar controversy in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Drawing on a wide variety of sources, Aaron Friedberg explains how England's rulers understood and responded to the initial evidence of erosion in their country's industrial, financial, naval, and military power.

"*The Weary Titan* combines exhaustive research, penetrating analysis, and lucid prose. It is a model in the use of historical cases to illuminate key issues of international politics. A scholarly study in theory and history, its conclusions also have direct relevance to the problems currently facing American statesmen."

—*Samuel Huntington, Harvard University*

Cloth: $29.95 ISBN 0-691-05532-7

Policy Making in China

Leaders, Structures and Processes

Kenneth Lieberthal and *Michel Oksenberg*

From interviews with over a hundred Chinese bureaucrats and foreign business people, and from new documentary evidence, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg present a richly detailed analysis of the Chinese energy industry that speaks to issues well beyond the energy field. Tracing the evolution of post-Mao policy toward three major energy projects (Shanxi coal, South China Sea petroleum, and the Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze), they outline a new theory of the organization of power in contemporary China.

"This is a landmark volume because of the mix of new case study material and the intellectual framework that the authors have developed. They move us a major distance in fleshing out the processes, the layering of authority, and the issues over which political warfare in China is fought. . . .The book is a model of how to use archival and interview sources."

—*David M. Lampton,*
National Committee on United States-China Relations

Cloth: $39.95 ISBN 0-691-05668-4

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • 609-452-4900

ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED